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ABSTRACT	
This thesis addresses the issue of why NGOs do or do not become involved in 
geoengineering (GE) as a policy area in the UK and China. GE refers to the employment of 
large-scale manipulation to exert an influence on the global environment in order to deal 
with climate change. Governance of GE is a key issue in the academic literature and public 
policy. In terms of governance related issues, public participation has been frequently 
discussed in the existing literature within environmental law and related fields. Among all 
the stakeholders involved in GE, the issue of NGOs’ participation stands out due to their 
limited involvement. The thesis is generally based on the literature on public participation 
in environmental law. Although public participation has long been an interest of study, the 
literature has paid little attention to the causes of participation. The thesis contributes to the 
existing literature by way of adding a consideration of why certain groups participate or 
not in particular areas of environmental law and policy. The main research question of the 
thesis is ‘why do NGOs participate in GE or not in the UK and China?’ In order to explore 
the causes of participation, qualitative interviews were employed: notably in-depth 
interviews were conducted among environmental NGOs in the UK and China. The thesis 
then employs the literature on social movements and public policy to generate variables for 
analysing the relevant data.  
 
Through analysing the data with variables generated from these literatures, two basic 
findings were identified: involvement and non-involvement of NGOs in the UK can be 
considered as intentional and the deliberate outcome of strategic choices; however in 
	 v	
China, only international NGOs make strategic decisions on non-involvement, while 
domestic Chinese NGOs were unintentionally not involved with GE.  
 
In conclusion, the contribution of the thesis is three-fold. It adds to the literature on social 
movements and public policy by concentrating on whether NGOs make strategic choices 
on becoming involved in GE or not and why. It also contributes to the future governance 
framework of GE by understanding what may lead NGOs, as a potentially critical part of 
this framework, to become involved. Aside from this, the thesis makes a contribution in an 
empirical way by mapping the picture of NGO involvement with GE in the UK and China.  
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Chapter	1	Introduction	
	
Global warming is a severe issue that has to be tackled for all human beings and other 
species. It refers to ‘the phenomenon of increasing average air temperatures near the 
surface of Earth over the past one to two centuries’.1  It is generally accepted that human 
influence on the climate system is clear while recent climate changes, in turn, have had 
significant impacts on human beings as well as the environment.2 Due to the close 
interaction between human activities and global warming, countermeasures must be taken 
to deal with it. As a result, mitigation and adaptation have been proposed as effective 
strategies for dealing with climate change. In addition, geoengineering (GE) has recently 
been proposed as a third option. 
 
This thesis sets out to establish the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in GE 
in order to explore the causes of NGO participation. This is significant in two respects: 
First, from an empirical perspective, NGOs have not, generally, been actively involved in 
the discussion and policymaking process around GE. It is worth exploring the reasons 
behind this compared with the important role that NGOs have played in other novel 
technology areas, such as GMOs, that possess a similar risk profile to GE. From a 
theoretical perspective, although public participation has long been a topic in 
environmental law and policy,3 little attention has been paid to the causes of participation. 																																																								1	 John	Maunder,	Dictionary	of	Global	Climate	Change,	vol	2	(London:	UCL	Press	1994).	2	 Myles	Allen	and	others,	Climate	Change	2014	Synthesis	Report	(IPCC	Fifth	Assessment	Synthesis	Report,	2014).	3	 Maria	Lee	and	Carolyn	Abbot,	‘The	Usual	Suspects?	Public	Participation	Under	the	Aarhus	Convention’	(2003)	66	Modern	Law	Review	80;	Maria	Lee	and	others,	‘Public	Participation	and	Climate	Change	Infrastructure’	(2013)	
	2	
The thesis adds to the literature by considering why NGOs become involved in certain 
areas of environmental law and policy or not.4 It adopts qualitative interviews as the 
principal research method in order to map the picture of NGO involvement with GE in the 
UK and China. 
 
This introductory chapter comprises three sections. The first part deals with the research 
background and motivation. A general background of mitigation, adaptation and GE 
including their interactions within the context of global warming will first be introduced as 
well as an analysis of the definition of GE. The motivation for this research will then be 
introduced to explain why I became interested in this area and decided to research on it. 
This section includes discussion of why GE creates governance problems, the gap in the 
literature, why the thesis focuses on NGOs, and why the research chose to investigate 
NGOs in the UK and China. The second section addresses the design of the research 
project, notably what has been done concerning this research and why, as well as setting 
out, in an initial manner, the findings and conclusions of the thesis. The third part provides 
an outline of the thesis, drawing a chapter-by-chapter summary. Therefore, the first section 
addresses the question of ‘Why’, and the second focuses on the question of ‘What’, while 
the last section deals with the question of ‘How’. 	
																																																																																																																																																																							25	Journal	of	Environmental	Law	33;	Sally	Eden,	‘Public	Participation	In	Environmental	Policy:	Considering	Scientific,	Counter-Scientific	And	Non-Scientific	Contributions’	(1996)	5	Public	Understand	Sci	183.	4	 It	is	necessary	to	acknowledge	that	there	has	been	some	research	done	in	recent	years	on	reasons	for	participation,	such	as	Heike	Klüver,	Lobbying	in	the	European	Union:	Interest	Groups,	Lobbying	Coalitions,	and	
Policy	Change	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	2013).	However,	there	is	not	that	much	on	it	and	it	is	not	well	known	outside	the	public	policy	field.	
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1.1 Research	Background	and	Motivation	
This section introduces the background of the topic area – GE – and the motivation for 
conducting the research. The background includes three interrelated climate change 
concepts of mitigation, adaptation and GE. In terms of the motivation for research, I will 
explain it from several aspects, including why GE creates governance problems and the 
gap identified in the literature. 
1.1.1 Research Background 
When it comes to introducing the background of GE, two important concepts need to be 
mentioned – mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation and adaptation are traditional ways of 
counteracting global warming or climate change. Due to the fact that they may not in the 
end be effective enough to meet the pace of rising temperature, GE has been proposed in 
some circles as a quicker way to address global warming. Therefore, before focusing on 
GE technology, mitigation and adaptation should first be introduced. 
 
Mitigation	and	Adaptation	
Mitigation and adaptation are two kinds of strategies to deal with global warming although 
there are major differences between them. Mitigation refers to ‘technological change and 
substitution that reduce resource inputs and emissions per unit of output’ 5  while 
adaptation is ‘a response to climate change that seeks to reduce the vulnerability of social 
and biological systems to climate change effects, which presents the challenge of 
mainstreaming climate change planning into more general development goals’ for both 																																																								5	 Ottmar	Edenhofer	and	others,	Meeting	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	Expert	Meeting	
on	Geoengineering	(2012).	
	4	
developed and developing countries.6 As can be extracted from these definitions, while 
mitigation focuses on the source of climate change – Greenhouse Gases especially carbon 
dioxide – adaptation addresses its consequences.  
 
The relationship between adaptation and mitigation can be summarised to the effect that, 
the ‘more mitigation that takes place, the less adaptation will be needed, and vice versa’.7 
Adaptation does not necessarily fall within the domain of pollution control or even 
environmental law.8 In addition, adaptation refers to adjustments to the impacts of climate 
change with policy-driven measures and is proposed as a standard element in programs of 
development agencies in both developed and developing countries.9 Adaptation policies in 
development can be identified in a wide range of agendas, such as development agencies 
and sectoral ministries.10 
 
Geoengineering 
The definition of GE has been discussed among academics for some time. The generally 
accepted definition is proposed by the 2009 Royal Society Report. According to this report, 
GE is ‘the deliberate large scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract 
anthropogenic climate change’.11 In much of the existing literature, there are other terms 
used to describe GE, such as climate engineering or climate geoengineering. However, it 
can be confusing in that these terms are not always clearly defined in the existing 																																																								6	 Ibid.	7	 Freya	Schipper	and	Emma	Lisa,	‘Conceptual	History	of	Adaptation	in	the	UNFCCC	Process’	(2006)	15	Review	of	European	Community	and	International	Environmental	law	82.	8	 Thomas	Gremillion,	‘Setting	The	Foundation:	Climate	Change	Adaptation	At	The	Local	Level’	(2011)	41	Envtl	L	1221.	This	is	because	climate	change	will	have	influences	on	various	aspects	of	people’s	daily	life,	in	this	regard,	adaptation	is	required	in	a	wide	range	of	areas.	9	 Ibid.	10	 Schipper	and	Lisa	(n	7).	11	 John	Shepherd	and	others,	Geoengineering	the	Climate:	Science,	Governance	and	Uncertainty	(The	Royal	Society,	Science	Policy,	London,	2009).	
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literature.  
 
In order to address this issue of terminology, it is worth looking back to the period before 
geoengineering had been proposed as a means of combating climate change. 
Geoengineering techniques were employed in mining, energy, infrastructure and 
environment at that time; moreover, the discipline of geoengineering in universities has 
been considered as identical to geological engineering.12 In other words, geoengineering is 
a conception from the engineering or geosciences area. However, as far as climate 
engineering is concerned, it involves the deliberate and large-scale intervention in the 
Earth’s climatic system with the aim of reducing global warming. Thus, climate 
engineering can be seen as seeking to achieve the goal of solving the global warming 
problem by using geoengineering methods or approaches.  
 
Although there is a slight difference between climate engineering and geoengineering, in 
climate science, these two terms refer to the same thing. This is because, in climate science, 
when talking about geoengineering, it obviously means the content of geoengineering 
related to the climate science area, 13  which stands for the same thing as climate 
engineering. Similarly, the term, “climate geoengineering”, can be seen as synonymous 
with climate engineering.14  
 																																																								12	 For	example,	University	of	Nevada,	‘Degree	Programs:	Geo-Engineering’	 	 	<https://www.unr.edu/geology/degree-programs/geo-engineering>	University	of	Minnesota,	‘Geoengineering’	 	 	<https://cse.umn.edu/r/geoengineering/>	.	13	 Shepherd	and	others	(n	11);	John	Pyle	and	others,	Solar	Radiation	Management:	The	Governance	Of	Research	(Solar	Radiation	Management	Governance	Initiative,	UK,	2011).	14	 Rose	Cairns,	‘Climate	Geoengineering:	Issues	of	Path-Dependence	and	Socio-Technical	Lock-In’	(2014)	5	Wiley	Interdisciplinary	Reviews-Climate	Change	649.	
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In the existing literature on climate change, geoengineering is also considered to be exactly 
the same as climate engineering, including in some official reports by research institutes, 
such as the 2009 Royal Society Report.15 Climate geoengineering seems to be the 
combination of those two terms. This short discussion on terminology does not seek to 
provide an opinion on which term should be employed; rather, it aims to introduce the fact 
that these terms, although with some different arguments on terminology in the literature, 
refer to the same thing in the context of climate change. Therefore, either of them can be 
regarded as the appropriate term for my research. In order to be consistent however, 
geoengineering (GE) will be the term used in this thesis. The relationship between GE, 
mitigation and adaptation can be summarised as follows: mitigation is the optimal 
countermeasure to global warming; adaptation deals with the consequences that mitigation 
cannot cope with; and GE is the final choice, which may yet be needed in an emergency 
where the other two have failed. 
1.1.2 Research Motivation 
As I worked on climate change for two years when doing my Master’s degree, my research 
interest has always been in this area. Due to my focus on rising global temperatures, I first 
came to know about the idea of GE from websites. After exploring the dimensions of this 
technology by referring to the scientific literature and reports released by research 
institutes, I started to agree with most scholars who have worked on this area in that GE 
creates governance problems because of its risky and uncertain nature, as well as the idea 
that it does not address the root cause of global warming. This indicated to me that the 																																																								15	 Shepherd	and	others	(n	11).	
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technology of GE would need to come under the regulation of environmental law and 
policy. This was the initial motivation for research on it. From this consideration, I then 
examined the relevant literature from various perspectives, such as legal concerns, political 
and ethical considerations, and scientific issues, in order to set up a research angle for the 
thesis. Finally, a gap on the role of NGOs was identified in the literature based on an 
institutional framework including all stakeholders involved in GE. When exploring the 
literature both in the UK and China, I found that although China was considered by 
Western countries as the most probable country to conduct GE unilaterally, little literature 
on GE could be found in China. Therefore, I decided to include these two countries to 
discuss the involvement or non-involvement of NGOs with GE. In general, this paragraph 
shows a narrative of my research motivation, which aims to explain how I became 
interested in investigating NGO participation in GE in the UK and China. A detailed 
explanation of motivation based on the relevant literature will be introduced in the 
following section. 
 
1.1.2.1	Why	does	GE	create	governance	problems?	
There is no international agreement covering the full scale of GE. More research aiming to 
reduce the uncertainties of GE is considered to be necessary in the literature before we can 
achieve an international agreement on GE.16 The scientific research activities on GE can 
be summarised as two-fold: indoor activities and outdoor activities.17 Indoor activities 
include non-hazardous studies and laboratory studies. Outdoor activities consist of small 
field trials and medium and large-scale field trials. In practise, the majority of research that 																																																								16	 Jesse	Reynolds	and	Floor	Fleurke,	‘Climate	Engineering	Research:	A	Precautionary	Response	to	Climate	Change?’	[2013]	CCLR	101.	17	 Pyle	and	others	(n	13).	
	8	
has been done is indoor activities, especially computer modelling on GE, both in the UK 
and China. In relation to outdoor activities, a famous and controversial project in the UK – 
the SPICE (Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering) Project – was carried 
out in 2010.18 However, the field test was finally cancelled due to controversy concerning 
the research, and an agreement among all project partners was achieved that more public 
engagement was required. Therefore, the project continued to focus on lab-based 
experiments. 
 
The reasons why GE creates governance problems can be summarised in three aspects. 
First, according to the categories described above, medium and large-scale field trials can 
have regional or global irreversible effects, which can widely influence the environment as 
well as human beings. In addition, according to the scientific research that has been done 
so far, there are still many uncertainties. Due to the unknowns and uncertainties of GE, 
governance is important and required when conducting research activities, such as field 
trials, not to mention large-scale deployment. Without proper governance, human society 
as well as the environment may suffer a considerable loss. Second, GE techniques, 
especially solar radiation management, would be relatively cheap compared with 
mitigation activities, and could conceivably be capable of reducing global temperatures in 
a short period of time.19 This will potentially cause unilateral action to be taken by some 
nations or companies, which could lead to conflicts and disputes among relevant nations. 
Third, as the impacts of GE activities could be transnational or even global, how to deal 
with the potential transnational disputes is likely to be of significance. 																																																								18	 SPICE,	‘The	SPICE	Project’	 	 	 <http://www.spice.ac.uk/>	.	19	 Shepherd	and	others	(n	11).	
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1.1.2.2	Gaps	in	the	literature	
Another motivation for my research stemmed from a perception of gaps in the relevant 
literature. As a detailed review on the literature will be included in chapter 2, this section 
only includes a brief introduction on the gaps in the literature. In the literature on GE, two 
main issues have been discussed: legally related issues, and political and ethical issues. 
The core legal issues identified in the literature are related to various governance 
approaches on GE, including binding and non-binding governance approaches, and an 
institutional framework of stakeholders involved in GE. 20  However, among the 
stakeholders, most NGOs are currently not actively involved in GE. In terms of the 
literature, little attention has been paid to NGO participation in GE. This gap provides an 
explanation of why the thesis focuses on the role of NGOs, which will be discussed in 
detail in the following section. Given the gap on the role of NGOs, I then explored the 
literature on NGOs and public participation in environmental law and policy and identified 
that, although many issues have been discussed around public participation,21  little 
attention has been paid to causes of participation. Therefore, the focus of the thesis is to 
investigate why NGOs become involved or not in GE as a policy area. 
	
1.1.2.3	Why	an	NGO	focus?	
As mentioned above, the thesis specifically places emphasis on the role of NGOs to 
explore why NGOs become involved or not in the particular area of GE. In order to explain 																																																								20	 David	G.	Victor,	‘On	The	Regulation	Of	Geoengineering’	(2008)	24	Oxford	Review	of	Economic	Policy	322;	Catherine	Redgwell,	‘Geoengineering	the	Climate:	Technological	Solutions	to	Mitigation	-	Failure	or	Continuing	Carbon	Addiction?’	(2011)	2	CCLR	178;	Tuomas	Kuokkanen	and	Yulia	Yanmineva,	‘Regulating	Geoengineering	in	International	Environmental	Law’	[2013]	CCLR	161.	21	 Maria	Lee	and	Carolyn	Abbot,	‘The	Usual	Suspects?	Public	Participation	under	the	Aarhus	Convention’	(2003)	66	The	Modern	Law	Review	80	(n	3);	Giuseppe	Pellegrini,	‘Biotechnologies	and	Communication:	Participation	for	Democratic	Processes’	in	Alfons	Bora	and	Heiko	Hausendorf	(eds),	Democratic	Transgressions	of	Law:	Governing	
technology	through	public	participation	(Boston:	Brill	2010);	Elizabeth	Fisher,	Bettina	Lange	and	Eloise	Scotford,	
Environmental	Law:	Text,	Cases,	And	Materials	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	2013).	
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why the thesis focuses on the role of NGOs and where the gap is, this section will establish 
an institutional framework of potential actors involved in GE. There are various kinds of 
actors related to GE: international treaty-based institutions, inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs), NGOs, the academic community and the media.  
 
In terms of treaty-based institutions, in general, they serve as the governing bodies in a 
top-down governance regime based on treaty systems. In particular, the relevant 
Conference of the Parties (COP) typically plays a core role in implementing and 
supervising the development of treaties. There are several treaties relevant to GE activities, 
such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 22  and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)23. The latter explicitly addresses ocean 
fertilization and can be potentially applied to general GE as well.24 The COP of the former 
has been discussed in the existing literature in order to test out its applicability for research 
governance of GE. 25 Other relevant treaties are applicable to some aspects of GE 
techniques.26 In relation to inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), the main focus and 
contribution to GE governance by a number of IGOs can be summarised as in Table 1.1 in 
the appendix of this chapter. With regard to NGOs, they can, for present purposes, be 																																																								22	 Convention	on	Biological	Diversity,	June	5,	1992,	Rio	de	Janeiro,	1760	UNTS.	79,	31	ILM	818	(1992),	entered	
into	force	on	Dec.29,	1993.	The	main	objectives	of	the	CBD	are	conserving	biological	diversity	and	making	use	of	the	components	of	biological	diversity	in	a	sustainable	manner.	It	addresses	not	only	ocean	fertilization	explicitly	but	also	general	geoengineering	although	it	is	not	binding.	 	23	 United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea,	Dec	10	1982,	Jamaica,	1833	UNTS	3/[1994]	ATS	31	/	21	ILM	1261	(1982),	entered	into	force	on	Nov	16	1994.	24	 Ocean	fertilization	is	a	form	of	GE	technology,	which	aims	to	increase	the	rate	of	absorbing	carbon	dioxide	by	manipulating	the	ocean	carbon	cycle	through	adding	nutrients	into	oceans.	See	Shepherd	and	others	(n	11).	There	can	be	implications	of	governance	regimes	on	ocean	fertilisation	for	other	GE	activities.	25	 Chiara	Armeni	and	Catherine	Redgwell,	‘International	Legal	and	Regulatory	Issues	of	Climate	Geoengineering	Governance:	Rethinking	the	Approach’	(2015)	 	<http://www.geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper21armeniredgwelltheinternationalcontextrevise-.pdf>	accessed	09	March	2015.	26	 I.e.	the	London	Convention	and	London	Protocol	on	the	Prevention	of	Marine	Pollution	by	Dumping	of	Wastes	and	Other	Matter,	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	and	the	Kyoto	Protocol	(UNFCCC	and	KP),	the	Vienna	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	the	Ozone	Layer	and	the	Montreal	Protocol,	ENMOD	Convention,	Space	law,	the	Antarctic	Treaty	system,	the	OSPAR	Convention	and	the	LRTAP	Convention.	
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classified into three types according to the extent that they are involved with GE as a 
policy area. The first type consists of NGOs which maintain a general interest in climate 
issues, such as the Red Cross and Oxfam. The second encompasses environmental 
campaign groups working within the environmental protection area but not specifically on 
GE, such as Greenpeace and Friends of Earth. The last type is made up of campaign 
groups who work specifically on GE, such as the ETC Group. The relationship of the three 
types of NGOs can be found in Figure 1.1 in the appendix. It is evident that the missions of 
the NGOs range from those very specifically focused on GE to those more generally 
interested in climate. The categories of NGOs based on their objectives can be found in 
Table 1.2 in the appendix of this chapter. However, as we shall see, few NGOs have been 
involved in GE discussion or policymaking activities, and it is worth exploring the reasons 
behind their limited participation given the active involvement of NGOs in campaigning 
against other controversial technologies, such as GMOs. 
 
When it comes to national authorities, they play a significant role in the governance of GE. 
There are a few examples where GE has been addressed at Parliamentary level, such as the 
UK, the US and Germany.27 Taking the UK as an example, GE ‘has been addressed twice 
by the HC Science and Technology Committee, which urged the Government to provide a 
clear view on GE approaches, and led the debate on ethical issues of GE’.28 With regard to 
the scientific community, this is made up of a network of scientists, within which various 																																																								27	 Chiara	Armeni	and	Catherine	Redgwell,	‘Geoengineering	Under	National	Law:	A	Case	Study	of	the	United	Kingdom’	(2015)	 	<http://geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper23armeniredgwelltheuk.pdf>	accessed	09	March	2015.	28	 Catherine	Redgwell	and	Chiara	Armeni,	‘Geoengineering	Under	National	Law:	A	Case	Study	of	Germany’	(2015)	 	<http://www.geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper24armeniredgwellgermany-1.pdf>	accessed	09	March	2015.	
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kinds of sub-communities focus on specific scientific topics. Scientific experts can play a 
very significant role in promoting a bottom-up governance approach to GE.29 There are 
two types of actors making up the scientific community, which are displayed in Table 1.4 
in the appendix: the first type includes individual research groups in universities, 
short-lived national projects and international short-lived projects. The second type 
includes national scholarly organizations, such as the Royal Society, and 
intergovernmental scholarly organizations, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). The scientific community plays an important role in GE activities, 
especially research activities. For example, in the UK, research councils facilitate the 
development of research governance on GE.30 In addition, universities, laboratory and 
research institutes in the UK make an effort to provide academic research findings and 
advice to government to improve the decision-making on GE. The stakeholders involved in 
GE are displayed in Table 1.3 in the appendix. A gap can then be identified in the 
participation of NGOs in the UK and China. Therefore, it is useful to investigate how 
NGOs are currently involved, and explore the causes of this situation. 
 
However, little attention has been paid to NGO participation in GE in the existing literature; 
more discussion among scholars is therefore required. According to Liu, the trend of public 
debate concerning GE depends mainly on the perceptions of NGOs, which can be 
considered as the bridge among the general public, the scientific community and policy 
makers.31 In addition, Somerville holds the similar view that NGOs have the ability and 																																																								29	 Ibid.	Text	to	Table	1.4	in	the	appendix	of	chapter	1.	30	 For	example,	a	report	on	governing	SRM	research	was	made	by	SRMGI;	Pyle	and	others	(n	13).	31	 Mirko	Hohmann	and	Joel	Sandhu,	‘Geoengineering	Governance	-	Global	Governance	Futures	2025	Interviews	Rongkun	Liu’	(2015)	 	
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opportunity to shape the conversation on GE and inform the general public about it just as, 
in the past, NGOs have shaped conversations on other risk technologies such as GMOs and 
nuclear weapons.32 NGOs play a significant role in affecting the public debate in general 
and provide useful suggestions and guidelines to policymaking, such as in the governance 
of GMOs.33 However, according to Liu, few NGOs in the UK notice the importance of GE 
or provide perceptions on it.34 Although there are some NGOs publishing reports on GE 
(e.g. the UK-based Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative35) or that are 
strongly opposed to GE activity (e.g. Greenpeace UK), most NGOs in the UK prefer to 
keep silent about it. Some NGOs broadly related to environmental justice are reluctant to 
talk about GE mainly because they fear that it will ‘validate the mad science and distract 
the civil society, governments and business communities from focusing on’ less risky 
measures, such as mitigation and adaptation.36 In addition, even just talking about GE can 
be considered to risk legitimizing the technology to some extent.37 Although NGOs have 
started to be considered by some academics as significant in forming part of the 
governance framework in GE,38 more discussion emphasising the role of NGOs is needed 
in the literature. 	
																																																																																																																																																																								<http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/01/2015/geoengineering-governance-%E2%80%93-global-governance-futures-2025-interviews-rongkun-liu>	accessed	9	January	2015.	32	 Rachael	Somerville,	‘Measuring	NGO	Response	To	NAS	Climate	Intervention	Reports’	(2015)	 	<http://ceassessment.org/measuring-ngo-response-to-nas-climate-intervention-reports-rachael-somerville/>	accessed	26	February	2015.	33	 Ibid.	34	 Hohmann	and	Sandhu	(n	31).	35	 Pyle	and	others	(n	13).	36	 Tina	Johnson,	‘Geoengineering	Is	Not	Environmental	Justice...So	Why	Are	Environmental	Activists	Not	Talking	About	It?’	(2014)	 	<http://powershift.org/blogs/geoengineering-not-environmental-justiceso-why-are-environmental-activists-not-talking-about-i>	accessed	15	February	2014.	37	 .Duncan	Green,	‘Why	NGOs	label	technology	as	nasty	or	nice’	(2013)	 	<https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/why-ngos-label-technology-as-nasty-or-nice/>	accessed	19	August	2013.	 	38	 Somerville	(n	32).	
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1.1.2.4	Why	China	and	the	UK?	
In the thesis, China and the UK will be considered as two typical cases for discussing NGO 
participation in GE. The reasons for including the two countries for comparison will be 
addressed across three aspects: contrasting social conditions in the UK and China, 
methodology considerations, and justifying comparison with reference to the relevant 
literature on comparative politics. 
 
The first reason to include the UK and China for comparison is related to their different 
social conditions, such as legal culture, the situation of public participation, and their 
interests in climate interventions. In terms of different legal culture, as is well known, 
China and UK belong to two different judicial systems: civil law and common law. The 
Chinese judicial system is based on civil law with its own characteristics, while the UK is 
based on common law. Based on two different judicial systems, the legal culture of them is 
different, which may lead to divergence in GE governance. There are also significant 
differences in China and the UK in terms of public participation in environmental matters 
and other issues of public concern. As the political organization in China is ‘socialist with 
Chinese characteristics’, public participation in governance is developing in its own way.39 
Normally, in China, it is the scientists in the relevant area who set the ethical guidelines for 
research activities through scientific research institutes. Scientists are reluctant to call for 
public debate on emerging technology research as they have little faith in the knowledge of 
the general public. Chinese scientists have also questioned the expertise of ethical 
																																																								39	 Margaret	Sleeboom-Faulkner	and	Seyoung	Hwang,	‘Governance	Of	Stem	Cell	Research:	Public	Participation	And	Decision-Making	In	China,	Japan,	South	Korea	And	Taiwan’	(2012)	42	Social	Studies	of	Science	684.	
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institutions40 and have little faith in the dialogue between scientists, regulators, ethicists 
and the public.41 To sum up, in China, research governance is mainly led by scientists and 
government with little public participation. In the UK in contrast, various stakeholders 
such as governments, scientists, policy makers and the general public, are involved in 
research governance. For example, the general public has typically been involved in health 
research in the UK for a number of years through ‘identifying and prioritizing research 
topics, being part of research advisory groups and steering groups, undertaking research 
projects and communicating research findings’.42 This type of approach could provide a 
model for public involvement in GE research governance. It can be concluded that the 
extent of public participation in research governance structures in the UK is much higher 
than that in China.43 
 
Despite the contrasts mentioned above, both China and the UK have showed a great 
interest in climate intervention technologies. There are plenty of climate interventions 
conducted in China, such as land creation in some mountainside cities to change the 
climate on a relatively small scale, and cloud seeding to make artificial rainfall.44 It seems 
that GE is very appealing to China. This sounds reasonable to some extent based on the 
current situation facing China regarding climate change – namely, that China is already the 
largest absolute GHG emitter worldwide, followed by the US and the EU, and mitigation 
seems to be not effective or fast enough to cool down the global temperatures. The UK is 																																																								40	 A	typical	example	of	ethical	institutions	is	the	Committee	on	Ethical	Issues	in	Universities.	41	 Sleeboom-Faulkner	and	Hwang	(n	39).	42	 INVOLVE,	‘Patient	and	Public	Invovlement	in	Research	and	Research	Ethics	Committee	Review’	(Involve,	2009)	 	<www.invo.org.uk>	accessed	Jan	2009.	43	 Xijin	Jia,	‘The	Development	and	Institutional	Environment	of	Non-Governmental	Think	Tanks	in	China’	in	Yuwen	Li	(ed),	NGOs	in	China	and	Europe:	Comparisons	and	Contrasts	(Burlington:	Ashgate	2011).	44	 Yihui	Ding,	Guoyu	Ren	and	Guangyu	Shi,	China's	National	Assessment	Report	on	Climate	Change:	Climate	Change	
in	China	and	the	Future	Trend	(Advances	in	Climate	Change	Research,	3,	1-5,	2007).	
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also a large GHG emitter in the world and has experience in conducting climate 
interventions.45 In addition, the UK and China have cooperated on climate change in 
various ways such as working on slowing down the carbon growth.46 
 
The social conditions discussed above imply that the UK and China are two contrasting 
cases with many differences. From a methodological perspective, the thesis adopts a 
comparative design seeking to compare two contrasting cases to explore explanations for 
differences and identify similarities applicable in both cases.47 This will enable us to gain a 
deeper understanding of NGO participation within different national contexts. The thesis 
aims to distinguish the characteristics of the role of NGOs in the UK and China to act as a 
springboard for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings. The details of the reasons 
for adopting a comparative design will be introduced in chapter 3. In addition, this 
comparative design carries more weight when comparing a socialist country (China) with a 
capitalist country (the UK) in comparative politics. The comparison between the UK and 
China can be justified in the literature on comparative politics on two levels: in a broad 
sense, according to contentious politics theory, it is feasible to analyse social movements in 
capitalist and socialist countries in the same frame; 48  in a narrow sense, political 
opportunity theory in the social movements literature can and has been applied to both 
																																																								45	 For	example,	James	Hodgskiss,	‘Top	British	Climate	Scientist	Acknowledges	Ongoing	Geoengineering	Interventions’	(2015)	 	<http://www.globalresearch.ca/top-british-climate-scientist-acknowledges-ongoing-geoengineering-interventions/5485739>	accessed	17	October	2015.	46	 Department	for	International	Development	and	others,	2010	to	2015	Government	Policy:	Climate	Change	
International	Action	(2015).	47	 Alan	Bryman,	Social	Research	Methods	(5th	edn,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	2016).	48	 See	previous	studies,	for	example,	Yunping	Xie,	‘From	Social	Movements	to	Contentious	Politics:	A	Comparative	Critical	Literature	Review	Across	the	US	and	China’	(Master's	Thesis,	Department	of	Sociology,	Indiana	University	2013).	
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capitalist and socialist countries, and has been proved to workable.49 One thing worth 
mentioning is that NGOs are an essential component of social movements.50 Campaigns 
and other efforts by NGOs to oppose GE can be considered as a sign of the emergence of 
an anti-GE social movement. Based on the core argument that ‘it is political opportunity 
structure which is responsible for the emergence and effects of social movements in 
different societies’,51 my research aims to examine this and then add to it that not only 
political opportunity structure, but also other variables can help to explain the involvement 
of NGOs in social movements in different societies. The details of justification on 
comparison between the UK and China in comparative politics will be discussed in chapter 
8. 
 
In conclusion, this section has introduced why I became interested in exploring the causes 
of NGO participation in GE and why this question matters. It offers explanations on 
research motivation in several aspects including why GE creates governance problems, 
what are the gaps in the literature, why the thesis focuses on the role of NGOs, and why it 
emphasises a comparison between the UK and China. After answering the question of 
‘why’, the following section will provide a summary of the thesis to introduce what I did 
concerning the research and what the conclusions or findings are. 	
	
																																																								49	 Lei	Xie	and	Hein-Anton	Van	Der	Heijden,	‘Environmental	Movements	and	Political	Opportunities:	The	Case	of	China’	(2010)	9	Social	Movements	Studies	51.	50	 Darren	Halpin,	Perspectives	on	Democratic	Practice:	Groups,	Representation	and	Democracy	(Manchester:	Manchester	University	Press	2010).	51	 Xie	and	Van	Der	Heijden	(n	49).	
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1.2 	 Research	Project	
This section deals with the question of ‘what’ to provide an expanded summary of the 
thesis. The purpose of the thesis is to explore the causes of NGO participation with GE as a 
policy area in the UK and China, notably understanding why NGOs in the two countries 
become involved in GE or not. Therefore the main research question of the thesis is ‘why 
do NGOs become involved or not in GE as a policy area?’ In order to establish an answer 
to this, the question is then broken down into the following three sub-questions. To what 
extent have NGOs engaged with GE in the UK and China? Why do NGOs in the UK and 
China become involved or not in GE as a policy area? Can NGOs be considered to make 
strategic choices on their involvement or non-involvement in GE as a policy area?  
 
The main research method employed in this research is the qualitative interview. It aims to 
answer the research question why NGOs become involved or not in both countries. 
Through in-depth qualitative interview with NGOs in the UK and China, empirical data 
were collected on respondents’ opinions of GE, whether their organisations had engaged 
with GE, and why they participated or not in GE as a policy area. Empirical data with 
regard to whether NGOs have engaged with GE provides evidence for exploring answers 
to the first question in a descriptive aspect. Detailed and in-depth results in relation to the 
reason why they become involved or not, which is the key part of the research, provide 
sufficient evidence to solve the second question. After acquiring the data, independent 
variables were established from the literature on social movements and other, legally 
related fields, such as governance. The variables identified in the literature can be 
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summarised as political opportunity, strategy, emotion and resources.52 These variables 
were used to analyse the data in the UK and China respectively seeking to understand 
NGO participation with GE in the two countries. In addition, based on analysis of data, the 
question concerning whether NGOs can be considered to make strategic choices on their 
involvement or non-involvement with GE was then addressed.  
 
From the data, a conclusion was drawn that, in the context of China, only the international 
NGO makes strategic choices not to engage in GE while the non-involvement of Chinese 
domestic NGOs is more an unintentional consequence rather than a strategic one. In the 
UK, empirical results have been examined with variables to form a conclusion that 
involvement and non-involvement of NGOs can be considered as intentional and deliberate 
outcomes, and hence strategic choices. Finally, NGO participation with GE in the UK and 
China were compared by employing the literature on comparative politics. Based on the 
comparison, a finding was identified that not only political opportunity but also threat, 
efficiency and competition, goals, funding and time, at least in the context of GE, can be 
useful in understanding NGO participation in GE in both capitalist and socialist countries 
such as the UK and China. 
 
In terms of the original contribution of the thesis, it mainly contributes to the existing 
literature by way of adding a consideration of why certain groups participate or not in 
particular areas of environmental law and policy. The contribution of the thesis is three 																																																								52	 John	McCarthy	and	Mayer	Zald,	‘Resource	Mobilization	and	Social	Movements:	A	Partial	Theory’	(1977)	82	American	Journal	of	Sociology	1212;	Christopher	Rootes,	‘Political	Opportunity	Structures,	Promise,	Problems	and	Prospects’	(1998)	10	La	Lettre	de	la	Maison	Française	75;	James	Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	
the	Real	World	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press	2006);	Anne	Binderkrantz,	‘Different	Groups,	Different	Strategies:	How	Interest	Groups	Pursue	Their	Political	Ambitions’	(2008)	31	Scandinavian	political	studies	173.	
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fold. It adds to the literature on social movements and public policy by concentrating on 
whether NGOs make strategic choices on becoming involved in GE or not and why. It also 
contributes to the potential future governance framework of GE by understanding what 
may lead NGOs, as a potentially critical part of this framework, to become involved. Aside 
from this, the thesis makes a contribution in an empirical way by mapping the picture of 
NGO involvement with GE in the UK and China.  
 
1.3 	 Research	Structure	
This section includes a summary of chapters, notably an outline of the thesis, to provide a 
general picture of how the thesis is structured. In total, the thesis comprises nine chapters 
beyond this initial introductory chapter 1. 
 
Chapter 2 addresses the literature review of the thesis. It first focuses on a literature review 
on GE in order to provide a background as well as to identify a gap in NGO participation 
there. This then links to the literature on NGOs and public participation, which is 
considered as the main literature on which the thesis is based. After reviewing the literature 
on public participation from within law and political science, a gap has been identified that 
although many issues have been discussed around it, little attention has been paid to the 
question why groups participate or not. This gap, namely the causes of NGO participation, 
is the focus of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the methodology of the thesis. It includes the research strategy, 
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research design, and research methods that the thesis adopts. In terms of research strategy, 
the thesis employs a qualitative research strategy in general. This is because it aims to 
understand why NGOs in the UK and China become involved or not in GE, which 
emphasises understanding and explanation. The main research method employed in this 
research is the qualitative interview. Through in-depth qualitative interviews, empirical 
data concerning respondents’ opinions of GE, whether their organisations have engaged 
with GE, and why they participate or not in GE as a policy area were collected. The 
research adopts a comparative design that embodies the logic of comparison. It is a 
comparative design because, through the identical method of investigating the reasons for 
NGOs’ involvement or non-involvement with GE in the UK and China, it seeks to 
compare the two contrasting cases to explore explanations for differences and identify 
similarities applicable in both countries.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the empirical results of qualitative interviews conducted in the UK and 
China. Based on the interviews in China, it was identified that none of the environmental 
NGOs (ENGOs) has been involved with GE. The results from China were presented and 
classified into five categories: government supported NGOs; business supported NGOs; 
large grassroots NGOs; small grassroots NGOs; and international NGOs. In relation to the 
UK, the results show that some ENGOs have engaged with GE while others have not. 
Therefore, the UK results will be presented in two parts, namely involved and 
non-involved NGOs. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on generating variables for analysing the data from the literature on 
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social movements, interest groups and governance. As a result, four categories of variables 
were generated: political opportunity, strategy, emotion, and resources. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the empirical results in China with a theoretical basis of variables 
identified in chapter 5. It seeks to examine the variables with empirical data in China in 
order to develop a theory on NGOs’ involvement in GE. This chapter achieves a finding on 
which variables contribute to non-involvement of NGOs in China and draws a conclusion 
that the international NGO makes strategic choices to not to engage in GE while the 
non-involvement of Chinese NGOs is more an unintentional consequence than a strategic 
one. 
 
Chapter 7 aims to analyse the empirical results of UK interviews and discuss them with the 
variables generated in chapter 5. In this chapter, empirical results in the UK have been 
examined with variables to form a conclusion on which of them contribute to involvement 
and non-involvement of NGOs in the UK. In addition, involvement and non-involvement 
of NGOs in the UK can be considered as intentional and deliberate outcomes. This is 
different compared to the conclusion on Chinese NGOs in chapter 6 in that only INGOs in 
China make strategic decisions on non-involvement. 
 
Chapter 8 addresses a comparative analysis of the empirical data in the UK and China. It 
aims to explore and identify more profound findings contributing to the existing literature 
through comparison. Transnational comparison can contribute to social movements theory 
by generalizing theories to other societies. Social movements theory was established in the 
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US and then spread to Europe, which suggests that the main body of studies in this area 
have been limited to Western countries or developed countries. Transnational comparison 
including a developing country like China will help to develop the theory in terms of its 
application in developing socialist countries. 
 
Chapter 9, the concluding chapter, includes a summary of what has been discussed in the 
thesis, how the research question was answered, and what the key difficulties were during 
the research. In addition, it concludes on the remaining unsolved issues and what research 
could usefully be done in the future. 
 
Appendix	of	Chapter	1	
Table 1.1: Intergovernmental organisations contributed or potentially 
contributed to GE 
	
Intergovernmental	
Organisations	
Main	 Focus	 of	
work	
Contributions	 or	
potential	
contributions	 to	 GE	
governance	 	
Intergovernmental	Oceanographic	Commission	
Ocean	Fertilization	 Produced	 a	 report	 on	ocean	 fertilization:	 A	scientific	 summary	 for	policy	makers.53	United	 Nations	 Climate	change	 Presidential	 Statement	
																																																								53	 Doug	Wallace	and	others,	Ocean	Fertilisation:	A	Scientific	Summary	for	Policy	Makers	(IOC/UNESCO,	2010).	
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Security	Council	 that	 acknowledged	security	 implications	on	 climate	 change;	possible	roles	for	UNSC	in	 addressing	 climate	change.54	World	Meteorological	Organization	
Meteorology,	SRM	 Weather	 Modification	Statement	 and	Guidelines	International	Maritime	Organisation	
Safety	 and	security	 of	shipping	 and	the	 prevention	of	 marine	pollution	
Can	 adapt	 its	 mandate	to	 regulate	marine-based	GE.	
International	 Civil	Aviation	Organisation	
Developing	international	standards	 of	civil	 aviation	regulations	
Can	 be	 related	 to	aircraft-based	GE.	
World	 Trade	Organisation	 Trade	activities	in	the	world	 Dealing	 with	 disputes	arising	 from	 countries	seeking	 to	 impose	restrictions	on	trade	of	GE	goods.	World	 Intellectual	Property	Organisation	
Intellectual	property	protection	issues	
Deals	 with	 the	intellectual	 property	issues	 involved	 in	 GE	research	activities.	
 
																																																									54	 Dane	Warren,	‘Possible	Roles	for	the	U.N.	Security	Council	in	Addressing	Climate	Change’	(Sabin	Center	For	
Climate	Change	Law,	2015)	 	<https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/warren_-_cc_and_international_peace_and_security_-_roles_for_the_un_security_council.pdf>	accessed	July	2015.	
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Table	1.2:	Categories of UK NGOs (based on online search of their websites)	NGOs	with	no	online	published	 views	 on	GE	
Client	Earth;	EIA;	Global	Witness;	Practical	Action;	Sense	about	Science;	CRF;	Oxfam;	the	Red	Cross	
NGOs	mentioning	GE	among	other	issues	 Greenpeace	UK	Oppose	GE:	ETC	Group	Priority	on	mitigation,	moratorium	on	GE:	Friends	of	the	Earth	NGOs	 with	 official	views	 specifically	on	GE	
Focusing	 on	 governance	 issues	 and	 advocating	 research	into	GE:	SRMGI;55	 EDF;56	 TWAS;57	 CDKN58	
	
	
Table	 1.3:	An overview of the actors involved in the research governance of	
geoengineering	
	
Actors	
involved	in	GE	
Top-down	 or	
bottom-up	
governance	
approach?	
Potential	
involvement	 or	
discussion	 in	
research	
governance	 of	
GE	
	
Boundaries	 of	
role	
																																																								55	 Solar	Radiation	Management	Governance	Initiative.	56	 Environmental	Defence	Fund.	57	 The	World	Academy	of	Sciences.	58	 Climate	and	Development	Knowledge	Network.	
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Treaty-based	
institutions	
	 Top-down	 	Some	 existing	treaty-based	institutions	 have	been	 discussed	 to	be	 applied	 to	 GE	while	 there	 is	 no	dedicated	institution	on	GE.	
	Providing	potentially	applicable	binding	 or	non-binding	treaties	 regarding	general	or	specific	GE.59	
IGOs	
	 Top-down	 	Part	participation.	 	Several	 IGOs	have	published	 reports	on	GE	to	draw	the	attention	 of	academics	 and	the	 wider	 public	and/or	to	provide	comprehensive	information	 and	guidelines.	
National	
Authorities	
	 Top-down	 	Wide	participation	 in	some	 Western	countries	 such	 as	the	UK	and	the	US	and	 less	participation	 in	other	 less	developed	countries.	
	A	 few	 national	authorities	 have	discussed	GE	on	a	parliamentary	level	 to	 discuss	 a	national	institutional	framework	on	GE.	Many	 other	developing	countries	 or																																																									59	 Some	treaties	may	be	applicable	to	specific	GE	methods,	e.g.	the	CBD	and	the	UNCLOS	could	be	used	to	deal	with	ocean	fertilization.	Other	treaties	may	be	applied	to	general	issues	on	GE,	such	as	the	UNFCCC.	
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regions	 have	 put	GE	 on	 their	agenda.60	
NGOs	
	 Bottom-up	 	 Little	participation.	
	In	 the	 UK,	 only	 a	few	 NGOs	 have	made	 their	opinions	 known	or	 conducted	research	 on	 GE.	Most	of	them	have	not	 discussed	 GE.	In	China,	no	NGOs	have	 been	involved	in	GE.	
Educational	
and	 research	
establishments	 	
	 Bottom-up	 	Actively	involved	in	the	research	governance	of	GE.	
	In	 the	 UK,	 most	research	has	been	carried	 out	 in	universities	 or	funded	 by	research	 councils.	They	 provide	literature	 and	empirical	research	 results	on	GE	from	both	a	scientific	 and	social	 science	perspective.	
	 	 	 																																																									60	 Some	developing	countries	have	commenced	the	conduct	research	on	geoengineering	instead	of	translating	and	disseminating	research	findings	on	GE	from	developed	countries	such	as	the	US	and	the	UK.	For	example,	China	has	launched	a	national	research	project	specifically	on	GE	named	‘	The	Research	on	the	Theory	and	Impacts	of	Geoengineering	2015’.	
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Members	 of	
scientific	
community	
Bottom-up	 As	 part	 of	research	establishments,	the	 scientific	community	 in	 the	UK	is	also	actively	involved	 in	research	governance	of	GE,	especially	 climate	scientists.	
Members	 of	 the	scientific	community	 can	generate	bottom-up	governance	through	 norms,	codes	 of	 conduct	and	peer	review.	
General	 public	
and	 private	
actors	
	Bottom-up	 	Little	participation	 in	general.	
	Public	engagement	 has	already	 received	attention	from	the	academic	community.	 	
	
	
Figure	1.1:	Three	types	of	NGOs	involved	with	GE	policy	
		
Campaign	groups	specisically	on	geoengineering,	e.g.	ETC	group
Environmental		campaign	groups,	e.g.	Greenpeace,	Friends	of	Earth
NGOs	who	are	interested	in	climate	issues,	e.g.	Red	Cross,		Oxfam
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Table	1.4:	The	framework	of	the	scientific	community	in	the	UK61		
Short-lived	Research	
Projects	
Specific	goals	for	each	project	 Individual	research	groups	in	universities	National	short-lived	projects	(funded	projects),	such	as	SPICE	and	IAGP	International	short-lived	projects	(goal-oriented,	unfunded	projects	based	on	voluntary	contributions),	such	as	GeoMIP	
Long-term	Scholarly	
Organisations	
Generally	aiming	at	promotion	of	science	 National	organisations	with	broad	goals	(government	funded),	such	as	Royal	Society	International	organisations	with	broad	goals	based	on	voluntary	contributions	(government	funded),	such	as	IPCC	and	WCRP				
																																																								61	 SPICE	–	Stratospheric	Particle	Injection	for	Climate	Engineering;	IAGP	–	the	Integrated	Assessment	of	Geoengineering	Proposals;	WCRP	–	World	Climate	Research	Programme;	Geo-MIP	–	The	Geoengineering	Model	Inter-comparison	Project.	
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Chapter	2	Literature	Review	
	
This chapter first focuses on a literature review on GE in order to provide a background, as 
well as to identify a gap in NGO participation in the GE policy area. The chapter then links 
through to the literature on NGOs and public participation, which is considered as the main 
literature on which the thesis is based. After reviewing the literature on public participation, 
a gap has been identified in that, although many issues are discussed around it, little 
attention has been paid to the question of why people or groups participate or not in GE as 
a policy area. This gap, namely the causes of NGO participation, is the focus of this thesis. 
This literature review comprises of three sections: section 2.1 concentrates on broadly 
reviewing the literature on GE; section 2.2 addresses the literature on the role of NGOs in 
the UK and China; and section 2.3 focuses on reviewing the literature surrounding public 
participation. 	
2.1	A	Literature	Review	on	GE	
The literature on GE can be categorised into two parts: ethical and political issues 
surrounding GE, and legal issues. First, I will summarise and describe the ethical issues 
that have been widely discussed in much of the existing literature. Second, I will outline 
the key legal issues that are focussed on in the literature. These legal issues include, for 
example, risk compensation, governance approaches, the role of the precautionary 
principle, and the institutional framework of various stakeholders involved in GE.  
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2.1.1 The Ethics of GE 
Ethical concern surrounding GE is a consistent theme in the existing literature. Generally, 
there are two main aspects of ethical concerns addressed and discussed amongst scholars. 
The first main aspect of concern refers to the situation where governments may pay less 
attention to mitigation and adaptation efforts due to the development of GE. This implies 
that deployment of GE may reduce the pressure to mitigate and offer an excuse for 
governments not to meet their emission targets. For example, Reynolds states that 
governments may prefer to conduct GE rather than mitigate as GE techniques, such as 
SRM, are invariably considered much cheaper and effective than mitigation.62 Rafael 
similarly indicates that there is a chance that governments will make less effort to conduct 
mitigation by taking advantage of GE techniques.63 In fact, in an extreme situation, GE 
could not only reduce the pressure on governments concerning mitigation, but may even be 
employed as an alternative to mitigation entirely. The other main concern relates to a 
justificatory problem. According to Gardiner, this refers to what conditions GE can be 
justified in the future.64 In terms of justification, various questions concerning GE have 
been raised. For example, ‘is it ethical to pollute the atmosphere on purpose, even for a 
good reason?’65 And ‘in relation to scientific purposes, how large a GE-related emission 
would be acceptable and justifiable?’66 This concern deals with field experimentation and 
																																																								62	 Jesse	Reynolds,	‘A	Critical	Examination	of	the	Climate	Engineering	Moral	Hazard	and	Risk	Compensation	Concern’	(European	Consortium	for	Political	Research	General	Conference,	Glasgow,	September	5,	2014).	63	 Leal-Arcas	Rafael	and	Andrew	Filis-Yelaghotis,	‘Geoengineering	a	Future	for	Humankind:	Some	Technical	and	Ethical	Considerations’	[2012]	CCLR	128.	64	 Stephen	Gardiner,	‘Geoengineering	And	Moral	Schizophrenia:	What	Is	The	Question?’	in	William	Burns	and	Andrew	Strauss	(eds),	Climate	Change	Geoengineering	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press	2013).	65	 Alan	Robock,	‘Geoengineering	Research’	(2011)	27	Science	and	Technology	5.	66	 Ibid.	
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posits that only lab-based or computer-based research can be considered completely safe.67 
However, in contrast, some consider GE as a lesser evil than climate change. In this regard, 
Gardiner considers the question ‘whether evils ought sometimes to be chosen’.68  
 
These questions concerning justification typically touch on a concern that GE may have 
equally adverse impacts on the environment to climate change. Given this potential, can 
GE be justified due to its potentially lesser harmful impact or should it not be chosen at all 
because of potential harm? 
 
Apart from these two main aspects of concern mentioned above, there are other 
considerations which are discussed in the literature. For example, a concern regarding GE 
technology is that even just discussing and exploring GE technology may produce a risk of 
‘path dependence’, which means that, with influence exerted on decision-making by 
experts or commercial stakeholders, exploring GE may inevitably lead to deployment.69 
Some commentators have expressed the view that developing GE technology may lead to a 
situation of ‘socio-technical lock-in’ – in other words that we end up relying heavily on the 
technology which we can then not shut down.70 Others have drawn attention to the fact 
that developing GE technology may mask or cover up the climate crisis, as well as the 
social and political reasons behind it, and therefore lead to a worse outcome.71 Fears have 
also been expressed in relation to unilateralism. Once GE is deployed by one country, it 
																																																								67	 Rafael	and	Filis-Yelaghotis	(n	63).	68	 Stephen	Gardiner,	‘Is	"Arming	the	Future"	with	Geoengineering	Really	the	Lesser	Evil?’	in	Stephen	Gardiner	and	others	(eds),	Climate	Ethics	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press	2010).	69	 Rafael	and	Filis-Yelaghotis	(n	63).	70	 Cairns	(n	14).	71	 Rafael	and	Filis-Yelaghotis	(n	63).	
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may have transboundary impacts that could cause international political conflicts. 	
2.1.2 Legal issues around GE 
After briefly summarising the main ethical and political concerns around GE, this section 
addresses the relevant literature on legal issues. In terms of GE governance, there are two 
areas typically addressed in relevant literature: GE governance and human rights, and 
potential governance regimes and approaches on GE. The former has drawn attention 
recently within the scope of the relationship between human rights and climate change. 
The literature proposes different normative frameworks concerning climate change 
including, for example, a cost-benefit analysis approach such as the Stern Review,72 and a 
security perspective such as the statement on Climate Change and International Security,73. 
Both of these frameworks do not pay sufficient attention to human rights.74 Therefore, a 
strand of literature has focused on the relationship between climate change and human 
rights. The relevant literature has discussed several main issues, including justice claims 
about climate change in relation to human rights concerns,75 and how climate change 
jeopardizes certain human rights.76 These issues highlight the rights-based approach. The 
majority of the literature on human rights and climate change concerns this rights-based 
approach to mitigate,77 and ‘the potential and problems with’ this approach.78 Within the 																																																								72	 Nicholas	Stern,	The	Economics	of	Climate	Change:	the	Stern	Review	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2007).	73	 This	online	report	can	be	found	at	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf.	74	 Simon	Caney,	‘Climate	Change,	Human	Rights	and	Moral	Thresholds’	in	Stephen	Humphreys	and	Mary	Robinson	(eds),	Human	Rights	and	Climate	Change	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2009).	75	 Stephen	Humphreys,	‘Competing	Claims:	Human	Rights	And	Climate	Harms’	in	Stephen	Humphreys	and	Mary	Robinson	(eds),	Human	Rights	and	Climate	Change	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2009).	76	 Paul	Hunt	and	Rajat	Khosla,	‘Climate	Change	and	the	Right	to	the	Highest	Attainable	Standard	of	Health’	in	Stephen	Humphreys	and	Mary	Robinson	(eds),	Human	Rights	and	Climate	Change	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2009).	77	 Jon	Barnett,	‘Human	Rights	and	Vulnerability	to	Climate	Change’	in	Stephen	Humphreys	and	Mary	Robinson	
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scope of climate change and human rights, scholars have expanded the focus to the impacts 
of ‘response measures to climate change’ on human rights, namely geoengineering 
technology.79 Burns discussed GE and human rights in his paper. His analysis surrounded 
the topics of the ‘potential threats of GE to human rights’, and ‘how to operationalize 
human rights protection concerning GE under the Paris Agreement’.80 He also suggested a 
‘human rights-based approach’ and provided details of implementing this approach in the 
context of GE.81 Adelman had similar concerns about the impacts of deploying GE on 
human rights, including the right to food, the right to water, the right to health, and the 
right to life, and then argued that GE jeopardized ‘human rights already under threat from 
climate change’.82 
 
Another theme that runs throughout the literature relates to potential models or types of 
governance regimes or approaches towards GE. At an international level, these approaches 
comprise of binding approaches, such as international agreements or treaties, and 
non-binding approaches, such as international customary law regarding the precautionary 
principle. In terms of potential governance regimes, most scholars emphasise the 
importance of international cooperation in regulating GE activities. For example, Virgoe 
proposes three potential models for governance: through the United Nations, by a State 
unilaterally, and through a consortium of states. Virgoe concludes that collaboration 																																																																																																																																																																							(eds),	Human	Rights	and	Climate	Change	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2009).	78	 Dinah	Shelton,	‘Equitable	Utilization	Of	The	Atmosphere:	A	Rights-Based	Approach	To	Climate	Change’	in	Stephen	Humphreys	and	Mary	Robinson	(eds),	Human	Rights	and	Climate	Change	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2009).	79	 William	Burns,	The	Paris	Agreement	and	Climate	Geoengineering	Governance:	The	Need	for	A	Human	
Rights-Based	Component	(CIGI	Papers	No	111,	Centre	for	International	Governance	Innovation,	2016).	80	 Ibid.	81	 Ibid.	82	 Sam	Adelman,	‘Epistemologies	of	Mastery’	in	Anna	Grear	and	Louis	Kotzé	(eds),	Research	Handbook	on	Human	
Rights	and	the	Environment	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2015).	
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amongst states is considered to be the most appropriate approach.83 Similarly, Long has 
considered the various existing international institutional frameworks that could potentially 
apply to GE activities, such as UNFCCC, and found that none of the existing international 
institutions can make legitimate decisions on GE related activities.84 Therefore, according 
to Long, governments are only capable of dealing with GE interventions, such as setting 
goals and evaluating outcomes of GE, through international cooperation.85  
 
The theme of binding governance approaches in the literature considers whether one can 
and should apply existing international agreements and treaties to regulate GE or whether a 
new and dedicated international agreement is practical and necessary. When examining 
whether a brand new international agreement is needed, most scholars tend to agree that 
creating a new agreement is not necessary. The majority of the academic community 
agrees that existing treaties and institutions could potentially cover governance on GE at 
this stage, such as the CBD and the UNFCCC.86 For example, according to Kuokkanen 
and Yanmineva, creating a new and dedicated international agreements does not seem to 
be feasible because of difficulties in engendering agreement by states on the principles, 
contents and appropriate negotiating forum for a treaty.87 Redgwell has reached the similar 
conclusion that a single and dedicated treaty on all GE activities is unlikely and 
undesirable.88 It is unlikely because the motivation for law makers is low and it is 																																																								83	 John	Virgoe,	‘International	Governance	of	A	Possible	Geoengineering	Intervention	to	Combat	Climate	Change’	(2009)	95	Climatic	Change	103.	84	 Jane	C.	S.	Long,	‘A	Prognosis,	and	Perhaps	a	Plan,	for	Geoengineering	Governance’	CCLR	177.	85	 Ibid.	86	 Shepherd	and	others	(n	11);	Daniel	Bodansky,	‘The	Who,	What,	and	Wherefore	of	Geoengineering	Governance’	(2013)	121	Climate	Change	539;	Anders	Hansson,	Steve	Rayner	and	Victoria	Wibeck,	‘Climate	Engineering’	in	Karin	Bäckstrand	and	Eva	Lövbrand	(eds),	Research	Handbook	on	Climate	Governance	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2015).	87	 Kuokkanen	and	Yanmineva	(n	20).	88	 Redgwell	(n	20).	
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undesirable because one or more of the existing legal frameworks in international law will 
work, which makes it unnecessary. 89  Along the same lines, Parker suggests that 
governance methods can be conducted without a dedicated international agreement on 
GE.90 Victor also believes that establishing a new and dedicated regime focussed on GE 
will not have any meaningful outcomes although governance will be required.91 Since 
most scholars do not consider a dedicated international agreement as a feasible or desirable 
option, they typically prefer to apply existing governance regimes to regulate GE activities. 
For example, Kuokkanen and Yanmoneva suggest that the most suitable approach would 
be to insist on using existing governance regimes, such as the LC/LP, the CBD and 
UNFCCC,92 in a coordinated manner.93 Long believes that governments ‘should plan to 
use collaboration on natural disasters as a vehicle for developing the institutional capacity 
to manage the global climate’.94  
 
The non-binding governance approaches discussed in the literature include regulating GE 
activities through international norms and international customary law. Some scholars 
emphasise the need for international binding norms to cover GE field trials and 
deployment. For example, Victor believes that field trials and deployment of GE will 
require norms to be put in place very soon.95 The reason why he prefers norms over 
standard governance instruments, such as treaties, is that treaties are not capable of 
constraining GE actors effectively as it is likely that players will avoid international 																																																								89	 Ibid.	90	 Andy	Parker,	‘Governing	Solar	Geoengineering	Research	As	It	Leaves	The	Laboratory’	(2014)	372	Philosophical	Transactions	of	the	Royal	Society.	91	 Victor	(n	20).	92	 See	n	26.	93	 Kuokkanen	and	Yanmineva	(n	20).	94	 Long	(n	84).	95	 Victor	(n	20).	
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commitments and act unilaterally.96 Instead, norms, especially efforts to establish new 
binding norms from the bottom-up backed by research and assessment, will be more 
effective.97 There are also dedicated principles developed for GE. Redgwell proposes an 
option to apply existing guiding principles on GE, such as the Oxford Principle.98 
 
 
In the context of international environmental law, customary law addressing transnational 
environmental problems, especially transboundary pollution, can be generally applied to 
the governance of GE. Therefore, it is important to look into transboundary environmental 
problems. In addition, customary international law is expected to provide general and basic 
ideas for regulating GE. As Lin puts it, given the significant gaps within the existing 
treaties, customary law including general principles will likely play a critical role in GE 
governance. 99  Among these principles, the transboundary harm principle and 
precautionary principle have drawn a significant amount of attention. The existing 
literature on transboundary harm has focused on two main issues. The first relates to the 
issue’s elements. The majority of scholars agree that the transboundary harm principle has 
two elements: the harm can be attributed to a specific state and the activity must be proved 
to have caused the harm outside one’s national boundary. 100  The second issue is 
limitations or difficulties of its implications for GE activities. One main difficulty is to 																																																								96	 Ibid.	97	 Ibid.	98	 Redgwell	(n	20).	99	 Albert	Lin,	‘International	Legal	Regimes	and	Principles	Relevant	to	Geoengineering’	in	William	Burns	and	Andrew	Strauss	(eds),	Climate	Change	Geoengineering	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press	2013).	100	 Ralph	Bodle,	‘Geoengineering	and	International	Law:	The	Search	for	Common	Legal	Ground’	(2011)	46	Tulsa	Law	Review	305;	Adam	Abelkop	and	Jonathan	Carlson,	‘Reining	in	Phaëthon's	Chariot:	Principles	for	the	Governance	of	Geoengineering’	(2013)	21	Transnational	Law	&	Contemporary	Problems	763;	Vishal	Garg,	‘Engineering	A	Solution	To	Climate	Change:	Suggestions	For	An	International	Treaty	Regime	Governing	Geoengineering’	(2014)	2014	Journal	of	Law,	Technology&	Policy	198.	
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prove the causation between an activity and transboundary harm in practice. It might not 
be straightforward enough to identify whether a GE-related activity could have adverse 
impacts on the environment.101 Another problem of its implications for GE activity is that 
the principle works only after activities have taken place, and is therefore ‘retrospective’.102 
 
Another focus in the literature is the precautionary principle within international customary 
law. The precautionary principle has been used in arguments for, as well as against, GE. 
On one hand, the principle can suggest that caution be applied in using GE, to minimize 
the risks to the environment; on the other hand, GE is a precautionary measure itself 
against the unknown adverse impacts of climate change.103 This dual nature of GE can 
lead to divergent decisions on whether to support or prohibit GE. According to the existing 
literature, application of the precautionary principle to GE depends on the specific 
illustration of the principle as well as the particular GE techniques at issue.104 There are 
many different versions of the principle and many potential GE techniques, which means 
that there cannot be a simple relationship between the two. In addition, the stage of GE 
activity also matters in that a precautionary approach to research would differ from the 
approach for deployment.105 Furthermore, although the precautionary principle has been a 
predominant topic concerning governance of GE, it does not itself offer clear guidance for 
action. However, some scholars argue that the principle does not work as a detailed 
																																																								101	 Bodle	(n	100).	102	 Ibid.	103	 Elizabeth	Tedsen	and	Gesa	Homann,	‘Implementing	the	Precautionary	Principle	for	Climate	Engineering’	CCLR	90.	104	 Lauren	Hartzell-Nichols,	‘Precaution	and	Solar	Radiation	Management’	(2012)	15	Ethics,	Policy	&	Environment	159.	105	 Tedsen	and	Homann	(n	103).	
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instruction manual, but rather provides a directional guidance for practice.106 
 
Apart from the binding and non-binding governance approaches towards GE proposed in 
the literature, various stakeholders involved in GE have been discussed from an 
institutional perspective. These stakeholders include research establishments and the 
scientific community. In the UK, research councils facilitate the development of research 
governance on GE. For example, SRMGI produced a report on how to govern SRM 
research.107 In addition, universities, laboratory and research institutes in the UK make an 
effort to provide academic research findings and advice to governments in order to 
improve the decision-making policies surrounding GE. However, in most countries NGOs 
are not typically involved in GE currently. Within the literature, little attention has been 
paid to NGO participation in GE. Therefore, based on this gap in NGO participation, the 
thesis focuses on NGOs as one of the stakeholders involved in GE. This then links to the 
literature on NGOs and public participation in environmental law and policy. The 
following two sections will review this topic. 	
2.2	A	literature	review	on	the	role	of	NGOs	in	the	UK	and	China	
A glaring gap in stakeholder participation, within practice and within the literature, is the 
level of NGO involvement in GE. Therefore, this thesis focuses on NGOs. It is meaningful 
to review the literature on the role of NGOs in both the UK and China to identify how my 
research fits in with the literature as well as to provide a background context. This section 																																																								106	 Steve	Maguire	and	Jaye	Ellis,	‘Redistributing	the	Burden	of	Scientific	Uncertainty:	Implications	of	the	Precautionary	Principle	for	State	and	Non-State	Actors’	(2005)	11	Global	Governance	525.	107	 Pyle	and	others	(n	13).	
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comprises two parts, concentrating on the role of NGOs in the UK and China respectively.  	
2.2.1 Literature Review: UK NGOs 
The literature on the role of NGOs in the UK has focused on two main aspects: the role of 
NGOs in political and legal processes, and the role of NGOs in facilitating public 
participation. Given the fact that NGOs have played a critical role in shaping the policy on 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) that possess a similar risk profile to GE,108 it is 
interesting that NGOs are not actively involved in GE discussion and policy-making. 
 
In the UK, ENGOs have become highly professionalized organizations.109 They have 
varying levels of political access, financial resources, organizational size, and international 
connections.110 ENGOs have become increasingly active in political and legal processes. 
ENGOs work closely with the government and, therefore, have achieved success in raising 
relevant agendas with political actors. They have played the role of policy advisors to 
influence government policy.111 However, ENGOs do not seek ongoing partnerships with 
the government in implementing policy.112 In addition, they have served a functional role 
that extends the debate well beyond the confines of the mainstream political parties.113 In 
terms of legislative process, by acting as lobbyists and campaigners, they have had a 
																																																								108	 Patrycja	Dąbrowska,	‘Civil	Society	Involvement	in	the	EU	Regulations	on	GMOs:	From	the	Design	of	a	Participatory	Garden	to	Growing	Trees	of	European	Public	Debate’	(2007)	3	Journal	of	Civil	Society	287.	109	 Christopher	Rootes,	NGOs	in	Contemporary	Britain:	Non-state	Actors	in	Society	and	Politics	since	1945	(Nick	Crowson,	Matthew	Hilton	and	James	Mckay	eds,	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan	2009);	Matthew	Hilton	and	others,	The	Politics	of	Expertise:	How	NGOs	Shaped	Modern	Britain	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	2013).	110	 Nina	Hall	and	Ros	Taplin,	‘Solar	Festivals	and	Climate	Bills:	Comparing	NGO	Climate	Change	Campaigns	in	the	UK	and	Australia’	(2007)	18	International	Journal	of	Voluntary	and	Nonprofit	Organizations	317.	111	 Hilton	and	others	(n	109).	112	 Rootes,	NGOs	in	Contemporary	Britain:	Non-state	Actors	in	Society	and	Politics	since	1945	(n	109).	113	 Hilton	and	others	(n	109).	
	 41	
profound impact on the legislative history of the UK Parliament.114 They also act as 
witnesses in court or as scientific advisors.115 Moreover, NGOs have also played a role in 
law enforcement in the UK.116 They also have a role in developing soft law, which relates 
to GE as soft law, such as guidelines, can provide a template and a starting point for further 
specific legislation. In the UK, soft law is influential and comprises Green Papers, White 
Papers and a wide range of ‘governmental guidelines, circulars, codes of conducts and 
administrative rule which produce indirect legal effects’.117 In terms of GE, soft law would 
be potentially effective in regulating research activities, which may be able to fill the gap 
owing to the lack of dedicated governance framework for GE research. NGOs, via GMOs, 
have a history of contributing to the enunciation of soft law regarding the environment.118 
The case of GMOs may serve as a potential model for discussing NGO participation in 
developing soft law regarding GE. 
 
ENGOs have been critical in facilitating the improvement of public participation in the UK.  
As the general public often trusts ENGOs more than the government, ENGOs have been 
successful in shaping public opinion and mobilizing members of the public.119 ENGOs 
also contribute to public debates, generate publicity for issues and coordinate or undertake 
research.120 In addition, they have been the means by which an increasingly assertive 
public has endorsed policy preferences within the wider political sphere. Some NGOs have 
																																																								114	 Ibid.	115	 Angus	Nurse,	‘Privatising	The	Green	Police:	The	Role	Of	NGOs	In	Wildlife	Law	Enforcement’	(2013)	59	Crime	Law	Soc	Change	305.	116	 Ibid.	117	 Armeni	and	Redgwell,	‘Geoengineering	Under	National	Law:	A	Case	Study	of	the	United	Kingdom’	(n	27).	118	 Arif	Ahmed	and	Md.	Jahid	Mustofa,	‘Role	of	Soft	Law	in	Environmental	Protection:	An	Overview’	(2016)	4	Global	Journal	of	Politics	and	Law	Research	1.	119	 Hilton	and	others	(n	109).	120	 Nurse	(n	115).	
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leveraged the media to ensure continued coverage of their social and political causes.121 
 
In terms of GMOs, which have a similar risk profile to GE, ENGOs have been actively 
involved in the policy-making process in the EU to promote deliberative democracy. NGO 
participation aiming to shape the EU policy on GMOs can be considered in the two 
institutional contexts of the Commission and European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).122 
In terms of the Commission, the NGO involvement strategy on GMOs is three-fold: first, 
the establishment of permanent advisory bodies including certain NGOs; 123  second, 
‘written consultations resulting from statutory reporting obligations’;124 third, ad hoc 
initiatives ‘taking the form of open meetings or written consultations’.125 In terms of the 
EFSA, the strategy of NGO participation includes two methods: first, the EFSA has 
established a permanent Stakeholder Consultative Platform in which NGOs are involved 
for providing advice on general matters including issues related to GMOs; second, the 
EFSA has established ad hoc initiatives involving NGOs for consultations.126 NGO 
involvement in shaping EU policy on GMOs ‘contributes to democratic legitimacy, as least, 
in view of participatory democratic theory’.127 From the discussion above, one could argue 
that NGOs have been actively involved in shaping the policy on GMOs and their 
involvement has made significant contributions to improve public participation and 
ultimately achieve participatory democracy. Given the importance of NGO participation in 
GMOs, one could assume that NGOs might be expected to participate in GE, given its 																																																								121	 Hilton	and	others	(n	109).	122	 Dąbrowska	(n	108).	123	 For	example,	‘Competitiveness	in	Biotechnology	Advisory	Group’	and	‘Advisory	Group	on	the	Food	Chain	and	Animal	and	Plant	Health’,	see	ibid.	124	 Ibid.	125	 Ibid.	126	 Ibid.	127	 Ibid.	
	 43	
similar risk profile. 
 
However, when it comes to GE specifically, ENGOs in the UK have not been actively 
involved in promoting public participation. In fact, most of the relevant NGOs have not 
published any comments or views in relation to GE or GE research. Indeed, there are only 
a few NGOs, such as Greenpeace UK and Friends of the Earth UK, who have been 
involved in the academic discussion on research governance of GE by acting as partners 
with universities and research institutes. The lack of public participation, specifically NGO 
participation, in GE is puzzling, as NGOs in the UK have historically been involved in the 
governance of controversial technologies such as GM technology and xenotransplantation 
technology. Furthermore, participatory governance of controversial technologies has been 
widely discussed in relevant literature. One part of the literature focused on examining 
different forms of participation, while another part has discussed limitations of 
participation.128 Literature that is more recent has focused on case studies to analyse public 
participation events involving a specific controversial technology. There have been no 
studies exploring explanations for under-participation. Practically, the lack of public 
participation in GE is the only case that has been identified thus far. Exploring the reasons 
why there is a lack of public participation by NGOs will add to the public participation 
literature on controversial technologies.  
 
Many studies have discussed the limits of participation in the legal and political processes 
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concerning NGOs. The causal factors can be summarised from two main perspectives. 
From an NGO perspective, there are barriers to tackling intractable social problems; they 
fail to define, articulate and explain the problem and convince the government to accept 
such a frame of reference. In addition, they may fail to present problems to the government 
because the proliferation of many hundreds of competing organisations and the focus of 
some of the larger ones on maintaining their own organisational growth.129 From a 
government perspective, the reasons why the role of NGOs is limited may lie not in their 
efforts to present their case, but in the refusal of governments to listen.130 
 
The explanations for limited participation identified in the literature can offer some 
implications for GE. First, as pointed out in most literature on public participation in 
environmental law and policy, NGOs favoured by the authorities may edge less favoured 
NGOs out of the arena.131 This could potentially be similar for the GE arena. Expertise is 
the second limitation arising from the literature. NGOs in the UK face a dilemma as, on the 
one hand, they have to achieve professionalism in order to actively participate in the 
decision-making process. On the other hand, the more expertise they gain by employing 
professional people, the fewer social interests they are able to represent on behalf of the 
general public. Most NGOs do not have the expertise required to participate in GE. For the 
NGOs that do have the experience, it can be difficult to convey the sophisticated and 
technical aspects of GE to the public articulately. It is important to notice that NGOs have 
a representative role as well as a bridging role, which not just reflects, but also shapes 																																																								129	 Hilton	and	others	(n	109).	130	 Ibid.	131	 Jane	Holder	and	Maria	Lee,	Environmental	Protection,	Law	and	Policy	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2007).	
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public opinion. Within their bridging role, representing the public is still their first and 
fundamental priority. Thus, the professionalism of NGOs, which may limit their 
participation, as well as the competition between them, is worthy of examining through 
empirical research. Lastly, NGOs might fear that talking about GE will validate what some 
regard as ‘mad science’ and thereby distract civil society, government and business 
communities from focusing on less risky measures, such as mitigation and adaptation. 
Furthermore, talking about GE might risk legitimizing GE technology. Therefore, a central 
obstacle of the political dilemma facing NGOs is that, on the one hand, they do not want to 
endorse GE technology as they have severe reservations and are reluctant to encourage the 
public to focus on GE technology.  However, on the other hand, they ought to have a role 
in identifying less risky technology and ensuring the development of an effective 
governance framework. 
 
In addition, there is another general practical concern that may further limit the role of 
NGOs in participating in the policy-making process and, by extension, GE. ‘Participation 
overkill’ is the fear that NGOs may be heavily ‘swamped by the workload involved in 
keeping pace with a number of meetings’ with policymakers as they have limited financial 
or human resources. The strain on their resources will not allow them to invest too much 
time, energy, human capital or financial capital to engage with meetings with policymakers 
if they ‘feel that the dice are already loaded in favour of’ more powerful actors or 
stakeholders.132 Furthermore, there is a risk that policymakers would engage with NGOs 
just to provide ‘green window-dressing’ to improve the image of the policy-making 																																																								132	 Karen	Morrow	and	Holly	Cullen,	‘International	Civil	Society	In	International	Law:	The	Growth	Of	NGO	Participation’	(2001)	1	Non-State	Actors	and	International	Law	39.	
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process instead of providing NGOs with substantial influence over the outcome. 	
2.2.2 Literature Review: Chinese NGOs 
NGOs in China have been considered in the relevant literature due to their partial 
involvement in the political decision-making process and public participation. Chinese 
NGOs are far less participatory than UK NGOs. They are deemed to have a close 
relationship with the Chinese government, which is a necessity in the special context of 
China. NGO participation in GMOs, which possess a similar risk profile to GE, can 
provide implications for the role of NGOs in GE. 
 
On the political side, NGOs in China use different strategies to influence the 
policy-making process. For example, Chinese NGOs are proactive in informing the state, 
providing initiatives for the state to act upon, offering examples for the state to emulate, 
pressuring and mobilizing the state, and acting as watchdogs.133 In addition, they receive 
help and resources from the government, cooperate with the government, and assist the 
government. In some cases, they even adopt official roles.134 Sometimes NGOs speak for 
the government and increase the legitimacy of the state by adapting to the government’s 
norms and using politically correct language.135 Finally, they convince or lobby the state 
as well as linking the government to its constituencies.136 They have played a vital 
																																																								133	 Taru	Salmenkari,	‘Encounters	Between	Chinese	NGOs	and	The	State:	Distance,	Roles	and	Voice’	(2014)	50	Issues	and	Studies	143.	134	 Ibid.	135	 Ibid.	136	 Maohong	Bao,	‘Environmental	NGOs	in	Transforming	China’	(2009)	4	Nature	and	Culture	1.	
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intermediary role in bringing different actors together.137 ENGOs in China are considered 
as both sites and agents of democratic social change that will ultimately shape Chinese 
politics in the long run.138 In the existing literature, they are also identified as having the 
capacity to be alternative social service providers.139 
 
Promoting citizen participation, collective action and volunteerism in the public sphere are 
essential for a functioning of democracy to improve public participation. Generally, 
ENGOs in China are considered, in the existing literature, as lacking both strength and 
independence to pressure the state to move in a more democratic direction. In recent years, 
ENGOs have contributed to making China’s environmental governance a more open 
process.140 They are increasingly contributing to the emergence of a pluralistic civil 
society and no longer restrict their role to uncontroversial service provisions. They, 
therefore, tend to act as a host for pluralistic debate. With regard to GMOs, which share a 
similar risk profile with GE, NGOs have continued to play a role in improving public 
participation. They have done this in spite of the absence of sufficient countervailing 
forces from domestic NGOs. For example, NGOs have helped the government to identify 
and address major gaps in regulating GM rice field trials and have participated in shaping 
governmental GM food policy.141 One could argue that NGO participation might be 
significant in expanding the space for public participation in relation to GE. When it comes 
																																																								137	 Michael	Buesgen,	‘Environmental	NGO'	Role	in	Expanding	Social	Spaces-Diversification	With	Chinese	Characteristics:	A	Case	Study	of	ENGO's	Opposition	to	the	Nujiang	Dam	in	China's	Yunnan	Province’	(2008)	1	China	Journal	of	Social	Work	160.	138	 Guobin	Yang,	‘Environmental	NGOs	and	Institutional	Dynamics	In	China’	(2005)	181	The	China	Quarterly	46.	139	 Reza	Hasmath	and	Jennifer	Hsu,	‘Isomorphic	Pressures,	Epistemic	Communities	and	State-NGO	Collaboration	in	China’	[2014]	The	China	Quarterly	936.	140	 Shui-Yan	Tang	and	Xueyong	Zhan,	‘Civic	Environmental	NGOs,	Civil	Society	and	Democratisation	in	China’	(2008)	44	The	Journal	of	Development	Studies	425.	141	 Lorena	Luo,	‘Refining	the	GMO	Debate	in	China’	(2009)	10	China	Environment	Series	132.	
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to GE governance specifically, however, NOGs have not been involved in promoting 
public participation. 
 
The literature has also highlighted reasons for limited NGO participation in China. Various 
restrictions on the development of ENGOs in China have limited their participation. These 
restrictions take the form of legal constraints, political constraints and resource constraints. 
From a legal perspective, it is difficult for ENGOs in China to register with the 
government. 142  No established institutional framework is in place for ENGOs to 
participate in the policy process and they are not yet able to form stable partnerships with 
government authorities. NGO activities are legal but not protected by law, which 
highlights the absence of governmental regulation.143 NGOs cannot gather information 
independently as legal restrictions have been placed on opening new branches or affiliated 
offices.144 
 
From a political perspective, these organisations have not played a role in directly 
challenging authoritarianism. Therefore, they have played a limited role in fostering a 
more open democratic process.145 Chinese ENGOs are constrained by the nature of their 
dependence on government benevolence,146 and there are only low levels of collaboration 
between the local state and NGOs in China due to the domination and the strength of the 
central government. Interaction with the government diminishes an NGO’s potential 
interpretive power. Small and grassroots NGOs may be marginalised by larger, 																																																								142	 Tang	and	Zhan	(n	140).	143	 Salmenkari	(n	133).	144	 Jonathan	Schwartz,	‘Environmental	NGOs	in	China:	Roles	and	Limits’	(2004)	77	Pacific	Affairs	28.	145	 Tang	and	Zhan	(n	140).	146	 Bao	(n	136).	
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government-backed NGOs. They are vulnerable to government incorporation.147 
 
In terms of resource constraints, domestic Chinese NGOs lack a strong middle-class 
support network and rely heavily on international funding.148 They also lack capital 
workforce with a professional background. Additionally, they are not able to access 
sensitive data from the government.149 The lack of collaboration among ENGOs is also a 
significant issue, which may cause unbalanced resource distribution and information 
sharing. In addition, it can also be a barrier for efficient operation when conducting 
campaigns.  
 
These constraints are discussed within a general framework of the role of ENGOs in China, 
which can provide implications for exploring the explanations for why NGOs are not 
involved in GE. Some assumptions can be made based on a combination of the existing 
literature and the characteristics of GE technology. First, there are environmental 
constraints. In general, GE has not drawn much public attention in China. This is because 
GE is a novel topic in the country and there has been no apparent progress that could be 
disseminated to the public. Most information about GE that is available to the public is 
through translated research findings from abroad that appear in the media.  
 
Second, there are legal constraints as NGOs rarely register with the government as civil 
society organisations. Third, there are collaboration and political constraints. Although the 																																																								147	 Hasmath	and	Hsu	(n	139).	148	 Tang	and	Zhan	(n	140).	Funding	from	domestic	sources	has	been	limited;	more	funding	has	been	available	from	international	sources.	149	 Schwartz	(n	144).	
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Chinese government launched a research project on GE in 2015,150 ENGOs are not able to 
take part in it as there is a very low level of collaboration between ENGOs and the 
government. In addition, as ENGOs in China depend heavily on the government, they may 
not risk opportunities for development by opposing the government before the government 
makes its attitudes towards GE research clear. For ENGOs in China, they also face a 
political dilemma. On the one hand they may not want to endorse GE technology as they 
have severe reservations about its potential risks and harms. However, on the other hand, 
they may feel that they ought to play a role in identifying the least risky measures to ensure 
the development of an effective regulatory framework. In addition, as they do not have 
access to sensitive government data, ENGOs are not informed about research projects on 
GE that are undertaken in China. Finally, there are resource constraints. Unlike ENGOs in 
the UK, those in China lack expertise and human resources with a professional background. 
Even if NGOs are able to obtain information about GE, they are highly unlikely to form an 
expert view that is robust enough to influence policymaking. 
 
To conclude, the role of NGOs in both China and the UK in the policy-making process and 
public participation has been discussed in the existing literature. In general, NGOs have 
played a critical role in the UK and have some influence on the policy making process in 
China. With regard to GMOs, which possess a similar risk profile to GE, NGOs in both 
countries have contributed to its governance. However, they are not actively involved in 
GE discussion or policy making in the UK or China. This gap concerning limited 
participation with GE requires a review of the literature on public participation. 																																																								150	 See	n	60.	
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2.3	Reviewing	the	Literature	on	Public	Participation	
As mentioned above, NGOs are not actively involved in GE discussions and the literature 
has paid little attention to their participation. Based on this, this section proceeds to review 
the literature on public participation in environmental law and policy in order to identify 
gaps and further the discussion. Public participation is a topic that has been discussed from 
many different perspectives within the literature.  
 
Public participation theory has been developed and discussed over a long period of time. It 
has many implications for politics, science, as well as law. The most important implication 
for environmental law is that public participation can take many different forms or 
models.151 The three models in environmental law include the ladder model, the model 
distinguishing between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, and the model 
distinguishing between substantive and procedural dimensions.152There are several main 
consistent themes in the public participation literature. The first theme relates to who 
participates or whom public participation involves. The existing literature concentrates on 
the role of NGOs and the public, as well as the relationship between the two. The authority 
of NGOs derives from ‘normative forces, rooted in modern conceptions of justice, and 
rational planning’.153 Their right to participate is regarded as a basic entitlement stemming 
from rights of freedom of expression and association.154 A distinct role for NGOs is the 
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most significant innovation from the Aarhus Convention.155 The Convention emphasises 
NGO involvement, which helps legitimise NGOs’ role in the decision-making process 
because it clearly establishes NGOs among the stakeholders in the process even though it 
is a weak legal document.156 
 
When discussing NGOs in public participation theory, there are three concepts to address: 
representative, participatory and deliberative democracy. As representative democracy has 
been criticized on the grounds of its many demerits, such as ‘political apathy, low 
participation rates, predominance of party politics, elitist tendencies and 
under-representation of minorities’, participatory democracy emphasizes the role of active 
citizenship. 157  Participatory democracy should be regarded as a supplement to 
representative democracy, rather than a potential replacement.158 In democratic theory, 
deliberative democracy, which can be combined with representative and participatory 
democracy, emphasises the ‘authenticity of democracy: the degree to which democratic 
control is substantive’ (e.g. deliberation in decision-making) ‘rather than symbolic’ such as 
voting.159 The concept of deliberation has been applied in environmental law as this 
concept can benefit from problem solving when dealing with environmental risks.160The 
majority of the literature perceives NGOs as traditional actors, together with academics, 
																																																								155	 Lee	and	Abbot,	‘The	Usual	Suspects?	Public	Participation	under	the	Aarhus	Convention’	(n	3).	156	 Ibid.	157	 Gabriele	Abels,	‘Participatory	Technology	Assessment	and	the	"Institutional	Void":	Investigating	Democratic	Theory	and	Representative	Politics’	in	Alfons	Bora	and	Heiko	Hausendorf	(eds),	Democratic	Transgressions	of	Law:	
Governing	Technology	Public	Participation,	vol	112	(Boston:	Brill	2010).	158	 Holder	and	Lee	(n	131).	159	 John	Dryzek,	Deliberate	Democracy	and	Beyond:	Liberals,	Critics,	Contestations	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	2000).	160	 Jenny	Steele,	‘Participation	and	Deliberation	in	Environmental	Law:	Exploring	A	Problem-Solving	Approach’	(2001)	21	oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	415.	
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experts, governments and businesses, within the domain of representative democracy.161 
This derives from the concern that ‘the proxy role of NGOs, its character is in fact altered 
from a notional mechanism of participative democracy to a practical alternative form of 
representative democracy’.162 Academics call for the development of participatory and 
deliberative democracy. However, the extent to which NGOs can achieve legitimacy in the 
process remains problematic.  
 
Most scholars accuse the Aarhus Convention of failing to clarify the status of the lay 
public, as including NGOs does not necessarily fill the entire public participation gap. In 
other words, NGOs are not considered as a part of the ‘lay’ public in the existing literature 
because many of them are professional entities. In terms of the expertise issue, the 
literature seems to divide various actors in the decision-making process into two main 
groups, namely authorities with experts and the so-called ‘lay’ public. Depending on 
self-selection modes, participatory procedures are criticized for being biased toward 
well-educated groups, thus failing to represent the public properly.163 For example, Lee 
and Abbot claim that ‘even if there are powerful and legitimate incentives to empower 
NGOs, we must not mistake their involvement for improved democracy’.164 That is to say, 
even though involving NGOs is significant for improving public participation, as they are 
definitely considered part of the general public, they cannot represent the ‘lay’ public 
entirely as their views may be different based on their different level of expertise. 
Therefore, there is a danger that NGOs will become the ‘new technocracy’ by sidelining 																																																								161	 Eden	(n	3).	162	 Holder	and	Lee	(n	131).	163	 Abels	(n	157).	164	 Lee	and	Abbot,	‘The	Usual	Suspects?	Public	Participation	under	the	Aarhus	Convention’	(n	3).	
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less officially sanctioned forms of public participation.165  
 
There is a general understanding that public participation is generally contrasted with 
expert regulation by the public administration.166 This is related to the challenge of moving 
from representative forms of democracy to more participatory and deliberative forms,167 
which places an emphasis on directly involving the public. Many academics have 
considered NGOs’ involvement as a form of expert regulation, which alters participatory 
democracy to representative democracy in terms of membership organisations. Because of 
this, they have stressed that their role in fulfilling public participation is problematic. 
Under the broad definition of civil society, including NGOs, business interests groups, 
trade unions, and professional organisations, value and rights-based NGOs are tightly 
linked to the grassroots or public.168 On the one hand, NGOs, as representatives of civil 
society, are involved in influencing the policymaking process and make governance more 
participatory.169 On the other hand, in order to comply with their obligation of linking civil 
society to the decision-making process, NGOs should convince authorities that they have 
the capacity for participation by demonstrating their expertise and their robust social and 
financial resources.170 Due to their increasing level of professionalism, NGOs are often 
accused of decreased democratic legitimacy and accountability.171 This is because staff 
members in NGOs are well trained, meaning there are fewer members from grassroots 																																																								165	 Holder	and	Lee	(n	131).	166	 Fisher,	Lange	and	Scotford	(n	21).	167	 Steele	(n	160).	168	 Beate	Kohler-Koch	and	Christine	Quittkat,	De-Mystification	of	Participatory	Democracy:	EU-Governance	and	
Civil	Society	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	2013).	169	 Ibid.	170	 Sabine	Saurugger,	‘The	Professionalisation	Of	Interest	Representation:	A	Legitimacy	Problem	For	Civil	Society	In	The	EU?’	in	Stijn	Smismans	(ed),	Civil	Society	and	Legitimate	European	Governance	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2006).	171	 Ibid.	
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levels. This has led to the perception that NGOs are elitist in most Western countries.172 
This dynamic creates a tension between the members of the NGO and their 
professionalization. Empirical studies even prove that maximizing their professional 
capacity to influence the decision-making process can actually drive them further away 
from civil society.173  
 
The second focus of the literature is the benefits and as barriers to public participation.174 
There are several main functions or benefits: public participation as a solution to improve 
procedural legitimacy; participation to improve results and decisions as a substantive 
approach; and public participation itself as an alternative regulatory tool against a 
traditional command-and-control approach. According to Lee and Abbot, public 
participation is required to improve procedural legitimacy because of the political nature of 
environmental decisions.175 That is to say, environmental decisions normally include very 
technical elements and therefore rely on professional expertise. However, governments 
cannot make decisions on controversial topics alone. Therefore, public discourse and 
opinion can bridge gaps in scientific knowledge. 176  Another important element in 
procedural legitimacy is the expression of green values.177 Although public participation 
may not necessarily lead to ‘green outcomes’, it is a crucial way of ensuring expression of 
‘green values’ by the public.178 From a substantive point of view, public participation is 
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also a way of improving results and achieving better decisions.179 Participation and 
deliberation not only emphasise procedural legitimacy by enhancing ‘the transparency of 
environmental justice’, but also lead to better outcomes of decision-making.180 Apart from 
the substantive approach and procedural legitimacy, public participation itself is also 
considered as an alternative regulatory tool.181 According to Maria Lee, the traditional 
command-and-control approach is not sufficient to cope with emerging environmental 
issues, which require public participation as an alternative regulatory mechanism and a 
supplement to traditional regulatory tools.182 
 
However, some scholars have insisted that the benefits of participation should not be 
overstated. They are most effective when used as a complementary instrument to 
representative democracy.183 The literature also discusses various weaknesses of public 
participation. First, it is difficult to strike a balance between relying on expert judgment 
concerning technical areas and including public value judgements on controversial 
topics.184 This leads to a weakness that people who have opportunities to express their 
opinions may not necessarily represent the interests of the lay public. Another limitation of 
involving the public relates to the delay and cost of the decision making process.185 Public 
participation may slow down the process of making decisions and increase the cost. 
 
When focusing on NGO participation and democracy in China, one may argue that public 																																																								179	 Steele	(n	160).	180	 Ibid.	181	 Maria	Lee,	EU	Environmental	Law:	Challenges,	Change	and	Decision-making	(Oxford:	Hart	2005).	182	 Ibid.	183	 Pellegrini	(n	21).	184	 Lee	and	Abbot,	‘The	Usual	Suspects?	Public	Participation	Under	the	Aarhus	Convention’	(n	3).	185	 James	Creighton,	The	Public	Participation	handbook:	Making	Better	Decisions	Through	Citizen	Involvement	(1st	edn,	San	Francisco:	Jossey-Bass	2005).	
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participation is less developed in China, as the development of civil society organizations 
is different from that in Western countries. It is reasonable to some extent as civil society 
organizations or NGOs in China are often criticised as being heavily reliant on the 
government. However, this issue ought to be analysed in a comprehensive way by 
categorizing Chinese NGOs. There are two paths of development for NGOs in China: the 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ paths.186 Top-down is the path that is organised and instructed 
by the government or its branches while the bottom-up path refers to a path that is formed 
by people based on social needs.187 Based on the two different paths of development, their 
central role of advocacy emphasises different factors corresponding to policy performance 
and policy representativeness. 188  Top-down NGOs focus heavily on serving the 
government as government administrative units, which makes them heavily involved in the 
policy process. Alternatively, bottom-up NGOs place great emphasis on improving their 
capacity to represent the civil society position by influencing the policy-making process. 
For example, top-down NGOs offer constructive recommendations using their expertise 
within the government’s overarching plans due to their reliance on the government,189 
whereas bottom-up NGOs advocate by lobbying or demonstrating due to their civilly 
rooted incentives.190 There is an imbalance between involvement in the policy-making 
process and representing the interests of the public. This is similar to issues faced in the 
UK. NGOs in both the UK and China are facing the challenge of redressing this imbalance 
between participation and representation. However, the causes of the problem differ in that 
																																																								186	 Xijin	Jia,	‘Civil	Organization-Government	Relationships:	Functional	Cooperation	and	Power	Dilemmas’	in	Ming	Wang	(ed),	Emerging	Civil	Society	in	China,	vol	volume	7	(Boston:	Brill	2010).	187	 Ibid.	188	 Ibid.	189	 Ibid.	190	 Ibid.	
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professionalism mainly creates this imbalance in the UK while distance to or reliance on 
the government primarily causes it in China. 
 
However, it is different and even more complex when exploring the space for public 
participation in GE. Therefore, this research investigates the involvement of NGOs in GE, 
based on the public participation literature. In addition, amongst various topics discussed 
surrounding public participation, there is a gap surrounding methods of public participation. 
Very few articles have focused on understanding the reasons why NGOs fail to participate. 
Although public participation has long been discussed, the literature has paid little 
attention to the causes of participation. This thesis contributes to the literature by 
considering why certain groups participate or do not participate in particular areas of 
environmental law and policy.  
 
This research seeks to further how environmental lawyers think about public participation. 
Up until now, the literature has examined the ways in which law provides for public 
participation and has made a number of arguments, especially normative arguments, for 
such participation, such as increasing the legitimacy of decision-making. By exploring why 
NGOs participate or do not participate, this research does not seek to contribute to these 
normative arguments, nor does it add to the discussion concerning participatory, deliberate 
or representative governance. Rather it adds to the literature with a consideration as to why 
certain groups participate or do not participate in particular areas of environmental law and 
policy, such as GE. However, the participation referred to in this research is not necessarily 
participation in a formal sense enshrined within the law. Rather it is participation in civil 
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society and media debates and discussions, and government consultations on GE. The 
novelty and contribution of this research to environmental law is that environmental law 
and policy, although it has long studied public participation, has paid little attention to the 
causes of participation.
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Chapter	3	Methodology	
This chapter addresses the issue of methodology employed in this thesis. It seeks to 
provide a clear picture of the research strategy it was based upon and how the research was 
designed. It comprises three sections focusing on research strategy, research design, and 
research methods respectively. The methodology adopted in this research aims to solve the 
research question, namely, ‘why NGOs become involved or not in GE as a policy area.’ It 
aims to investigate why certain groups participate or not in particular areas of 
environmental law and policy. The question emphasises the causes of NGO participation, 
which adds to the literature on public participation in environmental law. Although public 
participation has long been an interest of study, the literature has paid little attention to the 
causes of participation. This main question can be divided into three sub-questions. Have 
NGOs engaged with GE in the UK and China? Why do NGOs in the UK and China 
become involved or not in GE as a policy area? Can NGOs be considered to make strategic 
choices on their involvement or non-involvement in GE as a policy area?  
 
The main research method employed in this research is the qualitative interview. It mainly 
aims to answer the research question whether NGOs have engaged or not with GE in both 
countries and why. Through in-depth qualitative interviews, empirical data concerning 
respondents’ opinions of GE, whether their organisations have engaged with GE, why they 
participate or not in GE as a policy area were collected. Empirical data with regard to 
whether NGOs have engaged with GE provides evidence for exploring answers to the first 
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question in a descriptive manner. Detailed and in-depth results in relation to the reason 
why they become involved or not, which is the key part of the research provide sufficient 
evidence to solve the second question. Based on analysis of data, the question concerning 
whether NGOs can be considered to make strategic choices on their involvement or 
non-involvement with GE was also addressed. 	
3.1	Research	strategy	
Research strategy may be divided into two distinct types – quantitative and qualitative 
research. This division is ‘commonly drawn among writers on and practitioners of social 
research’ with regard to a range of considerations including the nature of the relation 
between theory and research, epistemological consideration, and ontological issues.191 It 
can be considered as a theoretical basis for research design. Before discussing which 
research strategy the thesis employs, it is necessary to address a variety of considerations 
mentioned above. According to Carey, a research project includes elements of ontology, 
epistemology, methodology and method.192 A set of these sections helps researchers to 
understand what is expected and how this can be conducted. The relationship between 
these considerations can be illustrated by definition. Ontological considerations stand for 
‘the nature of social entities’ while epistemological considerations deal with the nature of 
knowledge including ‘what a researcher counts as knowledge’.193 Methodology refers to 
the ‘theoretical and philosophical assumptions’194 of a topic while methods entail the 
																																																								191	 Bryman	(n	47).	192	 Malcolm	Carey,	Quallitative	Research	Skills	for	Social	Work:	Theory	and	Practice	(Burlington:	Ashgate	2012).	193	 Ibid.	194	 Ibid.	
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process of collecting data concerning the topic.195 Therefore, in order to address the 
methodology issue of this research, this chapter is organised in an order linked to the four 
considerations mentioned above: ontology, epistemology, methodology, and methods. In 
this section, ontology, epistemology and methodology are discussed. Methods of this 
research, as well as the detailed design of this research project, will be introduced in 
sections 3.2 and 3.3.  
 
This section comprises four parts: the first part deals with the relationship between theory 
and research, notably whether theory guides research or theory is generated from research; 
the second issue concerns ontological considerations, notably a distinction between 
objectivism and constructionism; the third part addresses epistemological elements and 
indicates a distinction between positivism and interpretivism; the last part discusses 
whether a quantitative or qualitative strategy is adopted in this research based on the 
considerations and discussions in the preceding parts. 
3.1.1 Theory and research 
The discussion on the relationship between theory and research deals with the question 
whether theory guides research or theory is the outcome of research. According to Bryman, 
theory is able to provide guidance for data collection and analysis or occurs after collection 
and analysis of data; therefore, two types of link between theory and research can be 
identified – deductive and inductive approaches. 196  A deductive approach refers to 
situations in which researchers deduce hypotheses based on what is already known as well 																																																								195	 Ibid.	196	 Bryman	(n	47).	
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as theoretical considerations before testing hypotheses through research.197 In other words, 
the process of deduction can be illustrated as: theory – hypothesis – data collection – 
findings – hypothesis confirmed – revision of theory.198 In contrast, inductive approach 
refers to theory generated from data collection and analysis.199 It involves a process of 
making ‘inductive inferences from initial data collected to guide further data collection’ 
until saturation is achieved.200 Normally, an inductive approach or reasoning is related to 
qualitative research while deductive reasoning is involved in quantitative research.201 
However, there is no ‘hard and fast distinction’.202 Instead, these two strategies are 
considered as tendencies of linking theory and research. In the process of inductive 
reasoning, patterns or trends are identified from data collected by, for example, conducting 
interviews, and based on this, a summary of findings is then concluded to develop a 
theory.203 In contrast, in the process of deductive reasoning, a hypothesis is formed at the 
outset of research and data is employed for testing the hypothesis.204 In this approach, the 
conclusion will either confirm or reject this hypothesis.  
 
My research aims to identify the reason why NGOs in the UK and China participate in the 
GE as a policy area or not by conducting interviews in order to collect empirical data. 
Based on the data collected in the two countries, analysis was involved to identify a pattern 
or trend of the reasons for their involvement or non-involvement with GE. The data 																																																								197	 Terry	Boswell	and	Cliff	Brown,	‘The	Scope	of	General	Theory:	Methods	for	Linking	Deductive	and	Inductive	Comparative	History’	(1999)	28	Sociological	Methods	and	Research.	198	 Bryman	(n	47).	199	 Boswell	and	Brown	(n197).	200	 Monique	Hennink,	Inge	Hutter	and	Ajay	Bailey,	Qualitative	Research	Methods	(London:	Sage	Publications	2011).	201	 Carey	(n	192).	202	 Bryman	(n	47).	203	 Carey	(n	192).	204	 Ibid.	
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analysis employed different strands of literature to generate overall findings and then 
formed a theory. Therefore, this thesis adopts an inductive approach to link theory and 
research, which entails that the theory is generated from data collection and analysis of the 
empirical study rather than using empirical data to test the theory. 	
3.1.2 Ontological considerations 
Ontology emphasises ‘the nature of being or social entities’ and people’s perceptions on 
‘what the reality is made of’.205 It entails questions about ‘the nature of social entities, 
which refers to the question of whether social entities can and should be considered 
objective entities that have a reality external to social actors, or whether they can and 
should be considered social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of 
social actors’.206 It holds two opposite positions, namely objectivism and constructionism. 
Objectivism emphasises independence of social phenomenon from social actors while 
constructionism implies that social phenomenon are produced and revised constantly 
through interactions with social actors.207 According to Bryman, they ‘feed into the ways 
in which research questions are formulated and research is carried out’.208  
 
In terms of my research questions, they aim to address the involvement or 
non-involvement of NGOs in GE as a policy area and explore the motives of their 
objectives and behaviour. The research questions emphasise the active involvement of 
																																																								205	 Hennink,	Hutter	and	Bailey	(n	200).	206	 Bryman	(n	47).	207	 Ibid.	208	 Ibid.	
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NGOs in GE, which admits the active involvement of people in the construction of reality. 
The facts of public participation and governance on GE can be influenced and reached by 
the engagement or non-engagement of NGOs. 
 
3.1.3 Epistemological considerations 
An epistemological consideration stands for ‘the question of what is regarded as acceptable 
knowledge in a discipline’.209 The epistemological position in natural science is positivism 
that ‘advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social 
reality and beyond’.210 It entails several principles, including the idea that phenomena 
confirmed by senses are the only way of warranting knowledge, the purpose of theory is to 
test hypotheses and assess explanations of law, and the concept that research must be 
conducted in an objective way.211 Positivism includes a process whereby a hypothesis is 
formulated at the outset and then tested with empirical data.212 Interpretivism is the 
opposite epistemological position to positivism. It can be illustrated as ‘a strategy that 
respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and 
therefore requires the social scientists to grasp the subjective meaning of social action’.213 
It therefore emphasises ‘the importance of interpretation and observation in understanding 
the social world’.214 One of its focuses is related to the social contexts on people’s lives, 
																																																								209	 Ibid.	210	 Ibid.	211	 Hasan	Nazmul,	‘Positivism:	To	What	Extent	Does	It	Aid	Our	Understanding	Of	The	Contemporary	Social	World?’	(2016)	50	Quality	and	Quantity	317.	212	 Hennink,	Hutter	and	Bailey	(n	200).	213	 Bryman	(n	47).	214	 Hennink,	Hutter	and	Bailey	(n	200).	
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which suggests the importance of studying people in social contexts in which they live.215 
Another focus is the importance of understanding people’s lives from their own 
perspectives.216 For example, if one seeks to explain and understand why a phenomenon 
occurs, the answers cannot be identified through survey data. Instead, it requires 
interpretation of the data.217 
 
Typically, the epistemological position of positivism is associated with a deductive 
approach of linking theory and research, while the epistemological position of 
interpretivism is associated with an inductive approach.218 However, this link is just a 
tendency and not a hard correspondence. For example, according to Hennink, Hutter, and 
Bailey, some interpretive approaches have positivism influences, such as ‘grounded theory 
or content analysis’.219 As far as my research is concerned, it adopts interpretivism rather 
than positivism. My research aims to explain and understand why NGOs in the UK and 
China become involved or not in GE as a policy area. It emphasises subjective elements, 
notably the perspective of NGOs on their involvement or non-involvement. In other words, 
it seeks to understand how NGOs perceive their involvement or non-involvement with GE. 
In addition, it does not focus on objective facts, which is emphasised in positivism; rather, 
it addresses NGOs’ subjective opinions on why they participate in GE or not. Furthermore, 
interpretivism emphasises the context in which a causal relationship occurs, which goes 
beyond looking just for the ‘presence or absence’ of this relationship.220 This research 																																																								215	 Ibid.	216	 Ibid.	217	 Ibid.	218	 Bryman	(n	47).	219	 Hennink,	Hutter	and	Bailey	(n	200).	220	 Ann	Chih	Lin,	‘Bridging	Positivist	and	Interpretivist	Approaches	to	Qualitative	Methods’	(1998)	26	Policy	studies	journal	162.	
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admits the importance of contexts in that it studies NGOs in the context of the UK and 
China and regards contextual issues as a significant influence on their engagement or 
non-engagement with GE. This, again, can be considered as adopting interpretivism. With 
regard to the relationship between theory and research, as discussed in the previous part, 
this research does not follow the process of formulating a hypothesis and then testing it. 
Instead, it interprets empirical data to generate theory. In addition, according to Carey, by 
adopting interpretivism, researchers should ‘explain the role that participants’ themselves 
have in creating the micro-worlds around them’.221 This research involves investigating 
how NGOs perceive their role in public participation concerning GE, which also entails an 
element of interpretivism. 
 
Although it entails some elements of positivism, for instance exploring the causation of 
NGOs’ behaviour, the emphasis is on understanding the behaviour of NGOs more broadly. 
That is to say, although there are some elements of causation in explaining NGOs’ 
behaviour, this research is more about how NGOs perceive or understand their 
participation in GE. As mentioned above, the difference between positivism and 
interpretivism is not ‘always as distinct as it may appear’.222 Although this research may 
involve an element of causation, which may lead to positivism, it does not focus on the 
objective facts of what causes NGOs’ involvement or non-involvement with GE. It 
emphasises interpretation and understanding of NGOs’ perceptions on why they become 
involved or not. The answers to the research question why NGOs participate in GE or not 
and whether they are making strategic choices are in fact subjective in nature. In terms of 																																																								221	 Carey	(n	192).	222	 Hennink,	Hutter	and	Bailey	(n	200).	
	68	
the question whether NGOs are making strategic choices on their involvement or 
non-involvement with GE, it requires interpreting the responses of interviewees in certain 
contexts. 		
3.1.4 Research strategy: quantitative or qualitative? 
There are two main research strategies that are contrasted with each other: quantitative and 
qualitative research. Both of them include three elements mentioned in preceding sections 
– the orientation of theory and research, the epistemological position and the ontological 
position – which can be employed to distinguish the two strategies. To examine this in 
more detail, quantitative research is usually associated with the deductive approach of 
linking theory and research, while qualitative strategy is related to the inductive approach; 
in terms of the epistemological consideration, quantitative and qualitative strategies usually 
include the positivism and the interpretivism standpoints respectively; with regard to the 
ontological orientation, quantitative research is normally associated with objectivism while 
qualitative research is typically related to the constructionism. 223  That is to say, 
quantitative research seeks to ‘quantify a research problem, to measure and count issues 
and then to generalize findings’ while qualitative research aims to ‘understand or explain 
behavior and beliefs’.224 
 
This research adopts a qualitative research strategy in general. This is because it aims to 
																																																								223	 Bryman	(n	47).	224	 Hennink,	Hutter	and	Bailey	(n	200).	
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understand why NGOs in the UK and China become involved or not in GE, which implies 
the nature of understanding and explanation. It is not concerned with measurement of 
issues which is the nature of quantitative research. 
 	
3.2	Research	design:	a	comparative	design	
The previous section introduced the choice of a qualitative research strategy adopted in this 
research, which provides a theoretical framework for my methodology. However, 
according to Bryman, the decision on research strategy does not ‘get you far along the road 
of’ conducting research.225 Another two choices on research design and research method 
need to be considered. Although sometimes confused, the two terms – research design and 
research method – differ in that research design provides ‘a structure guiding data 
collection and analysis’ while research method represents a way of gathering data which 
can be ‘associated with different kinds of research design’.226 Therefore, before discussing 
the research method employed in this thesis, it is useful to address the research design first. 
 
This research adopts a comparative design that embodies the logic of comparison.227 It is a 
comparative design because through the identical method of investigating the reasons for 
NGOs’ involvement or non-involvement with GE in the UK and China, it seeks to 
compare the two contrasting cases to explore explanations for differences and identify 
																																																								225	 Bryman	(n	47).	226	 Ibid.	227	 David	De	Vaus,	Research	Design	in	Social	Research	(London:	Sage	Publications	2006);	Bob	Hancké,	Intelligent	
Research	Design:	A	Guide	For	Beginning	Researchers	In	The	Social	Sciences	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press	2009).	
	70	
similarities applicable in both countries. Moreover, this will enable us to gain a deeper 
understanding of NGO participation within different national contexts. It aims to 
distinguish the characteristics of the role of NGOs in the UK and China and to act as a 
springboard for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings. More specifically, this 
research adopts a form of cross-national or cross-cultural research to examine the 
particular issue of NGO engagement with GE in the UK and China within their different 
socio-cultural settings by conducting similar interviews, in order to seek explanations for 
similarities and differences. It carries more weight, than comparing among Western 
countries, when comparing a socialist country (China) with a capitalist country (the UK) in 
comparative politics, which will be addressed in detail in chapter 8. As a qualitative 
research study, it adopts the form of qualitative interviews for two cases of the UK and 
China to bring the research strategy and research design together.  
 
The reason why this research includes an empirical component, namely the qualitative 
interview, rather than adopting a desktop approach, can be explained according to two 
aspects. One is that there is no empirical work that has been done in this specific area. In 
order to seek the reasons why NGOs have or have not been involved in GE, analysis of 
secondary resources will not be adequate to generate valid findings. Instead, obtaining first 
hand materials by conducting qualitative interviews will provide data and evidence capable 
of answering the main research question why NGOs have or have not been involved in GE. 
The answers to this question are expected to be generated through analyzing the collected 
data. Another aspect is that qualitative interviews have been employed in similar studies 
when investigating how NGOs perceive certain issues or how they may potentially have a 
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role in these issues. This can potentially have implications for my research method as the 
thesis aims to investigate how NGOs perceive or understand their involvement and 
non-involvement in GE as a policy area. For example, in the research involving NGO in 
international governance and policy, researchers have examined how NGOs perceive the 
issue of legitimacy.228 As traditional theories of legitimacy were unsuited to certain NGO 
cases, and there was a lack of empirical research, researchers employed qualitative 
interviewing as the research method with semi-structured questions. A study by Boström 
and Hallström investigates the role of social and environmental NGOs in 
standard-settings. 229  They employed a semi-structured interviewing technique as a 
principal research method to collect data. Furthermore, research seeking to compare 
climate change campaigns by NGOs in the UK and Australia has also employed this 
interviewing method.230 The details of research method – qualitative interviewing – is 
discussed in the following section. 				
3.3	Research	methods	
In this section, the research methods employed in the thesis are introduced. First, the 
choice of sampling strategy – purposive sampling – is discussed as well as the detailed 
arrangement of sampling in the UK and China. The question of how many samples are 																																																								228	 Anton	Vedder	and	others,	NGO	Involvement	in	International	Governance	and	Policy	(Anton	Vedder	ed,	Boston:	Brill	2007).	229	 Magnus	Boström	and	Kristina	Hallström,	‘NGO	Power	in	Global	Social	and	Environmental	Standard-setting’	(2010)	10	Global	Environmental	Politics	36.	230	 Hall	and	Taplin	(n	110).	
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included in this research, notably sample size, is then introduced and justified including a 
list of respondents. The procedure of qualitative interviews, which is adopted as the 
principal research method, is discussed in the third part of the section. The following parts 
focus on introducing methods of data analysis and storage. The last part includes 
difficulties encountered during the process of conducting qualitative interviews and 
acknowledges limitations of adopting this research method. 
3.3.1 Sampling strategy 
First, purposive sampling, which refers to a ‘non-probability form of sampling’, has been 
employed as the sampling strategy.231 That is to say, based on the research questions, 
samples are selected in a strategic way rather than on a random basis. Based on the nature 
of a comparative study, sampling must be achieved through two levels: first, two countries 
of the UK and China have been selected; second, units within the case study have been 
sampled. In other words, sampling areas and then participants are both elements of the 
sampling strategy. 
 
A typical form of purposive sampling, namely theoretical sampling, has been employed. 
This contrasts with generic sampling in that the latter belongs to a fixed sampling strategy 
or non-sequential sampling, which entails that the sample is established at the outset of the 
research with no adding to the sample during the process itself, while the former 
emphasises iteration which entails an ongoing process rather than a fixed plan at the 
																																																								231	 Bryman	(n	47).	
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outset.232 In contrast to generic purposive sampling, theoretical sampling is defined as ‘the 
process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, 
and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in 
order to develop his theory as it emerges’.233 It entails iterations with an ongoing process 
rather than a one-off process. Therefore it is typically involved in grounded theory that will 
be discussed in the section on data analysis later on.  
 
In relation to this research, certain eligible NGOs were selected at the outset. After 
analysing data and generating categories, more samples were then selected according to the 
requirement to develop categories. With regard to eligible NGOs, these were 
environmental NGOs (ENGOs). An ENGO is a non-governmental organisation in the field 
of environmentalism. In the UK, ENGOs have experienced different phases of 
development ranging from nature conservation to environmentalism and more radical 
ecologism.234 The definition of an ENGO has not been considered as a controversial issue 
in the existing literature. In China however, the definition of an ENGO or even an NGO 
has received significant attention in the literature due to governmental interventions into 
these organizations. Thus, there are different ways of defining ENGOs in China according 
to the existing literature. This research employs the definition by Schwartz that 
‘environmental NGOs [are] organizations registered with the government Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, that receive no state funding, and have no official ties to government beyond the 																																																								232	 Ibid.	233	 Ibid.	234	 Rootes,	NGOs	in	Contemporary	Britain:	Non-state	Actors	in	Society	and	Politics	since	1945	(n	109).	Nature	conservation	refers	to	a	movement	aiming	to	conserve	natural	resources,	which	is	considered	by	some	as	a	part	of	the	broader	environmental	movement	or	environmentalism.	See	Mark	Wilson,	‘The	British	Environmental	Movement:	The	Development	of	An	Environmental	Consciousness	and	Environmental	Activism,	1945-1975’	(Doctoral	thesis,	University	of	Northumbria	2014).	
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necessity of a sponsoring unit’.235 The reason why this research focuses mainly on ENGOs 
is that geoengineering aiming to tackle climate change is closely related to environment 
issues, and as a public good, geoengineering is supposed to work in the public interest. In 
order to ensure the quality of in-depth interviews and obtain effective results from them, 
staff members with high positions, such as directors, from ENGOs as respondents were 
sought out where available as they could be expected to know more about geoengineering 
than other non-environmental NGO employees. This was even more so for interviewing 
NGOs in China as geoengineering research is considered to be at its initial stages and thus 
few NGOs have noticed or know about it.  
 
This research seeks to identify two types of ENGO in each country, namely ENGOs that 
have shown interest in GE and ENGOs that have not shown interest in it. Based on the 
categorisation of two different ENGOs, this research seeks to identify and compare 
distinctive reasons why they become involved in GE or not. The sampling method has also 
been chosen to avoid selection bias236 and to try to include all relevant types of ENGOs. 
Within the two categories, a certain number of participants were invited for the interviews. 
Moreover, I added to the sample during the process of interviewing in order to gather 
enough data for developing variables.  
 
The sample selection was based on two categories among environmental NGOs: 
environmental NGOs who have shown an interest in GE, and environmental NGOs who 
																																																								235	 Schwartz	(n	144).	236	 Avoiding	selection	bias	means,	in	this	research,	not	selecting	on	the	dependent	variable,	which	is	NGO	participation	in	GE,	but	also	including	participants	from	NGOs	that	had	not	been	involved.	
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have not been engaged or shown an interest in GE. Therefore, the criteria for this study can 
be classified as follows: 1) the sample selection will be conducted among ENGOs; 2) the 
regions of samples will be restricted to the UK and China; 3) the samples will cover both 
involved and non-involved ENGOs. The sample selection criteria aim to examine why 
some ENGOs have been engaged in geoengineering while others have not. This is 
expected to answer the research question why NGOs participate or not in relation to GE. 
Details of samples will be introduced in the following section.  		
3.3.2 Sample size 
According to Bryman, the sample size should neither be too small to achieve data 
saturation or theoretical saturation nor too large to conduct a deep analysis.237 This 
research includes two types of ENGOs, which were approached in each country according 
to the criteria. Based on this, in the UK, two ENGOs were considered as respondents for 
each type at the outset: Greenpeace UK and Friends of the Earth UK (FoE) were 
interviewed as respondents who had become involved in GE, while TearFund and Practical 
Action were selected as participants who have not engaged with GE. TearFund was chosen 
because, although it is not an ENGO, it is a group with climate interests.238 After analysing 
the data and generating basic categories, more samples were approached in order to 
achieve a theoretical saturation. Finally, six NGOs including Greenpeace UK, FoE, World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF), Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC 																																																								237	 Bryman	(n	47).	238	 I	have	approached	other	non-ENGOs	which	also	include	climate	change	as	one	of	their	focus	areas.	However,	due	to	access	issues,	they	turned	down	my	requests	for	interviews.	This	is	why	TearFund	is	the	only	non-ENGO	included	in	my	research.	
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Group), Biofuel Watch, and Blue & Green Tomorrow were selected as respondents who 
have become involved in GE while three NGOs, namely TearFund, Practical Action, and 
ClientEarth, were invited as respondents who do not engage with GE. A brief introduction 
to the scope of selected groups in the UK is shown in Table 1.2 in the appendix. The 
reason why these six NGOs were considered as appropriate respondents is that they are the 
main players that actively participate in GE policy discussion and campaigns in the UK. 
This is based on the responses from participants as well as results from online searching. In 
terms of the three non-involved groups, they were selected because, although these groups 
have not engaged in GE, their focus lies in climate change, which includes the area of GE. 
It is meaningful to explore why they are not involved in GE since they do focus on a 
broader area of climate change. In China, due to the fact that none of ENGOs have been 
involved in GE, all respondents were selected within the type of non-involved groups. In 
detail, CBCGDF, HDIEO, TBEAS, IPE, Lvxing Taihang and Greenpeace China were 
chosen as participants for interview. These groups were interviewed because, in order to 
avoid selection bias when sampling, they cover a wide range of types of ENGOs 
concerning climate change in China, namely: government-supported NGOs, 
business-supported NGOs, large grassroots NGOs, small grassroots NGOs, and 
international NGOs. A brief introduction to these Chinese groups is provided in Table 1.1 
in the appendix.  
 
In terms of sample size, this research involves a relatively small number of NGOs as 
respondents. One may argue that the small number could produce problems in generating 
reliable findings. However, a small number of in-depth qualitative interviews, although it 
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may still have disadvantages, can be justified in the literature. According to Wilmot, the 
small number of cases is a feature of qualitative sampling, as ‘a phenomenon only need 
appear once to be of value’.239 It contrasts with quantitative sampling in that it does not 
emphasise statistical significance. 240  From a practical perspective, including a large 
quantity of in-depth interviews may go way beyond one’s ability to deal with data. In 
terms of how many qualitative interviews is enough, almost every scholar in methodology 
gives the same answer ‘it depends’.241 A consensus has been made that this includes 
research objectives, validity and practical concerns like time and resources.242 These 
factors, which have impacts on determining the number of interviews, can be summarised 
as inside and outside factors. Inside factors refer to methodological and epistemological 
considerations while outside factors include time and resources.243 Although it is inside 
factors that should determine the number of interviews in theory, normally it is outside 
factors that play a predominant role, especially for early career researchers.244 A concept 
of saturation is often employed to justify the number of interviews. It refers to a point ‘of 
diminishing return[s] to a qualitative sample because as the study goes on more data does 
not necessarily lead to more information’.245 However, achieving a stage of saturation is 
challenging as ‘it forces the research to combine sampling, data collection, and analysis’.246 
In addition, saturation is an ideal condition for data collection while in practice, it is 																																																								239	 Amanda	Wilmot,	Desiging	Sampling	Strategies	for	Qualitative	Social	Research:	With	Particular	Reference	to	the	
Office	for	National	Statistics'	Qualitative	Respondent	Register	(Survey	Methodology	Bulletin-Office	For	National	Statistics,	2005).	240	 Ibid.	241	 Sarah	Baker	and	Rosalind	Edwards,	How	Many	Qualitative	Interviews	Is	Enough?	Expert	Voices	and	Early	Career	
Reflections	on	Sampling	and	Cases	in	Qualitative	Research	(National	Centre	for	Research	Methods	Review	Paper,	2012).	242	 Ibid.	243	 Uwe	Flick,	Designing	Qualitative	Research	Book	1	of	The	SAGE	Qualitative	Research	Kit	(London:	Sage	Publications	2008).	244	 Ibid.	245	 Mark	Mason,	‘Sample	Size	and	Saturation	in	PhD	Studies	Using	Qualitative	Interviews’	(2010)	11	Qualitative	Social	Research	Art.	8.	246	 Bryman	(n	47).	
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difficult to achieve this stage or researchers often claim to achieve it but are unable to 
prove it.247 This is because the idea of saturation offers little practical guidance.248 In 
terms of my research, it achieves saturation to some extent as no more new valid 
information was identified after data collection. The respondents were basically holding 
similar views on the explanations for their involvement or non-involvement. What’s more, 
the special situation concerning GE in the UK and China also plays a vital role in 
determining the number of samples. In relation to the involved UK NGOs, although I 
cannot approach all involved groups due to constraints on time, at least all the main players 
regarding GE discussion in the UK were covered. With regard to non-involved ones, which 
is an even a larger quantity, although it is not feasible to include all of them due to limited 
time and resources, at least well-known groups involved in climate change were selected in 
order to explore why they do not engage with GE. This made the selection manageable and 
non-random from a potentially huge sample group. In the context of China, due to the fact 
that no NGOs have engaged with GE, the samples were only selected under the 
categorisation of non-involved groups. With limited time and resource, although it is 
unpractical to interview every well-known environmental group in China, a good variety of 
well-known environmental groups, with different types and sizes, were included which can 
avoid selection bias to some extent. 	
3.3.3 Qualitative interviews 
Qualitative interviewing, and more specifically semi-structured in-depth interviewing, is 																																																								247	 Mason	(n	245).	248	 Michelle	O'Reilly	and	Nicola	Parker,	‘'Unsatisfactory	Saturation':	A	Critical	Exploration	of	The	Notion	of	Saturated	Sample	Sizes	in	Qualitative	Research’	(2012)	13	Qualitative	Research	190.	
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employed as the research method. This emphasises detailed and rich answers. The in-depth 
nature of this research method aims to ‘gain a detailed insight into’ research questions 
from the perspective of respondents.249 According to the literature, in-depth interviews can 
be employed to explore, for example, ‘how people make decisions’ and ‘the motivation for 
certain behaviour’.250 This research seeks to explain and understand why NGOs become 
involved or not in GE as a policy area, which involves an idea of identifying how NGOs 
make decisions on their involvement or non-involvement and why they are motivated to 
become engaged in or stay clear of GE. Therefore, an in-depth interview is the appropriate 
method for this research. In addition, in-depth interviews, rather than other methods such 
as questionnaires, are more effective in gathering ‘privileged information’ if keys players 
can be approached.251 In terms of this research, the purpose is to investigate the deep 
reasons for NGO participation in GE. The most effective way of acquiring a rich amount 
of privileged information is to approach directors or those in senior leadership positions in 
NGOs. Therefore, by conducting in-depth interviews with directors or their equivalents in 
targeted groups in the UK and China, insights into NGO participation can be collected. 
  
The in-depth interview takes a form of semi-structured interview in this research. It is 
different from structured and unstructured interview methods as structured interviewing 
entails ‘the administration of an interview schedule by an interviewer’.252 This means that 
respondents are given the same context of questioning in order to ensure that their answers 
can be coded and processed quickly. Structured interviews are normally associated with 																																																								249	 Hennink,	Hutter	and	Bailey	(n	200).	250	 Ibid.	251	 Carey	(n	192).	252	 Bryman	(n	47).	
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quantitative research methods. Unstructured interviews are another typical form of 
qualitative interview. During an unstructured interview, there may be just a single question 
to which the interviewee can respond freely, which is considered very similar to a normal 
conversation. 253 This research employs semi-structured interviewing, which not only 
allows room for respondents but also expects them to follow a script to a certain extent; it 
demands rich and detailed answers for analysing rather than simple answers that are easily 
aggregated. In addition, a semi-structured interview is more effective in obtaining what is 
expected from respondents compared to an unstructured method: it involves the advantage 
of sticking to the research purpose and research questions. For the purposes of the current 
project, an interview guide containing a list of questions was been prepared before the 
formal interviews were conducted. 
 
The project included two phases: an initial pilot interview and a then series of formal 
interviews. Before the interviews started, a research ethical approval from University of 
Reading was attained in January 2016 for my research. The pilot study is not only designed 
to ‘test how well the interview flows but in order to gain some experience’, which helps 
refine the interview questions.254 The pilot interview aims not only to refine the interview 
design for the formal study but also helps answer several aspects of the research question. 
It provided experience that can be used to feed back into re-design of the formal interviews, 
which not only helped refine questions but also offered an outsider angle that generated 
valuable insights. Although there were various stakeholders involved in GE who could 
provide an indirect angle on ENGOs, the pilot study singled out meteorologists. This is 																																																								253	 Ibid.	254	 Ibid.	
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because, according to the existing public participation literature, scientists are a key part of 
traditional expert regulation of new technologies. Among various actors, they invariably 
play a central part in regulating novel technology, providing professional advice to 
regulators or governments. Depending on past collaborative experience with NGOs in 
governance, scientists can be expected to form views on NGO participation in regulating 
novel technology. Therefore, it was appropriate to invite meteorologists as respondents for 
the pilot study, as they are not only GE professionals but also tend to be experienced in 
collaborating with NGOs in regulating new technologies.  
 
The formal interviews aimed to explore answers for two research questions: the first 
question of whether NGOs have engaged with GE or not in the UK and China, and the 
main research question of why NGOs become involved in GE as a policy area or not in 
both countries. As a part of the public, the participation of NGOs, which is considered as 
the dependent variable in this research, has been discussed in the existing relevant 
literature. As mentioned in chapter 2, the majority of the literature on public participation 
in environmental law focuses mainly on several aspects, the first of which is the rationale 
of public participation. There are several main themes regarding the rationale of public 
participation: public participation as solutions to improve procedural legitimacy; 
participation to improve results and decisions as a substantive approach; public 
participation itself as an alternative regulatory tool against traditional 
command-and-control approach. The second involves methods of public participation. The 
third focus of the literature is on the benefits of as well as barriers to public participation.255 																																																								255	 Albert	and	Passmore	(n	174).	
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However, among the various topics discussed surrounding public participation, little 
attention has been made to the causes of NGO participation and what leads NGO, as an 
actor in public participation, to engage with certain policy areas, such as GE.  
 
 
Pilot study  
Time scale: from 20 May to 20 June 2016 
Location: Reading 
Participants: the pilot interview was conducted in the UK with an academic meteorologist 
in the Department of Meteorology, University of Reading who has not only expertise in 
GE but also collaboration experience with NGOs. In China, the pilot interview was 
conducted with two scholars involved in the ‘National 973 Project’ specifically on GE 
research.256 The two scientists were selected as respondents for the pilot interview because 
they are the only ones who have expertise on GE and possess a clear understanding of the 
situation concerning it in China. 
 
Procedure: first, invitations were sent by email attached with a question outline and an 
information sheet included as attachments; a time and location were then arranged 
according to the convenience of participants. Each pilot interview lasted for 45-60 minutes 
and the whole process was recorded. The languages used in the interviews in the UK and 
China were English and Mandarin respectively. 
 																																																								256	 Wenqi	Zhang	and	Weijing	Hao,	‘The	Launch	of	National	'973	Project'	on	Geoengineering’	CSSN	(16	June,	2015)	<http://www.cssn.cn/jjx/jjx_dt/201506/t20150616_2036676.shtml>	.	
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The question outline for the pilot interviews is listed in the appendix. The first part of 
question outline seeks to rate the knowledge of participants about GE and form a general 
picture of their perceptions of GE. The second part aims to investigate their views on GE 
governance and make revisions for the formal study according to the results of the pilot 
interview. The last section aims to investigate the involvement or non-involvement of 
NGOs from a scientific community perspective. 
 
 
Formal interviews  
Time scale: from 25 June to 25 Sep 2016 
Location: China and the UK 
Participants: Two categories of respondents in the UK were selected: NGOs involved in 
GE include Greenpeace UK, FoE, WWF, Blue & Green Tomorrow, Biofuel Watch and 
ETC Group; non-involved NGOs include Practical Action, ClientEarth, and TearFund. As 
none of Chinese NGOs have engaged with GE, only non-involved NGOs were selected as 
respondents including Greenpeace China, China Biodiversity Conservation and Green 
Development Foundation (CBCGDF), Hande Institute of Environment Observation 
(HDIEO), The Institute of the Public and Environment Affairs (IPE), and Lvxing Taihang, 
which range from international NGOs to grassroots NGOs. 
 
Procedure: invitations for the interviews were sent by email with a question outline and 
information sheet included as attachments; following this, the time and location were then 
arranged according to the convenience of participants. Each formal interview lasted for 
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45-60 minutes and the whole process was recorded. The language used in the interviews 
was either English or Mandarin. 
 
The question outline for the formal interviews is listed in the appendix. The first part of the 
question outline seeks to form a general picture of staff members’ knowledge about GE, 
while the second part tries to explore their different attitudes towards it and how they make 
decisions on their involvement or non-involvement. 			
3.3.4 Data analysis: grounded theory 
	
The general strategy of qualitative data analysis employed in this research is seen as 
grounded theory. This is defined as ‘theory that [i]s derived from data, systematically 
gathered and analyzed through the research process’, which emphasises theory generated 
from data collection and analysis.257 Although it is discussed as a method of data analysis 
in this section, it can also be considered as a strategy of data collection as it involves a 
complete process from gathering data to analysing data.258 That is to say, grounded theory 
is an approach guiding data collection and analysis, which involves a process for 
generating theory from empirical data in social sciences.259 
 
Concepts and categories are the key elements of grounded theory and it has several tools, 																																																								257	 Bryman	(n	47).	258	 Ibid.	259	 Hennink,	Hutter	and	Bailey	(n	200).	
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such as theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation, which have been mentioned in the 
preceding paragraphs, to guide the generation of concepts and categories. There are some 
characteristics of this approach that need to be emphasised. The first point worthy of note 
is that it involves an element of iteration. As is identified in the literature, grounded theory 
refers to a ‘circular process rather than a linear sequence of steps’.260 That is to say, the 
process of data collection and analysis needs to be repeated. In practices, this means that 
data is gathered from some participants at the outset, and analysis of this data is then 
conducted in order to refine and revise the questions as well as approach more eligible 
participants. Another round of data collection and analysis starts afterwards. In terms of 
this research, it adopts a grounded theory approach to collect and analyse data. At the 
outset of the research, roughly two participants were approached in the UK and China 
respectively to explore why they became involved with GE or not. Transcripts and analysis 
of the two interviews were then completed in order to revise the interview questions and 
identify who else was required as respondents to finally generate concepts and categories 
on the causes of their participation. That is to say, data analysis started after some data 
were collected and then shaped the next step of data collection based on the implications of 
the previous data. After this process, roughly two more ENGOs were approached as 
respondents and they were asked revised questions to see whether themes could be 
identified in terms of the reasons for their involvement or non-involvement with GE. This 
circular process was similarly carried out in the UK and China until reaching a point where 
concepts and categories could be generated. This raises another important point of 
grounded theory: saturation. It refers to a point where no more themes or elements are 																																																								260	 Ibid.	
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identified to fit in with the concepts or categories in terms of the coding of data, and a 
point where no new data is needed to formulate theory with regard to data collection. 
Therefore it emphasises the stage where a repetition of outcomes emerges.261 The issue of 
saturation has been discussed earlier in sampling strategy and sample size. 
 
There is the issue of constant comparison in grounded theory, which is regarded as the core 
element by Glaser and Strauss.262 It suggests that researchers compare bits of data so that 
categories can be identified, and then compare categories, notably paying attention to 
contrasts and connections between categories, in different settings.263 In terms of my 
research, it involves the core element of comparison, as it is a comparative research design 
to compare NGO participation in GE between the UK and China, which is not only 
cross-national but also cross-organisational. In terms of data and categories, raw data was 
analysed and compared to form different categories, notably gathering data to form 
important variables concerning why they become involved with GE or not. Different 
variables or categories were then compared within each country to identify which elements 
or categories play an important role in determining their involvement or non-involvement 
with GE. Finally, categories regarding the causes of involvement or non-involvement, 
which were generated from data in each country, were compared to achieve a 
cross-national comparison between the UK and China. 
 
Comparison includes a key process of coding, especially axial coding (explained further 																																																								261	 Carey	(n	192).	262	 Barney	Glaser	and	Anselm	Strauss,	The	Discovery	of	Grounded	Theory:	Strategies	for	Qualitative	Research	(London:	Aldine	Transaction	1967).	263	 Bryman	(n	47).	
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below). Within this strategy of data analysis, coding has been employed as the key process 
to explore the potential theoretical significance when reviewing the transcripts.264 It is 
regarded as the first step of generating theory and can be distinguished in three phases in 
grounded theory: open coding requiring researchers to be open-minded to break down, 
compare, categorise data and generate as many new ideas as necessary; axial coding aims 
to make connections between categories by putting data together in new ways; and 
selective coding emphasising the most common codes.265 In terms of my research, the 
process of data analysis follows these three stages: first, according to the transcripts, I 
examined the responses of each respondent carefully in order to find useful information as 
much as possible, and then identified repetitive themes, regarding why they became 
involved in GE or not, as codes which were grouped into categories later on. Second, 
based on already formed categories, I considered whether some categories could be linked 
together into a new category. For example, I found that many respondents in the UK 
mentioned an important element of resources in different ways. Some stated in effect that 
as they lack resources, such as money and time, they prefer to engage with areas where 
they can be more effective or more competitive rather than the area of GE. Others simply 
mentioned ‘resources’ by just stating that ‘they don’t have enough money’. Therefore, 
after reconsidering the code of ‘resource’, I grouped the latter response into a code of 
‘material resource’ and categorised the former response into a code of ‘strategy’. The last 
step was identifying the most common codes, which were discussed as the most important 
variables in chapter 8. 
 																																																								264	 Ibid.	265	 Ibid.	
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Another important issue requiring clarification concerns the point that grounded theory, 
after decades of development, involves many different approaches. According to Dey, 
‘there is no such thing as grounded theory if we mean by that a single, unified 
methodology as we have different interpretations of grounded theory’. 266 In the literature, 
a distinction between ‘a full grounded theory’ and ‘grounded theory-lite’ has been 
identified with the former requiring a full and complete process ranging from theoretical 
sampling to develop a theory while the latter includes employing the techniques of 
grounded theory to develop concepts and categories as well as connections between 
categories, but not a theory.267 The latter is the most frequently adopted strategy nowadays. 
My research, as with most research employing grounded theory, aims to develop 
categories and identify connections between categories by using the techniques of 
grounded theory. This interpretation of grounded theory is very similar to the analysis 
approach of thematic analysis. It aims to ‘construct an index of central themes and 
subthemes, which are then represented in a matrix for ordering and synthesising data’.268 
From the definition, it can be seen that thematic analysis also involves coding and 
generating patterns and categories.269 Themes are sometimes considered as codes or 
categories in the literature.270 However, the difference between grounded theory and 
thematic analysis is that grounded theory is a methodology including a set of procedures, 
not just a method as with thematic analysis.271 Therefore, although they have many 																																																								266	 Ian	Dey,	‘Grounded	Theory’	in	Clive	Seale	and	others	(eds),	Qualitative	Research	Practice	(London:	Sage	Publications	2007).	267	 Nick	Pidgeon	and	Karen	Henwood,	‘Using	Grounded	Theory	In	Psychological	Research’	in	Nicky	Hayes	(ed),	
Doing	Qualitative	Analysis	In	Psychology	(viii	edn,	Hove,	England:	Psychology	Press/Erlbaum	(UK)	Taylor	&	Francis	1997).	268	 Bryman	(n	47).	269	 Carey	(n	192).	270	 Bryman	(n	47).	271	 Kathy	Charmaz,	Constructing	Grounded	Theory:	A	Practice	Guide	Through	Qualitative	Analysis	(David	Silverman	ed,	CA:	Sage	2006).	 	
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similarities, grounded theory-lite is employed in this thesis to indicate a set of procedures 
including theoretical frameworks (ontological and epistemological positions), data 
collection and analysis. 		
3.3.5 Data storage and confidentiality 
I have gone through the ethical approval in University of Reading and been permitted to 
carry out interviews for my research. Consent forms including data confidentiality issues 
were sent to participants and signed by them before interviews started. The information 
given by participants will remain confidential and can only be accessed by the researcher 
and her supervisors. Respondents are not identified in the thesis although some of their 
responses will be used for discussion in an anonymised form in the later chapters. Any data 
collected has been held in strict confidence (i.e. on the N drive in the University of 
Reading Law School) and no real names were used in this study. The records and 
transcripts of this study have been and will be kept private. No identifiers linking 
respondents to the study will be included in any publications. The data will be destroyed 
securely and safely after five years. 		
3.3.6 Difficulties and Limitations 
This research adopts a small number of in-depth interviews to explore the reason why 
NGOs in the UK and China participate in GE or not. An advantage of small number 
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approaches is that they have better internal validity and measurement validity,272 which 
means the approaches allow more in-depth study into what we want to explore.273 
However, it has problems with generalising, which means the findings cannot be over 
generalised among all groups in the UK and China. Second, this research can be 
considered as a ‘most-different design’, which refers to a method examining cases as 
different as possible to identify similar factors influencing these different cases.274 This 
research includes two different cases of the UK and China in order to identify variables 
that work in both countries through comparison. Meanwhile, it is a cross-organisational 
comparative design between involved and non-involved NGOs. However, this method has 
a limitation in that ‘it is more useful for ruling out necessary causes than determining 
causality’.275  
 
There are also difficulties in conducting in-depth interviews in practice. The first aspect of 
difficulty lies in accessing participants. As the respondents need to speak for the 
organisations they represent, it is better to invite directors or staff members with high 
positions in these groups. Although most of the interviewed respondents were directors in 
their organisations, there was a difficulty in accessing chief directors in some large NGOs, 
such as Greenpeace. Another obstacle in approaching potential participants is that, 
																																																								272	 Internal	validity,	as	opposed	to	external	validity	was	introduced	by	Campbell	in	1957.	Internal	validity	aims	to	deal	with	the	question	of	whether	‘a	treatment	had	an	effect	in	a	given	study’	while	external	validity	addresses	the	issue	of	whether	this	effect	could	be	generalised.	(See	Donald	Campbell,	‘Factors	Relevant	to	the	Validity	of	Experiments	in	Social	Settings’	(1957)	54	Psychological	Bulletin	297;	Charles	Reichardt,	‘Internal	Validity’	(2015)	12	International	Encyclopedia	of	the	Social	&	Behavioral	Sciences	450)	Measurement	validity	relates	to	the	concern	whether	operationalization	‘adequately	reflect	the	concept	the	research	seeks	to	measure’.	(See	Robert	Adcock	and	David	Collier,	‘Measurement	Vadility:	A	Shared	Standard	for	Qualitative	and	Quantitative	Research’	(2001)	95	American	Political	Science	Review	529.)	273	 Baker	and	Edwards	(n	241).	274	 Arend	Lijphart,	‘Comparative	Politics	and	the	Comparative	Method’	(1971)	65	The	American	Political	Science	Review	682.	275	 Ibid.	
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especially in China, people turned down my request for an interview in the first place when 
they heard about the topic of GE, as they were reluctant to make comments if they had 
little knowledge on it. It takes time to persuade people to participate to talk about why they 
do not engage with GE and some still refused to be interviewed in the end. The second 
aspect of difficulty was conducting interviews in different national contexts. As mentioned 
earlier, this research involves a comparison between the UK and China. Due to the 
different situation concerning GE in the two countries, as well as the different languages 
required, it was difficult to arrange all the interviews in both countries in a relative short 
period of time to situate responses in different social contexts. In addition, translating the 
transcripts of interviews in China required considerable time, and also the accuracy of 
translation matters when understanding their responses. 
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Appendix	of	Chapter	3	
Appendix	3.1:	Question	outline	for	the	pilot	The	purpose	of	 this	 interview	 is	 to	 find	out	a	 little	more	about	 the	perceptions	and	experiences	 of	 respondent	 relating	 to	 geoengineering	 and	 views	 on	 the	 NGO	participation	in	it.	 		To	start	off,	what	do	you	know	about	geoengineering?	1.	How	did	you	find	out	about	geoengineering	for	the	first	time?	2.	Have	you	ever	done	research	on	geoengineering?	What	kind	of	research	have	you	done?	 	3.	As	a	climate	scientist,	is	your	work	now	specifically	focused	on	GE	research?	4.	So	far,	how	would	you	rate	your	own	knowledge	of	geoengineering?	 	5.	What	are	the	main	uncertainties	in	our	understanding	of	the	feasibility	and	impacts	of	geoengineering?	Do	you	think	geoengineering	will	be	 implemented	 in	the	 future?	Why?		What	are	your	perceptions	of	geoengineering	research	and	its	governance?	6.	How	would	you	classify	different	stages	of	research	on	geoengineering?	What	are	the	criteria	for	these	stages?	7.	To	the	best	of	your	knowledge,	what	stage	of	research	on	geoengineering	are	we	at	now?	 	8.	 What	 do	 you	 think	 are	 the	 most	 serious	 concerns	 involved	 in	 conducting	geoengineering	research?	 	9.	 Do	 you	 think	 self-governance	 is	 sufficient	 for	 the	 current	 research	 stage	 of	governance?	If	so,	why	is	that?	If	not,	what	further	measures	might	be	needed?	10.	 What	 kind	 of	 research	 governance	 do	 you	 think	 is	 needed	 at	 other	 stages	 of	research?		How	do	you	perceive	NGO	participation	in	geoengineering?	11.	Do	you	know	any	NGOs	who	have	 shown	 interest	 in	geoengineering?	 If	 you	do,	could	you	name	a	few?	(Which	NGOs?	What’s	the	nature	of	these	NGOs?	How	did	they	show	interest	in	geoengineering?)	
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12.	Have	you	ever	been	in	collaboration	with	NGOs	during	the	course	of	your	working	life?	If	so,	could	you	describe	the	circumstances	of	the	collaboration?	13.	What	are	the	benefits	and	obstacles	of	collaborating	with	NGOs?	14.	 Is	 there	 any	difference	of	 involvement	 in	 geoengineering	between	 the	 scientific	community	and	NGOs?	15.	What	do	you	think	are	the	most	serious	concerns	about	the	involvement	of	NGO	in	GE?	 			
Appendix	3.2:	Question	outline	for	formal	interviews	The	 purpose	 of	 this	 interview	 aims	 to	 find	 out	 the	 perceptions	 and	 experiences	 of	respondents	relating	geoengineering	and	the	reasons	why	NGOs	become	involved	or	not	in	GE.	 		To	start	off,	what	do	you	know	about	geoengineering?	1.	How	did	you	find	out	about	geoengineering	for	the	first	time?	2.	Have	you	ever	obtained	some	knowledge	about	geoengineering?	 	3.	As	a	staff	member	of	an	NGO,	is	your	work	now	related	to	GE	research?	4.	So	far,	how	would	you	rate	your	own	knowledge	of	geoengineering?	 	5.	 What	 do	 you	 think	 are	 the	 main	 uncertainties	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	feasibility	and	impacts	of	geoengineering?	 			How	do	you	perceive	the	role	of	NGOs	in	geoengineering?	6.	 Do	 you	 generally	 oppose	 or	 support	 GE	 research?	 Could	 you	 outline	 the	 main	reason?	7.	Has	your	institution	(namely	the	ENGO	you	work	for)	expressed	or	published	any	comments	or	opinions	in	any	method	on	GE?	Could	you	tell	me	about	it	in	detail?	8.	 If	your	 institution	has	been	engaged	in	GE,	could	you	tell	me	the	reason	why	you	have	paid	attention	to	this	area?	If	not,	could	you	explain	your	potential	reasons	for	staying	clear	of	GE?	9.	 Have	 NGO	 tried	 to	 get	 involved	 in	 establishing	 a	 governance	 framework	 for	 GE	research?	(This	could	be	a	specific	effort	by	your	institution	or	other	NGOs	you	know	of.)	
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10.	 If	so,	what	are	the	methods	or	opportunities	 for	NGOs	to	be	 involved?	What	are	the	challenges	and	obstacles	during	the	course?	 	11.	How	do	you	evaluate	the	effects	of	the	 involvement?	What	contributions	do	you	think	NGOs	can	make	to	governance	of	geoengineering?	12.	How	would	you	situate	NGOs	in	the	debate	of	geoengineering?	Which	NGOs	have	been	the	biggest	players	so	far	around	the	world?	13.	Chinese	NGOs:	What	 is	your	opinion	of	 the	national	geoengineering	project	 ‘the	Research	on	the	Theory	and	Impacts	of	Geoengineering’	in	China?	Has	any	NGO	tried	to	exerted	influence	on	the	project?		
Table	3.1:	Scope	of	Chinese	NGOs	
	 	
Typology	 	 Aims	and	scope	Greenpeace	China	 INGO	 Various	 topics	 in	environment	areas.	CBCGDF	 Government-supported	NGO	 Green	 development	 and	environmental	litigation.	HDIEO	 Business-supported	NGO	 Investigation	 on	 local	and	 regional	environmental	problems;	research	on	national	 and	worldwide	 hot	 topics	 in	environmental	area.	TBEAS	 Large	grassroots	NGO	 Local	 environmental	pollution	 problems,	 such	as	 air	 pollution	 and	water	 pollution	 in	 the	north	China.	IPE	 Large	grassroots	NGO	 Environmental	information	 disclosure	and	public	participation.	Lvxing	Taihang	 Small	grassroots	NGO	 Local	 pollution	problems	in	Hebei	Province.	
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Table	3.2:	Aims	of	UK	NGOs	
NGO	 Aims	and	scope	 	FoE	 Campaign	 group	 on	 various	 topics	 in	environment	 area,	 such	 as	 climate	change,	environmental	justice.	WWF	 Aiming	 at	 ensuring	 the	 harmony	between	human	beings	and	nature.	Greenpeace	 Campaign	 group	with	 various	 focuses,	such	 as	 climate	 change,	 oceans	 and	peace.	Blue	&	Green	Tomorrow	 Focusing	on	sustainable	living.	ETC	Group	 Aiming	 at	 monitoring	 power,	 tracking	technology,	 and	 strengthening	diversity.	Biofuelwatch	 Providing	 information,	 advocacy	 and	campaigning	 with	 regard	 to	 the	climate,	 environment,	 human	 rights,	and	public	health.	 	Practical	Action	 Aiming	at	using	sustainable	technology	to	challenge	poverty.	TearFund	 A	 Christian	 charity	 dealing	 with	reducing	poverty.	ClientEarth	 Lawyers	 using	 environmental	 law	 to	protect	 oceans,	 forests,	 other	 habitats	and	people.	
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Chapter	4	Interview	Results	
As mentioned in chapter 3, the main research method employed in this research is the 
qualitative in-depth interview method. It aims to answer the question of why NGOs 
participate or do not participate in GE in the UK and China. Based on this research 
question, samples of interviews were selected under the strategy of purposive sampling.276 
Respondents were selected in a strategic way through two criteria: first, two countries – the 
UK and China – were chosen as case studies;277 second, a certain number of NGOs within 
each country were selected. Most of the NGO respondents are environmental NGOs 
(ENGOs), making them eligible and relevant to this study. As mentioned in chapter 3, an 
ENGO is a non-governmental organisation in the environmental field. This research seeks 
to identify two types of ENGOs in each country, NGOs involved in GE and those not 
involved in it. In the UK, six ENGOs that are involved in GE were selected as respondents: 
FoE, WWF, ETC Group, Biofuel Watch, Blue & Green Tomorrow, and Greenpeace. 
These six NGOs are the most active NGO players in GE discussion. As for the 
non-involved NGOs, TearFund, Practical Action, and ClientEarth were selected. This is 
because, although these groups have not engaged in GE, their focus includes climate 
change, which is covered within the scope of GE. It is meaningful to explore why they are 
not involved in GE since they do focus on the broader sector of climate change and might, 
potentially, be expected to have some interest in GE. In China, due to the fact that none of 
the ENGOs have been involved in GE, all the respondents were selected from 
																																																								276	 For	literature	on	‘purposive	sampling’,	see	for	example,	Bryman	(n	47).	277	 The	reason	why	I	select	the	UK	and	China	as	case	studies	has	been	discussed	in	section	1.2.4.	
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non-involved groups. CBCGDF, HDIEO, TBEAS, IPE, Lvxing Taihang, and Greenpeace 
China were chosen as respondents for the interview. The reason why these groups were 
decided on as the respondents is that they cover a wide range of types of ENGO in China, 
namely government-supported NGOs, business-supported NGOs, large grassroots NGOs, 
small grassroots NGOs, and international NGOs respectively. This wide range of choice 
aims to reduce selection bias when sampling.  
 
In this chapter, the results of qualitative interviews to the ENGOs mentioned above are 
presented. These results will be employed to analyse the research question of why NGOs 
are or are not involved in GE in the UK and China. This analysis will be developed more 
fully in chapters 6 and 7. This chapter comprises three sections: section 4.1 presents the 
empirical results of interviews in China; section 4.2 provides the data collected among UK 
NGOs; the final section addresses concluding remarks of results in the two countries and 
points out interesting responses to be discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 		
4.1	Interview	Results	in	China	
Based on the interviews in China, it was identified that none of the ENGOs had worked on 
GE as a policy area. The fact was first identified by searching online with keywords like 
‘Geoengineering and NGO’, before conducting formal interviews in China, as no relevant 
search results revealed any Chinese NGO involvement. This assertion was validated by 
conducting interviews with respondents from Chinese NGOs where all respondents 
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indicated that they had realised that no groups, including their own organisation, were yet 
involved in GE. According to the methods outlined in chapter 3, nine interviews were 
conducted in China to investigate opinions on GE and reasons for non-involvement. Before 
conducting formal interviews, I carried out a pilot interview with a social scientist and a 
climate scientist on GE, both of whom are involved in the Chinese National 973 Project on 
GE. This national research project is the only research project specifically focused on GE 
in China. The two scientists were selected as respondents for the pilot interview because 
they are the only Chinese respondents that have expertise on GE and possess a clear 
understanding of circumstances surrounding GE in China. The aim of conducting a pilot 
interview is to examine the interview questions for the formal interviews and perhaps find 
likely initial answers to these questions. In relation to formal interviews, as mentioned 
above, none of the interviewed NGOs had engaged with GE.  	
4.1.1 Academics, Social Science Association (SSA), and Beijing Normal 
University: Pilot Interview 
I interviewed two academics from the National 973 project on GE in China: a professor 
from the social science group at the Social Science Association (SSA) and an expert from 
Beijing Normal University focusing on the technical part of GE. They commented on GE 
research, Chinese NGOs’ involvement in GE and public participation in GE. Generally, 
they held similar views on GE research that computer experiments should be carried out. 
These opinions were held based on several factors. First, GE is likely to have a great 
impact on a global scale, including in China, which requires us to consider it carefully 
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before deployment. It is also important for China to participate in GE research as a 
technical preparation for the nation. Second, computer modeling has no adverse climatic 
impact, and hence will not cause any health and environmental issues. However, there is a 
limitation for GE research in China as scientific research is based primarily on climate 
models without consideration of engineering factors. This makes it unrealistic or 
unpractical to some extent. For example, according to the respondent from SSA, ‘scientific 
research is mainly based on climate models in China. Scientists can change an index of a 
climate model on the computer easily just by clicking on the screen; however, they cannot 
do this in reality. This is a problem for research that scientists have not considered how to 
achieve the change of index in the real world’. 
 
In terms of GE NGO participation in China, they both agree that there are virtually no 
Chinese NGOs currently focused on or involved in GE except for a very few International 
NGOs in China, such as Greenpeace China. According to scientists, the reasons why 
NGOs in China do not talk about GE can be summarised in five points:  
• First, Chinese NGOs do not have enough expertise on GE. Besides the several 
scientists involved in the national GE project, the general public, including NGOs, 
does not have any foundational knowledge related to GE. Without enough 
information or expertise on GE, NGOs are not able to generate opinions or comments 
on it.  
 
• Second, NGOs in China do not have channels for accessing information on GE. GE is 
a specialised area in climate change and scientists in China have not made it clear to 
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the public, as it is still at its initial stage of research. In addition, Chinese NGOs have 
no collaborations, or even connections, with the scientific and academic community 
on GE.  
 
• Third, Chinese NGOs focus more on traditional environmental issues, such as 
pollution, energy saving and animal protection. They seldom choose topics on 
emerging technology or innovative environmental areas.  
 
• Fourth, most Chinese NGOs concentrate specifically on local environmental problems. 
In general, when the NGOs are initially founded, they are generally based on local 
issues, which tie in with their institutional aims. They may then go on to expand their 
focus to different areas during their organisational development.  
 
• Fifth, a low level of public consciousness of GE in China has led to the public caring 
more about environmental issues closely related to their daily life, especially 
environmental problems causing health issues. GE is neither salient to them, nor is it 
related to daily life. Therefore, without public concern, NGOs have little motivation 
to discuss GE. This point raises an interesting idea concerning public salience in 
political science aimed at exploring the various levels of importance of issues 
attached by the public, which will be discussed in further detail in chapter 6. 
Furthermore, as in its early stage of research, the scientists or experts involved in the 
national GE project do not regard it as an urgent issue. There are much more 
imminent concerns, such as air pollution, and therefore it may not be cost effective in 
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terms of time investment to spend time on GE. This relates to the sense of urgency in 
terms of the nature of the threat, which is discussed as an important variable to 
explain the non-involvement of Chinese NGOs in chapter 6. 
 
Greenpeace is an international NGO in China that has had some knowledge on GE. This is 
first because, in general, INGOs have more expertise than Chinese NGOs in climate 
science, which means their staff is better trained and more qualified. The INGO may also 
have received support, such as technology support and funding support, from their 
headquarters abroad. Additionally, INGOs may become involved in GE due to their global 
organizational aims. For example, Greenpeace China can access information on GE from 
its headquarters and can be involved in it according to the requirements from headquarters. 
INGOs in China also generally have sufficient professionalism to produce reports on 
environmental issues. These reports are well received by the scientific and academic 
communities in China. For example, the interviewed climate scientist sometimes quotes 
their newsletters or reports and then translates them into scientific language when 
conducting scientific research. This reveals that the expertise of INGOs in China is 
acknowledged by the academic community, and therefore provides more opportunities for 
them to engage in conversations with academics.  
4.1.2 Results of Formal Interviews 
Formal interviews were conducted amongst six ENGOs in China, none of which have 
engaged in GE. The government supported NGO – China Biodiversity Conservation and 
Green Development Foundation (CBCGDF) – considers biodiversity as their foremost 
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mission. HD Institute of Environment Observation (HDIEO) is a business-supported NGO 
focusing mainly on an environmental history project to record important environmental 
incidents in China. Tianjin Binhai Environment Advisory Service (TBEAS) is a large 
grassroots NGO focusing mainly on water pollution in Tianjin, due to the interest of the 
NGO’s leader in its early years, and has since expanded its mission to other environmental 
issues, including national climate change, based on public concerns and government policy. 
The other interviewed large grassroots NGO – the Institute of the Public and Environment 
Affairs (IPE) - focuses specifically on the disclosure of environmental information and 
public participation. As for small grassroots NGOs, Lvxing Taihang was selected as the 
respondent. It is a newly established NGO focusing specifically on pollution in Hebei 
province. In relation to INGOs in China, Greenpeace China was selected as the eligible 
participant.278  
 
The results of the interviews are presented according to the interview questions. The 
interview questions can be categorised in three parts: their knowledge on GE, the reason 
why they do not engage with GE, and their perceptions of NGO participation generally in 
China. These questions aim to explore the possible answers to the research question of why 
NGOs participate or do not participate in GE. At the beginning of the interviews, 
respondents’ knowledge on GE was explored to identify whether they have a basic 
understanding of it by asking questions like ‘how did you find out bout GE for the first 
time? And what do you know about it?’ It is not surprising that domestic Chinese NGOs 																																																								278	 This	is	because,	according	to	the	results	of	online	searching	on	NGOs	involved	with	GE	as	a	policy	area	in	China,	only	staff	members	from	Greenpeace	China,	who	became	the	respondents	for	my	research	later	on,	have	some	knowledge	on	GE.	Before	conducting	interviews	with	them,	I	was	expecting	them	to	talk	about	why	they	engaged	with	GE;	however,	it	turned	out	that,	although	the	staff	members	knew	about	the	topic,	they	were	not	involved	in	GE	as	an	organisation.	
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did not have any knowledge on GE. For example, the respondent from CBCGDF stated 
that the staff members have no knowledge or expertise on GE because there is not any 
publicity of GE in China. The same response was identified during the interviews with the 
other domestic NGOs. They all stated that they had never heard about the topic of GE in 
China. Greenpeace China, the interviewed INGO, indicated that the organisation had some 
information on GE. Firstly, this was due to a mandate from the headquarters that they have 
some knowledge of GE as part of the overall international mission of their organization. 
There was no direct mandate to engage with GE. Secondly, one of them had carried out 
research on GE for a PhD project but it was not related to current work. They also had 
communications with experts from the national GE project in China but these were 
personal and not on behalf of Greenpeace as an organisation. However, the respondent 
stated that Greenpeace China had not engaged with GE as a policy area. Therefore, it was 
evident that domestic Chinese NGOs did not have any basic understanding, much less 
expertise, of GE. The interviewed INGO did have some knowledge of it. 
 
After exploring their knowledge level on GE, I went on to investigate the core issue of the 
interviews, notably the reasons why they do not engage with GE. In response to a number 
of semi-structured questions, the respondents from domestic Chinese NGOs all provided 
very similar answers, while the INGO, Greenpeace China, provided different reasons. The 
first important and frequently mentioned reason for non-involvement by domestic Chinese 
NGOs was a deficit in information and expertise on GE. For example, the respondent from 
CBCGDF stated that they did not engage with GE because ‘the staff members have no 
knowledge or expertise on it and this is due to the lack of publicity on GE in China’. As for 
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HDIEO, the interviewee confirmed that the staff members in the organisation lack 
expertise on GE. He continued to explain that ‘we have no channel to get information on 
GE as we generally update information using social media and government reports which 
have not mentioned GE so far’. Respondents from TBEAS and IPE respectively also 
mentioned this information acquisition problem. They explained that ‘external exchange of 
information on topics such as GE has relied heavily on staff members including leaders. If 
we have not established contacts with NGOs abroad especially organisations in the UK and 
US, we can hardly find appropriate channels to retrieve information on GE. In addition, 
domestic NGOs in China generally seldom cooperate with academics or research institutes, 
which leads to the situation that they are not updated with scientific information related to 
the environment’. The participant from Lvxing Taihang stated that ‘small NGOs generally 
have no information on GE’. According to his explanation, it can be concluded that they 
have very limited means of retrieving information on GE. In theory, small NGOs are able 
to access information from the official websites of the Environmental Protection 
Administrations, news reports and communication with other NGOs. However in practice, 
they seldom keep up to date with the latest information. Additionally, small NGOs devote 
their time to solving local environmental problems, mainly by lobbying local governments 
directly or conducting field investigations on environmental issues. Therefore they barely 
take in updated, wider scientific information. In terms of expertise, the respondent in effect 
stated that small NGOs share the same lack of expertise. Most staff members are not well 
trained or do not possess a relevant scientific background and, thus, they may not be able 
to comment on specialised areas such as GE.  
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The idea of a deficit in knowledge and information can be analysed under the variable of 
resource, which will be discussed in further detail in chapter 6. The problem of expertise 
amongst domestic Chinese NGOs, considered as a form of labour resource, will also be 
discussed in chapter 6. However, the respondents from Greenpeace China did not mention 
any problems with a deficit in information or expertise. The difference in expertise and 
information between Greenpeace China and domestic Chinese NGOs will be analysed in 
chapter 6. 
 
Another important point made by the respondents is the focus area of a NGO. All 
respondents, including the interviewees from Greenpeace China, mentioned the idea of 
NGO’s focus and topic. For CBCGDF, the respondent stated that ‘many 
government-supported NGOs mainly focus on the macro-level of environmental policy, 
such as publicizing ideas according to government policy’. Therefore, the respondent 
indicated effectively that, as the government has not placed it on the agenda in the political 
area, government supported NGOs might not focus on GE unless and until government has 
made its policy position clear. This raises the idea of the political preferences of 
governments, as discussed in the literature on political opportunity, which will be 
examined in detail in chapter 6. The HDIEO interviewee stated that ‘the reason why 
HDIEO has not talked about or focused on GE is that it mainly works for the sponsor 
company that provides funding for HDIEO and focuses on areas according to the director’s 
interest’. The TBEAS respondent attributed non-involvement partly to the NGO’s focus 
area. He explained that ‘the initial focus depends on the interest of the director and then 
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expands to other areas according to results of field investigations,279 public consciousness 
and government policy during the process of development. Normally, NGOs focus on local 
environmental problems first and then pay attention to national and international 
environmental issues after they have established a broader network through social media’. 
Respondents’ views indicate that, at the early stages of NGO establishment it is not typical 
for NGOs to examine GE as an issue as GE is not considered a local problem. When 
NGOs have broader working areas, they may still be unwilling to consider GE because 
neither public consciousness nor government policy surrounding GE has been formed in 
China. As for Lvxing Taihang, a grassroots NGO, the interviewee stated that their working 
areas are based principally on the interests of the director and are, therefore, typically 
restricted to local environmental issues. The Greenpeace China respondent also included 
the focus of the group as one of the reasons why they did not engage with GE. According 
to the respondents, they choose their topics depending on whether they can effectively 
make contributions, which requires people with expertise, institutional capability, and 
enough funds to be spent on GE. This response raises the issue of effectiveness and 
material resource, which will be analysed under the variables of strategy and resource 
respectively in chapter 6. 
 
Greenpeace China mentioned several interesting points that were not identified in the 
responses by domestic Chinese NGOs. First, it is still very early for NGOs to be focusing 
on GE. According to the respondents, Greenpeace focuses more on mainstream 
environmental areas such as energy and pollution, which are more urgent than GE. This 																																																								279	 This	refers	to	field	investigations	into	local	environmental	problems.	
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decision relates to the sense of urgency and will be discussed in further detail in chapter 6.  
 
Second, the respondents stated that ‘GE is a novel topic in all kinds of disciplines such as 
politics, science and economics, without a clear impact on the environment’. This suggests 
that there is a concern surrounding the uncertainties and ethical issues (such as moral 
hazard in terms of the impact) of GE.  
 
Third, they made it clear that GE is still a topic located primarily within the scientific 
community and it takes time to make it known it to the wider public, including NGOs, and 
for the government to adopt policy making in the area. According to the respondents, it 
may be more reasonable to say that ‘the scientific community has not publicized GE to the 
public rather than saying that NGOs have not focused on it’. Another important point made 
by the respondents is that ‘it is important to know about the overall political environment 
in China, which means that understanding what the big theme is for government currently 
is crucial. In particular, if you have conducted good research, you must wait for the right 
time to put that information across, which may involve having to wait for the right 
moments in the political cycle where the government can actually take it in’. This point 
can be seen within the political opportunity variable, which will be an important focus of 
the discussion in chapter 6. 
 
The third portion of the interviews dealt with NGO participation in government policy in 
China. According to the respondent from CBCGDF, NGOs can play several roles in 
improving public participation in China. Firstly, they can publicize both policy and 
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environmental information. Secondly, NGOs can act as a bridge for communication 
between the public and the government when public anxiety is heightened over a specific 
issue. NGOs in China take on the role of a mediator, which will be further discussed in the 
literature on participation in chapter 5. However, according to the CBCGDF respondent, 
the difficulty with participation lies within the communication with the government. Most 
government supported NGOs do not participate until the government needs them to, as 
sometimes the government will not let them engage even if they would like to become 
involved. It is also important for NGOs to know how to communicate with the government. 
This means it may be hard for NGOs to participate when their views do not align with 
government views. This point relates to political opportunity and will be analysed further 
in chapter 6.  
 
HDIEO’s respondent also talked about NGO participation within government policy. He 
stated that the common method of participation for large NGOs is to apply for government 
projects on policymaking280. These programs allow the NGOs to make recommendations in 
reports and, thereby, have an influence. He added that ‘another method is to make plans on 
ecology development for government in the context of environmental impact assessment’. 
In addition, the respondent indicated that large NGOs hold regular meetings with the 
government and other NGO partners to discuss environmental issues, which is an effective 
way to influence policymaking. Based on this response, the relationship between NGOs 
and the government can be summarised as two types of relationship. On the one hand, 
there is a distance between NGOs and the government, as the government does not 																																																								280	 In	this	process,	according	to	the	respondent,	NGOs	can	bid	for	policy	projects	and	receive	funding	or	grant	for	this.	
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completely trust NGOs, especially INGOs. On the other hand, NGOs are very much reliant 
on the government as the government strictly restricts their activities.  
 
Out of the large NGOs in China, the respondents from TBEAS and IPE both believed that 
NGOs could act as a bridge between the government and the public. They believe this 
because the public finds it difficult to communicate with the government directly and may 
end up turning to mass protest in order to exert pressure on the government. NGOs can 
provide information before a protest is organised. This can help the government to identify 
and deal with relevant issues. However, the respondents added that the government faces a 
dilemma in that, although they may disclose high-quality information effectively, the 
public still may not be satisfied. Nevertheless, if the government fails to disclose 
information, conflicts will be more likely to crop up. With regard to the small, grassroots 
NGO, Lvxing Taihang, the interviewee indicated that small NGOs are potentially able act 
as a bridge between the government and the public. This is first because small NGOs have 
closer connections with the public. For example, the public provides information and 
reports environmental issues to the NGO via social media. However, smaller NGOs 
seldom publicize or campaign as they have no expertise and cannot ensure quality 
communication. Smaller NGOs generally seek out local environmental issues and then 
lobby local governments to provide solutions or attention to these issues. Meanwhile, small 
NGOs are able to influence the policymaking process by providing suggestions via an 
online government portal which revises laws and acts. However, in practice, due to the 
lack of expertise, most small NGOs are not able to make effective comments on it.  
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When it comes to Greenpeace China, both respondents also thought NGOs could act as a 
bridge between the government and the public. According to the respondents, INGOs can 
play a significant role in the publicity of scientific research. For example, Greenpeace 
conducts activities related to air pollution research at Beijing University. This cooperation 
with academics in universities helps bring their scientific recommendations to light in a 
way that the public will understand. Apart from air pollution, INGOs have frequently made 
use of research information from academics. Secondly, INGOs may apply pressure on the 
government by publicizing environmental issues and improving public consciousness so 
that the government is forced to deal with their issues. Thirdly, INGOs have various ways 
to influence policymaking. INGOs were able to use social media and their connections 
with deputies in the People’s Congress when the government solicits opinions.281 In 
addition, they are considered as experts on environmental issues to bring expertise or 
technology from overseas to improve their own institutional capability.  	
4.1.3 Conclusion on the results in China 
This section provides a brief summary on the results of the interviews in China. For impact 
and brevity, the data will not be presented in full detail. Rather, this paper will explore key 
themes and arguments and delve deeper into relevant issues. This approach may result in 
omitting some interesting points made by the respondents. However, all interesting points 
made, including those not presented in this section, will be addressed in detail in the 																																																								281	 Since	January	2017,	new	Chinese	laws	were	launched	to	tighten	security	controls	over	foreign	NGOs,	which	aimed	to	crackdown	against	‘foreign	forces’	and	protect	national	interests;	see	Zheping	Huang,	‘NGOs	Are	Under	Threat	In	China's	Latest	Crackdown	Against	Foreign	Forces’	(2017)	 	<https://qz.com/873489/ngos-are-trying-to-stay-alive-in-chinas-latest-crackdown-against-foreign-forces/>	accessed	4	January	2017.	
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discussion in chapter 6.  
 
Based on the results presented above, several themes emerge surrounding why NGOs have 
not been involved in GE.  
• First, the deficit in knowledge and lack of expertise on GE is identified as an 
important point concerning domestic Chinese NGOs.  
 
• Second, the focus of the relevant groups significantly affects non-involvement of both 
INGOs and domestic Chinese NGOs.  
 
• Third, low public consciousness on GE in China is an important political opportunity 
that will be discussed in chapter 6.  
 
• Fourth, the sense of urgency and effectiveness is only identified in the response from 
Greenpeace China.  
 
• Fifth, resources, including money and time, were frequently mentioned by all 
respondents, which will also be analysed in chapter 6. The role of NGOs in public 
participation in general can be identified as a bridge for communication between the 
government and the public. This raise up the mediating role of NGOs in the literature 
on public participation, which will also be discussed in further detail later on. 	
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4.2	Interview	Results	in	the	UK	
This section presents the results of the interviews conducted in the UK. Generally, the 
results indicate that some ENGOs have engaged with GE while others have not. The pilot 
interview with a climate scientist was conducted at the Department of Meteorology at the 
University of Reading. The aim of the pilot interview was to examine the questions for the 
subsequent formal interviews as well as find likely answers to some of these questions. 
The reason for inviting a climate scientist as the respondent for the pilot interview is that 
the scientist possesses a good understanding of GE and the stakeholders involved in the 
discussion on it. The formal interviews with ENGOs in the UK were carried out among 
eight respondents from nine different organisations (one respondent works for both Biofuel 
Watch and ETC Group and hence speaks for the two organisations). Among them, six of 
the involved ENGOs are main players that actively participate in GE policy discussion and 
campaigns in the UK: Greenpeace, ETC Group, Biofuel Watch, WWF, Friends of the 
Earth, and Blue & Green Tomorrow. The three NGOs that are not involved in GE are 
TearFund, Practical Action and ClientEarth. The results of the interviews will be presented 
in two parts: NGOs that are involved in GE and those that are not. Within each part, the 
responses will be summarised in different categories according to the structure of the 
interview questions. However, the responses will not be constrained strictly within each 
question, as the questions were semi-structured. Finally, a conclusion will be made that 
will point out any interesting or surprising answers or responses.  	
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4.2.1 Climate Scientist: Pilot Interview 
The respondent has a basic understanding of climate models and an interest in scientific 
and policy issues surrounding GE. A group of semi-structured questions concerning the 
respondent’s opinions on GE and research, perceptions of NGO participation and expertise 
were asked. The respondent considered GE as a last resort. However, he regarded research 
on GE as beneficial and sensible as it contributes to a better understanding of climate 
change, although he understood the concern that research may lead people towards 
deployment. He mentioned that amongst NGOs involved in GE in the UK, some 
organisations are hostile, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, as they fear that GE 
would distract people from reducing GHG emissions (i.e. mitigation). This view was 
confirmed by other respondents, which will be discussed later in this section. It is 
interesting to note that viewing GE as a distraction has been identified as one of the key 
reasons why NGOs in the UK are reluctant to become involved. This will be analysed in 
further detail in chapter 7.  
 
He continued to explain that ‘I would imagine many of the ENGOs are against it because 
they fear it would be sending the wrong message that we can engineer our way out of the 
problem rather than solving the problem, which is emissions, in the first place’.  In terms 
of NGOs’ hostile position to GE, the respondent agreed with the general view held by 
many NGOs that we should concentrate on reducing emissions at the current stage. 
However, he highlighted a concern about NGOs that are resistant to scientific facts. 
According to his response, ‘some NGOs have a prescribed policy and are hard to move 
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from that policy’, meaning they are slow to adapt to scientific facts if the facts contradict a 
policy. Finally, the respondent raised a crucial point regarding NGOs’ involvement in GE. 
He stated, ‘it is a case of proportion, which means it seems to be fine if there is a relatively 
a small proportion of NGOs working on GE rather than a huge institution dedicated to it’. 
This point highlights the importance of the proportion of resources, such as labour and 
money allocated into the area of GE. A similar view on the proportion of resources is also 
identified in other respondents’ answers. This relates to resource mobilization and will be 
analysed in further detail in chapter 7. 
4.2.2 Interviews with Involved NGOs 
Interviews were carried out with Greenpeace, Biofuel Watch, ETC Group, Friends of the 
Earth, WWF, and Blue & Green Tomorrow.282 These NGOs are the most actively involved 
groups in the UK. 
  
First, I explored the knowledge level of respondents on GE in order to have a basic 
understanding of their background. In general, all of the respondents believed that they had 
a relatively good knowledge on GE. For example, the respondent from Greenpeace had 
expertise in ocean fertilisation and was well informed on other technologies and proposals 
concerning biodiversity. He pointed out that Greenpeace put a marker down concerning 
GE when there was not really an active debate on it. Due to this early attempt to explore 
this area, as well as their general expertise as a NGO, they were invited to many 
discussions on GE and involved in crucial reports, such as the 2009 Royal Society 																																																								282	 All	the	interviewed	UK	NGOs	have	been	introduced	briefly	in	Table	3.2.	
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Report.283 In addition, he indicated that, with a good grasp of the uncertainties and the 
areas of unknown, he possessed more expertise on GE than many others within the NGO 
community. The respondent from both the ETC Group and Biofuel Watch also amassed a 
sound knowledge of GE during the course of his working experience. He explained that the 
current focus of his work is the implications of GE under the Paris Agreement. This raises 
an interesting point in that respondents have frequently mentioned the Paris Agreement 
when talking about GE. In chapter 7, this will be discussed under the variable of political 
opportunity concerning contingent factors. The respondent from Friends of the Earth stated 
that they had carried out some smaller projects and research on both SRM and CDR, and 
the NGO had a policy position on GE. The respondent from WWF held a similar view. He 
understood GE well in the context of mitigation and WWF has a position statement on GE 
within this context. The Blue & Green Tomorrow respondent stated that, as a 
nonprofessional rather than as a scientist, he personally had a good knowledge on GE. 
 
After exploring the respondents’ knowledge on GE, I went on to investigate their 
perceptions of GE research activities. It is interesting to identify that all respondents 
indicated that they do not oppose all forms of GE research. Some research, such as 
computer modelling, has brought many insights which are useful for the wider public to 
understand what options we have in the future. They believed that the decision whether to 
oppose or support GE research should depend on a case-by-case basis. However, they all 
expressed concern over the moral issues, in particular that too much effort and resource 
devoted to GE research will be a distraction from investing resources in other approaches 																																																								283	 Shepherd	and	others	(n	11).	
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to combating global warming. This is consistent with the view held by the Reading climate 
scientist, that the proportion of resources is a concern, in that we should not devote too 
much to GE. Instead, we need to invest the majority of resources elsewhere, notably in 
mitigation and adaptation. This is a key point related to the variable of resources, which 
will be discussed further in detail in chapter 7. The responses indicate that the NGO 
respondents generally do not oppose GE research activities, which can bring some useful 
insights and understanding to climate change, as long as there is not a large proportion of 
resource allocated to it. Aside from a general agreement amongst the respondents on this 
issue, the respondent from ETC Group and Biofuel Watch questioned the motivation 
behind various research activities on GE. He argued that ‘there is a particular reason 
behind carrying the research out. Lots of experiments are led by the funding and the body 
behind them, and expecting the outcome they are hoping for’. He suggests that we should 
pay attention to the sources of funding for research to ensure that the research is beyond 
reproach.   
 
These six NGOs are actively involved in the GE discussion and have published official 
opinions on the topic. In general, these organisations have significant concerns about GE. 
The respondent from Greenpeace indicated that they generally oppose the deployment of 
GE, as it is a risky strategy with no guarantee that the benefits would outweigh the risks. 
Greenpeace also highlighted that the research may have significant adverse impacts on the 
environment. Their view on the benefits and risks is consistent with the costs and benefits 
model in the resource mobilisation literature and with the idea of technological fear within 
the variable of emotions, which will be analysed in chapter 7. The respondent then added 
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that ‘we do not actively support research into GE but we do support having a governance 
system in place’. The respondent from ETC Group and Biofuel Watch indicated that they 
have commented on GE and tried to analyse research possibilities but, in general, the NGO 
has sought to be oppositional on it. As for FoE, the interviewee mentioned their policy 
position regarding their concern about SRM specifically. The respondent from WWF 
suggested that GE is not something necessarily to be considered as a first choice. The 
respondent from Blue & Green Tomorrow stated that their official view is that ‘GE is part 
of the continuum of sustainability: mitigation prevents the change; adaptation adapts to the 
change; and GE reverses the change’. From their involvement in and views on GE, it can 
be seen that these NGOs, which are actively involved in GE, are in varying degrees 
generally opposing it, expressing their concerns about GE activities, and contributing to 
governance control over it.  
 
The respondents provided a range of reasons for their involvement in GE. The respondent 
from Greenpeace outlined two main reasons for becoming involved:  
• First, Greenpeace is committed to dealing with the problems of climate change and, 
within this context, became involved in order to point out that GE is a distraction 
from the urgent actions needed to reduce emissions. In addition, he indicated that the 
1.5-degree target in the Paris Agreement means we still have to deal with emissions 
by any methods necessary, which may increase the potential and possible scope for 
GE methods. This response is interesting in that the Paris Agreement has encouraged 
Greenpeace to become involved in GE as a policy area rather than focusing purely on 
mitigation.  
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• The second reason for their involvement is due to the potential for GE to have its own 
impact on biodiversity. Biodiversity is one of the most important focuses for 
Greenpeace and they are involved in order to explore the potential impacts of GE on 
biodiversity. As for Biofuel Watch, the respondent stated that the main area of 
concern for them is biological techniques, which include GE techniques such as ocean 
fertilisation.  
 
The respondent from the ETC Group stated that it tended to focus on emerging and new 
technologies associated with the environment, which means that GE is within its remit. 
From the responses, we can conclude that being ‘within the remit’, which is considered 
related to the variable of goals, is the main reason why ETC Group and Biofuel Watch 
have become involved in GE. These points concerning the variable of goals will be 
discussed in further detail in chapter 7. In addition, according to the respondent, the main 
focus of the two groups is trying to disseminate the message of the Paris Agreement to the 
public, which again emphasises the Paris Agreement as a context variable. In relation to 
Friends of the Earth, the respondent provided two reasons for their involvement. Firstly, ‘it 
is clear to us that our chances of meeting the 1.5 degrees target in the Paris Agreement are 
incredibly limited, so we need to be looking to see what efforts CDR could have’, which 
will be discussed under the variable of political opportunity as Paris can be seen as 
representing this.284 The second reason is that they are trying to stop the political and 
scientific community from disseminating the message that there is no longer a need to 																																																								284	 This	point	will	be	analysed	in	section	7.1.1.	
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bother with mitigation. In relation to WWF, the respondent provided reasons from a 
different angle that GE is one of the things that they need to give some attention to in order 
to keep on top of it as an organisation. This is discussed under the sub-variable of 
competition in chapter 7.285 He also stated that the involvement is attributed to the fact that 
WWF is an ENGO with a working area including climate change, which suggests that GE 
falls under their goal remit. From the responses concerning the reasons for their 
involvement, it is interesting that all of the relevant NGOs mentioned the Paris Agreement 
and the goals of their organisations. 
 
Some respondents expressed their concerns on the perceptions of the involvement of other 
NGOs. The respondent from Greenpeace had a concern about the involvement of a volume 
of NGOs in the discussions on GE. This is because it is a distraction for NGOs, which are 
considered as having limited resources, to take up all their time and energy on a particular 
topic when they could have allocated resources more productively elsewhere. This falls 
under the variable of resources within the literature on resource mobilization and will be 
discussed further in chapter 7. He then added that GE is not limited to a narrow focus issue, 
but rather a broad concept. The broadness makes it difficult to thoroughly cover the vast 
spectrum of issues under the GE umbrella and, therefore, could distract NGOs. The 
respondent from Friends of the Earth held a similar concern, remarking that ‘there is too 
much talk around GE, and the more we talk about it the more it raises the idea that there is 
a magic solution. We need to avoid conversation about things of the future and concentrate 
on what we need to do now, such as mitigation’. In making this point, the respondent 																																																								285	 Because	of	high	competition	among	NGOs	in	the	UK,	WWF	needs	to	keep	its	organisational	competitiveness	to	know	about	emerging	topic	concerning	climate	change,	such	as	GE.	 	
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mentioned the relationship between the present and the future, which concerns a sense of 
urgency.286 Similarly, the interviewee from WWF provided an explanation surrounding the 
concern that NGOs, with their limited amount of resources, need to focus on areas where 
they can effectively contribute. The respondents mentioned above have expressed their 
opinions from the resource or urgency perspective. However, the respondent from Blue & 
Green Tomorrow explicitly mentioned ethical issues with more emphasis than other 
respondents. He stated that GE is not addressing the problem of climate change and thus, it 
makes sense that many NGOs avoid it. 
 
The respondents also expressed their perceptions surrounding how NGOs participate in the 
debate around GE as well as the challenges and obstacles during the course of participation. 
According to the respondents from ETC Group, Biofuel Watch and Blue & Green 
Tomorrow, most NGOs in the debate are generally opposed to GE. However, very large 
NGOs, such as FoE, favour CCS. In addition, according to the interviewee from 
Greenpeace, ‘there was an intense, broad-based discussion on GE in the early 2000s up 
until a few years ago, but there has not been much discussion in recent years’. The 
Greenpeace interviewee observed that they have become involved in establishing a 
governance framework on ocean fertilisation and marine GE.287 Although it is not their 
responsibility to design the governance framework, they are willing to engage in some of 
the discussions on those aspects whenever there is an opportunity. According to the 
interviewee from FoE, they have not been involved in establishing any governance 																																																								286	 This	point	will	be	discussed	under	the	variable	of	urgency	in	section	7.2.1.	287	 For	example,	Greenpeace	was	involved	in	the	COP	to	the	Convention	of	Biodiversity,	see	IMO,	‘Ocean	Fertilization	Under	the	LC/LP’	(2017)	 	<http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/EmergingIssues/geoengineering/OceanFertilizationDocumentRepository/OceanFertilization/Pages/default.aspx>	.	
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framework on GE. He argued that research institutes, research councils and governments 
ought to be leading the role in the debate on GE rather than NGOs. All NGOs can do is to 
input into the conversation opposed to leading the conversation. NGOs should, instead, be 
focusing on mitigation. However, the respondent from WWF considered that NGOs have a 
role in keeping governments and businesses honest about the issues surrounding GE and 
‘ensuring proper consideration is given to the subject where people can have a voice’. 
Aside from this, the interviewee added that NGOs are also able to influence the direction 
of scientific and policy research on GE. 
 
Some interviewees discussed the challenges and obstacles they encounter when 
participating in GE. According to the respondent from Greenpeace, the first challenge the 
organisation faced was related to resources. As there are many different discussions that 
have taken place on GE, it is difficult to identify the critical one to exert the most influence. 
The second obstacle lies in a misunderstanding between the scientific community and 
NGOs. He explained that ‘the assumption from the scientific community is that 
Greenpeace is anti research; this is a strange accusation when we played one of the most 
active roles within the ocean fertilization framework. And there is also an assumption that 
people think we are going to cause trouble’. The third challenge concerns the need to rely 
on a broad network when dealing with GE as it is a broad concept and no one can have 
expertise in all areas of GE. The interviewee identified two challenges for FoE concerning 
GE. The first challenge is resources. According to the interviewee, ‘we do not have the 
resources or even the base to concentrate on the debate on GE, as most NGOs are still 
working on getting off fossil fuels quickly’. This point will also be analysed within the 
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resources variable in chapter 7. The second obstacle is that the scientific community 
involved in GE should try to reach out to NGOs to have conversations, but that is not 
regular practice in the UK. 
 
As can be seen from the responses above, these involved NGOs are generally trying to 
oppose GE or to contribute to the governance of it. They have considerable understanding 
of why other NGOs are or are not actively involved. In addition, they placed an emphasis 
on their limited resources and the potential distractions when they talked about GE. In 
general, these NGOs have similar positions on GE but have slightly different reasons for 
their involvement.  
 
4.2.3 Interviews with Non-involved NGOs 
Respondents from TearFund, Practical Action and ClientEarth were interviewed as to why 
they have not been involved in GE. The results of the interviews will be presented based 
on the questions asked.  
 
The beginning of the interviews started with a question to explore their knowledge on GE. 
The respondent from TearFund claimed to have limited but reasonable knowledge on GE, 
meaning that he was generally aware of it but not an expert. The ClientEarth respondent 
stated that their group had followed the discussion in the early years but did not consider it 
as a significant focus, nor had the NGO become involved in the area in a serious way. 
Practical Action’s respondent stated that the organisation did not have direct experience in 
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GE, but from an individual perspective, he was generally aware of GE in the context of 
climate change. The reason why the respondent was aware of GE is that it is a topic within 
climate change and he considered it important to stay up to speed with the discussion 
surrounding it. This will be analysed under the variable of competition in chapter 7. 
 
When it comes to their attitudes towards GE research, the respondents tend to hold similar 
views in that they do not oppose every form of research on it, meaning they support GE 
computer modeling research, but they still have general concerns about it. The respondent 
from ClientEarth indicated that, in terms of GE research, ‘it is the question of priority of 
resources that we have; if you have to choose between research on different subjects 
including GE, then it depends on the possible costs, risks and disadvantages of solutions’. 
ClientEarth had a concern about GE research from a resource perspective, which will be 
analysed in detail within the resources variable in chapter 7. In addition, the respondent 
continued to explain that it is proper to consider solutions to global warming that would 
not necessarily have negative impacts. This concern can be illustrated within the variable 
of threat that people usually have a fear of negative changes in daily life, which will also 
be discussed in chapter 7. As for Practical Action, the respondent again placed great 
emphasis on the concern that GE will divert attention away from more critical issues, such 
as mitigation. This point can again be illustrated as NGOs strategically using their 
mediating role to stop the public from focusing on GE. The respondent from TearFund had 
concerns about SRM in particular because of its unpredictable side effects. 
 
The respondents provided a wide range of reasons as to why they are not involved in GE. 
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The respondent from Practical Action emphasised that GE, as an attempt to modify a 
large-scale planetary system, will divert the general population away from more pressing 
concerns such as mitigation. This point, which is identified in the data as a critical reason, 
will be illustrated within the variable of resources, urgency, and mediating in chapter 7. He 
then added that ‘reporting around GE might make it look like a good idea that we should 
invest our time and energy in and hence, the public would think that we do not have to 
worry about climate change’. This view will be analysed with the variable of ceasing to 
mediate in later discussion. Additionally, he expressed concern about the public as they 
might misunderstand what GE can really deliver and expect it to be a solution without fully 
understanding the complexity of GE techniques. This point will be analysed with public 
consciousness in the discussion.  
 
The respondent from ClientEarth explained that there are several reasons why they are not 
involved in GE. Firstly, they have great concerns surrounding how GE techniques are used 
and their knock-on impacts. Secondly, they are concerned that GE might be an excuse not 
to focus on mitigation, which is similar to the concern expressed by Practical Action that 
GE will divert the attention away. Thirdly, the current main focus of the government 
remains mitigation, ‘there is not a promotion of GE by the government as a solution to 
climate change; when there is such a promotion, we might start to consider more about 
GE’, which suggests the government’s political preference. This will be analysed in detail 
in chapter 7. In addition, the respondent provided assumptions as to why other NGOs are 
also not involved in GE. These assumptions include the following. First, GE is not high on 
their agenda and it is not the major question which needs to concern us at the moment. 
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Most NGOs focus on mitigation and meeting the target on temperature in the Paris 
Agreement. Second, most NGOs focus on using technologies that we already have, which 
will be analysed with the efficiency variable in the discussion. 
 
The respondent from TearFund respondent provided a range of answers. Firstly, NGOs 
have their own specific mandate and focuses and, therefore, GE sits outside of the remit of 
some groups. Although they are involved in climate change to help the poor who suffer 
from its side effects, they are not focusing on specific areas of climate change such as GE. 
This notion of remit will be analysed under the variable of goals in chapter 7. Secondly, 
the respondent mentioned that too much emphasis on GE could divert attention away from 
reducing emissions. Thirdly, as they have limited resources, they have to concentrate on 
the topics within their existing remit and scope. Finally, they prefer to focus on measures 
with less risk of dangerous impact on both the environment and human beings, such as 
mitigation.  
 
There has been extensive debate surrounding the role of NGOs in GE. The respondent 
from TearFund stated that the role NGOs can play in the debate is to make the public 
aware of the potentially significant harmful impacts of GE and get these messages across 
in a digestible manner. However, the respondent from Practical Action pointed out that, as 
mentioned earlier, although NGOs could inform the public about the impacts of GE, the 
public had difficulty understanding the complexity of GE techniques. In addition, he 
argued that the debate amongst the public should not continue, as it is a distraction. 
However, he agreed with the need to continue the debate in the scientific and academic 
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communities. 
 
In conclusion, the respondents from ClientEarth, TearFund and Practical Action have 
concerns surrounding GE as it can divert attention away from more pressing environmental 
matters. In addition, they emphasised the scarcity of resources, the remits of their 
organisations and the risks of GE techniques. These key points will be discussed in detail 
in chapter 7. 	
4.2.4 UK Conclusion 
From the results presented above, there are several interesting opinions that are worth 
highlighting. First, although some NGOs are involved in GE and some are not, they 
typically hold similar views towards GE. Generally, they have great concerns about GE 
and hence, are opposed to it. This is an interesting point to help understand why they have 
made different choices on their engagement, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 7. 
Second, all of the respondents, regardless if they are involved in GE or not, have a 
reasonable knowledge about GE. Third, all respondents, including both involved and 
non-involved sectors, agreed that GE is a distraction from pressing concerns for the 
government. Fourth, respondents from both involved and non-involved NGOs placed great 
emphasis on resources, the Paris Agreement and the remits of their respective 
organisations. These interesting points will be addressed in chapter 7. The fact that all of 
the groups, including both those engaged with GE and those not, provided similar answers 
in various aspects suggests that further analysis should be conducted to examine whether 
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the responses appear to explain the engagement or non-engagement. 		
4.3	Overall	summary	remarks	
This chapter has presented the results of interviews conducted in the UK and in China and 
identified significant themes from the responses. As for the results of interviews in China, 
a deficit in knowledge and lack of expertise were identified as important elements in the 
responses from domestic Chinese NGOs. The sense of urgency (as a reason for causing 
threat) and effectiveness (in terms of where NGOs can make effective contributions) were 
important to understand the non-involvement of INGOs. The focus of the relevant group 
and resources were significant in explaining non-involvement of both INGOs and domestic 
Chinese NGOs. These points will be analysed in detail in chapter 6. In relation to the 
results in the UK, several elements were considered as important in contributing to the 
involvement or non-involvement of the relevant NGOs: resources, the Paris Agreement, 
the remits of organisations, and GE being considered a distraction from focusing on 
mitigation. Furthermore, as similar answers were found in both involved and non-involved 
NGOs, it implies that further analysis is needed to illustrate this result in chapter 7. As the 
current chapter focuses on presenting the empirical data of the research, it comprises only a 
summary of interview results in order to report the data objectively to the reader. 
Discussion and analysis on the data will take place in chapters 6 and 7. These chapters 
employ different strands of the academic literature to generate variables based on the 
results in this chapter. 
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Chapter	5	Variables	
This chapter comprises a general discussion of results presented in chapter 4 within the 
context of theories in the relevant literature. It aims to provide a general analytic 
framework including potential variables, as a theoretical basis for further discussing 
empirical data and results in China and the UK. The aim is to address the research question 
of why NGOs have limited participation in GE as a policy issue. In doing so, the academic 
literatures on social movements, interest groups and governance are used to generate 
potential variables. This chapter comprises five sections: the first section deals with 
definitions of NGOs, social movement organisations (SMOs) and interest groups; the 
second section reviews the social movement literature and applies it to GE; the third part 
aims to use interest group literature to understand NGO participation in GE; the fourth 
section situates the issue within the context of governance as an analytical framework; and 
the last section seeks to draw a synthetic analytic framework combining the theories 
discussed and generates variables for further discussion on cases of China and UK. 	
	
5.1	NGOs,	SMOs	and	interest	groups	
As the theoretical basis for discussion consists of three differentiated but, to some extent, 
related literatures, it is important to distinguish these terms or labels mentioned in them. 
The terms – NGO, SMO and interest group – are interrelated and thus, we can to some 
extent usefully combine the literature and theories related to them. As can be seen from the 
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relevant literature, the terminology has been long debated among scholars and different 
labels and terms have been used to describe similar organisations.288 Some scholars prefer 
to regard NGOs and SMOs as “normative re-labeling” of interest groups and that the terms 
NGO and SMO are just interest groups by another name.289 By indicating ‘normative’, 
scholars claim that, especially in politics, how to label groups implicates normative 
messages. For example, groups labeled as pressure groups carry with them disapproving or 
negative perceptions while groups labeled as NGOs carry with approving messages.290 
That is to say, labeling groups reflects normative perceptions of approving or disapproving 
by the public. Of course there are criticisms of mixed usage of terminology, and one 
explanation is that, according to Halpin, those terms are applied based on the purposes of 
conducting research rather than “organizational attributes” which we ought to depend on.291  
 
In terms of my discussion, the main aim is not to discuss the issue of terms itself; rather, it 
is to explore whether social movement and interest group theories can be applied to 
discussing NGOs. My focus lies in their identities and interactions and whether they can be 
integrated. Based on existing literature, there are three main types of perspective adopted 
by scholars: one is that the term NGO has an equivalency with SMO and interest group, 
and, as adverted to above, scholars prefer to label them differently according to the 
purposes of their studies; another entails that SMO is a special type of interest group,292 
and NGOs are ‘essential components of social movements’.293 The last type preferred by 																																																								288	 Halpin	(n	50).	289	 Ibid.	290	 Ibid.	291	 Ibid.	292	 Frank	Baumgartner	and	Beth	Leech,	‘Interest	Niches	and	Policy	Bandwagons:	Patterns	of	Interest	Group	Involvement	in	National	Politics’	(2001)	63	the	Journal	of	Politics	1191.	293	 Halpin	(n	50).	
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social movement scholars entails that SMOs incorporate both non-institutional social 
movement actors and interest groups.294 From the three perceptions, it is apparent to see 
that the first perspective regards them as synonyms; the other two perceptions implicate a 
divergence lying in the relation between SMOs and interest groups but both regard the 
term NGO as the narrowest concept. It can be concluded that theories of SMOs and 
interest groups can be applied and generalised to NGOs. Whether they are considered as 
synonyms or the concept of NGO entails the narrowest intension compared to SMO and 
interest group, it enables me to apply and integrate theories on social movements and 
interest groups in the following analysis. 
	
	
5.2	Social	movement	literature	
Social movement theory has often been aimed at answering the question of why social 
movements occur, which comprises several strands of theories. These include, inter alia, 
collective behaviour, relative deprivation, resource mobilization, political opportunity, new 
social movement theory, and cultural perspectives. Generally speaking, strategic choices of 
NGOs are dominated by their tactics within strategy, resource and identity to a large 
extent.295 In order to understand why NGOs choose to participate in or stay clear of GE, 
social movement theory can be employed to seek answers for the question from a strategic 
perspective. Before using certain theories to discuss the issues in detail, a general review of 
the main strands of the literature is important for mapping the picture of social movement 
																																																								294	 McCarthy	and	Zald	(n	52).	295	 Clare	Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(London:	Bloomsbury	Academic	2013).	
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theory. 
 
Collective behaviour theory, which emerged early in the 20th Century and argued that 
social movements are the result of irrational action, has been frequently criticised by 
present scholars. In contrast, resource mobilization theory assumes people are rational and 
emphasizes organisations, and will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
Political opportunity structure emphasizes the political context within which social 
movements are mobilized. This will, again, be discussed further below. More recently, 
research on strategic participation in a cultural way has emerged combining culture, 
emotion and agency. This cultural perspective will be applied to my discussion to 
understand strategic choices of NGOs in GE. In this discussion, I will employ theories of 
resource mobilization, political opportunity and cultural perspectives to explore the 
applications to NGOs within the context of GE.  	
5.2.1 Resource mobilization 
Resource mobilization theory was originally proposed by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald 
in the 1970s. They assume that aggregation of resources is the critical factor for explaining 
why a social movement occurs – in other words social movements depend on various 
resources for survival, maintenance and to be effective.296 In addition, they believe that 
individuals make rational choices by weighing costs and benefits to achieving goals and 
they also place great emphasis on organisational infrastructure as a resource in itself.297 																																																								296	 McCarthy	and	Zald	(n	52).	297	 Ibid.	
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They focus heavily on organisations with formal structures, which makes their work 
particularly applicable in discussing NGOs. 
 
According to resource mobilization theory, target goals as well as characteristics of 
organisations link them to particular policy areas.298 This can explain why some NGOs 
have not chosen to focus on GE in the first place. Although there are many NGOs 
interested in environmental issues in a broad sense, they have differentiated emphases and 
aims based on their target goals when founded. For example, organisations acting actively 
in nature conservation and animal protection would not be expected to pay much attention 
to GE. Even some NGOs interested in climate change are not necessarily involved in GE 
as they may have more specific goals within the area. This suggests that as organisations 
have their target goals which separate them into different specialist policy areas, some 
NGOs not involved in climate related mobilizing areas are unlikely to participate in GE. 
But within the climate-specialising ENGOs, why do some organisations have broad goals 
for climate change while some pursue a narrow and specific goal in relation to GE? 
According to the theory under consideration, the cause lies in resources. As NGOs require 
resources to be effective, organisations within similar fields compete with each other for 
access to finite resources. Currently there are plenty of NGOs focusing on the area of 
climate change and hence NGOs have to respond to competition by specializing in their 
identities by moving into more specialist fields than climate change, such as GE. As 
pointed out by McCarthy and Zald, the more competitive a social movement area is, the 
																																																								298	 Ibid.	
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more likely it is for organisations to pursue narrow or specialised goals.299 GE is a 
specialised area within the issue of climate change, and thus NGOs targeting GE can be 
seen as a strategic response to competition for resources. 
 
Resource mobilization theory considers elites with conscience as the key factor in 
triggering social movements rather than individuals with self-interests. According to 
McCarthy and Zald, ‘the larger the amount of resources available to conscience adherents 
the more likely is the development of SMOs that respond to preferences for change’.300 In 
other words, they regard resources and conscience elites as responsible for the emergence 
of social movements.301 It makes sense that if organisations do not possess the resources 
needed, whether financial resource or labour resource, they are unlikely to become 
involved in action in a particular policy area. In terms of GE, even though NGOs might be 
concerned about the risks of GE, they may not take action or participate in relevant 
campaigns if they do not possess enough funding or labour to devote to the area. Since 
NGOs have finite resources for their development and survival, as implicated in the costs 
and benefits model, involvement in GE may not be appealing to some NGOs as they 
cannot work efficiently to make contributions. This is because large amount of 
uncertainties on GE techniques and an information deficit in the scientific community lead 
to a failure in providing sufficient scientific information on GE to NGOs for them to work 
effectively on it. This is connected with a tactical dilemma that due to competition and 
cooperation in similar areas, organisations make tactical choices to target specific goals 
																																																								299	 Ibid.	300	 Iibid.	301	 Ibid.	
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with finite resources. Sometimes aiming for one goal may cause conflicts with another 
goal, and thus NGOs will make key decisions determining which goal they are seeking to 
achieve. 
 
Under the model of costs and benefits as well as competing for finite resources, a free rider 
dilemma arises from resource mobilization theory. That is to say, it would be more rational 
and cost-effective for individuals and organisations not to become involved in certain 
policy areas if these areas are aiming at public goods, as they can still benefit even if they 
do not participate.302 Does this free rider dilemma contribute to the reason why some 
NGOs are not involved in GE? I assume that the free rider dilemma helps to explain both 
large and small NGOs within the context of GE, which will be discussed in the next 
paragraph. This dilemma poses a significant question in that, if individuals and 
organisations consider tactics on a cost-effective basis, why do organisations participate at 
all in the context of public goods? The free rider issue was first proposed by Mancur Olson 
in his group theory and entails an insight into a divergence between large groups and small 
groups in the face of the free rider dilemma.303 In the theory Olson argues that the free 
rider issue lies merely in relation to large groups of people. This is because a small number 
of individuals who are self-interested and rational will not aim for public interests or public 
goods. 304  Therefore, the solution proposed by McCarthy and Zald in the resource 
mobilization theory is well able to address the issue. They claim that resource mobilization 
theory emphasizes elites with conscience who are responsible for triggering social 																																																								302	 Jay	Weismuller,	‘Social	Movements	and	Free	Riders:	Examining	Resource	Mobilization	Theory	Through	the	Bolivian	Water	War’	The	Macalester	Review	accessed	August	05,	2012.	303	 Mancur	Olson,	The	Logic	of	Collective	Action:	Public	Goods	and	The	Theory	of	Groups	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press	1971).	304	 Weismuller	(n	302).	
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movements rather than individuals with self-interests. 305  That is to say, elites with 
available resources are considered preconditions of the emergence of mobilization, and 
with conscience, they will not free ride. However, some scholars have criticized resource 
mobilization theory, arguing that it fails to provide a solution for the free rider issue for 
small groups without elite support.306 Nonetheless, as the free rider problem identified by 
Olson only exists in large groups of people, the solution proposed in the resource 
mobilization theory is applicable to large groups with conscience elites and hence, it does 
not need to be examined in all contexts. However, in the context of GE, the argument that 
the free rider problem does not exist in small groups of people cannot be well illustrated in 
Olson’s theory. 
 
The dilemma lies in large NGOs with elite support in that, while some NGOs have 
participated in GE because of elites with conscience, other large NGOs may stay clear of it 
by weighing costs and benefits and deciding that they benefit no matter whether they 
become involved or not. In terms of small social groups, according to the theory by Olson, 
they will make efforts to purchase public goods without sanctions or inducements.307 He 
clarifies that this is because, in small groups, the personal gain that individuals can have 
through purchasing public goods exceeds the overall costs of purchasing public goods.308 
That is to day, although other members in the group will not purchase public goods as they 
can still benefit from them, an individual will still provide himself with public goods as 
how much he can gain exceeds how much he has to pay for it. This is why Olson argues 																																																								305	 Ibid.	306	 Ibid.	307	 Olson	(n	303).	308	 Ibid.	
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that free riders are not a concern in small groups. However, in the context of GE, costs and 
benefits are not directly interrelated and additional elements of risks and uncertainties need 
to be taken into account. According to Olson, an individual will spend the total cost on 
purchasing a public good because he can gain more from it. This can be illustrated as 
benefits exceed total costs when purchasing public goods. However, in the context of GE, 
costs do not necessarily lead to benefits. One explanation to the situation is that, unlike the 
other public goods, because of the complexity in the climate system and uncertainties over 
the outcomes of GE, anyone who spends costs on it will not necessarily benefit from it. For 
example, injecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere within the boundary of the UK 
might reduce temperature in other countries nearby without any impacts in the UK at all. If 
one cannot ensure that he can benefit from GE projects, why would he have the incentive 
to engage with it? Therefore the free rider problem exists in small groups as well in the 
context of GE. 
 
A critical variable that can be generated from the discussion is that of resources. Whether 
NGOs have access to finite resources, such as money and labour, and whether they are able 
to control and make effective use of it, are crucial to their involvement in GE. Resources 
can be divided up into several sub-themes: Material resource – NGOs require money and 
labour to work effectively and become involved in GE, which means that NGOs lacking 
material resources are unlikely to participate. Competition – this refers to competition for 
finite resources. The more competitive the policy area is, the more specialised and narrow 
the goals pursued by NGOs will be, such as engaging in GE, to create their specialised 
identities. Elites - they are the critical factor for generating social movements according to 
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the McCarthy and Zald theory. NGOs participating in GE may be attributed to conscience 
elites. Efficiency – based on costs-benefits analysis, NGOs not becoming involved in GE 
can potentially be attributed to the free rider dilemma in that they will be benefiting even if 
they do not participate. This dilemma can be identified in both large and small NGOs 
because GE as a public good has its own characteristics according to the preceding 
discussion. In general, however, resource mobilization theory is criticized for failing to 
consider contextual factors and placing too much emphasis on organisations and not 
paying proper attention to emotion, culture and other issues.309 I propose a solution of 
integrating resource mobilization with other strands of social movement theory – political 
opportunity and cultural perspectives – to form variables, which will be discussed in later 
paragraphs. 		
5.2.2 Political opportunity 
By accepting the criticism of resource mobilization theory, political opportunity theory 
provides a context variable for discussing why social movements mobilize. It states that 
whether social movements occur, as well as whether they succeed, is largely affected by 
political opportunities.310 Within the literature on new social movements, scholars make a 
distinction between ‘political opportunity’ and ‘political opportunity structure’. Rootes has 
proposed that the central problem of political opportunity structure is confounding 
																																																								309	 For	example,	Diana	Kendall,	Sociology	In	Our	Times	(Erin	Mitchell	and	others	eds,	8th	edn,	Wadsworth:	Cengage	Learning	2011).	310	 Ryan	Cragun,	Deborah	Cragun	and	Piotrus	Konieczny,	Introduction	to	Sociology	(Seven	Treasures	Publications	2012).	
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structure and contingency.311 Many variables considered in political opportunity structure 
are in fact contingent rather than structurally determined.312 Political opportunity structure 
refers to the structural aspect, such as the nature of government institutions, which is 
related to the openness of a polity.313 Differentiated from opportunity structure, political 
opportunity considers the receptivity of a political system which includes contingent, 
non-structural factors. 314  These contingent factors include, inter alia, preferences of 
government officials and divisions among political elites.315 It is therefore preferable to 
use the term ‘political opportunity’ to include both structural and contingent factors within 
a polity. In terms of application of the theory, one of the respondents in China placed great 
emphasis on understanding the dynamic themes or core issues of the Chinese government 
when influencing the policy making process; they also stated that it is important to find the 
right time in order to have an impact. That is to say, although the structure of institutions is 
fixed and relatively stable, the preferences of government can change from time to time, 
which will influence how effectively NGOs can influence relevant political decisions. 
These factors, defined as contingent factors, are important in understanding social 
movements within the same polity. 
 
Even the structural question of whether a polity is open or closed does not merely include 
simple openness of structures, but also relates to a matter of actors’ agency that whether it 
																																																								311	 Rootes,	‘Political	Opportunity	Structures,	Promise,	Problems	and	Prospects’	(n	52).	312	 Ibid.	313	 Sebastiaan	Princen	and	Bart	Kerremans,	‘Opportunity	Structures	in	the	EU	Multi-Level	System’	(2009)	31	West	European	politics	1129.	314	 Chris	Hilson,	‘New	Social	Movements:	the	Role	of	Legal	Opportunity’	(2002)	9	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy	238.	315	 Princen	and	Kerremans	(n	313).	
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is perceived as open or closed.316 Collective actors, constrained to their own values and 
beliefs, may have different perceptions of openness and hence this may affect whether they 
can seize those opportunities.317 In addition, they may adjust their strategies to create new 
opportunities for themselves rather than merely accept constraints.318 Therefore, political 
opportunity comprises three aspects: the objective structure of a polity; whether and how 
actors perceive the openness, and seize and create new opportunities; and the receptivity of 
the political system. Only the first aspect can be defined as purely structural, while the 
other two aspects are more non-structural or contingent. Therefore, a question arises: in 
terms of structural and contingent factors, which is more important in understanding the 
variable of political opportunity? Or to what extent should contingent or structural factors 
be considered when applying the variable of political opportunity in our discussion? Of 
course structural factors are fundamental within a polity, but they fail to explain the 
different social movements within the same polity.319 And the variety of social movements 
within the same country can be attributed to their strategies and status rather than the 
structure of the polity.320 Therefore, I agree that, when comparing organisations within one 
country, it is more reasonable to discuss political opportunities based on non-structural or 
contingent factors.321 While comparing organisations from a cross-national perspective, 
such as organisations in the UK and China, both contingent and structural factors should be 
considered.  
																																																								316	 Rootes,	‘Political	Opportunity	Structures,	Promise,	Problems	and	Prospects’	(n	52).	317	 Ibid.	318	 Clare	Saunders,	‘It's	Not	Just	Strcutural:	Social	Movements	Are	Not	Homogenous	Responses	To	Structural	Features,	But	Networks	Shaped	By	Organisational	Strategies	And	Status’	Sociological	Research	Online	<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/14/1/4.html>	accessed	16	Jan	2009.	319	 Ibid.	320	 Rootes,	‘Political	Opportunity	Structures,	Promise,	Problems	and	Prospects’	(n	52).	321	 Saunders,	‘It's	Not	Just	Strcutural:	Social	Movements	Are	Not	Homogenous	Responses	To	Structural	Features,	But	Networks	Shaped	By	Organisational	Strategies	And	Status’	(n	318).	
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In terms of resource mobilization and political opportunity, there could be an overlap 
between them in that they both admit the necessity of obtaining sufficient resources. Some 
scholars have demonstrated that political opportunity is closely related to resource 
mobilization theory as it also emphasizes resource mobilization, but from an external 
perspective concerning political opportunities.322 That is to say, making use of political 
opportunities requires mobilizing resources. It can be seen as a supplement to some aspects 
of the deficit in resource mobilization theory and useful to generate a context variable for 
my discussion. Understanding merely internal factors of organisations and resources 
themselves fails to draw attention to dynamic problems which refers to the changing social 
and political environment in which organisations mobilise. Therefore an insight into 
political opportunity theory may help to explain why NGOs do not get involved in GE at a 
given time. 
 
Many empirical studies have been conducted to examine political opportunity theory, and a 
well-known study by Goodwin involved four elements including ‘increasing access to the 
political system, divisions within the elite, availability of elite allies, and diminishing state 
repression’.323 Other studies have generated different variables even including for example, 
grievances and resources which is criticised by other critics, such as David Meyer, because 
these are variables belonging to the separate theories of deprivation and resource 
mobilization. Most of the empirical studies on political opportunity are accused be Meyer 
of simply adding different variables to the theory of political opportunity rather than 																																																								322	 David	Meyer,	‘Protest	and	Political	Opportunities’	(2004)	30	Annual	Review	of	Sociology	125.	323	 Ibid.	
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refining variables by Meyer. Because there are so many empirical studies within this area 
with diverse variables generated, it is important to decide which variables to include within 
political opportunity for the purposes of the current discussion. The choice of variables 
appears to depend on the case-by-case situation rather than being generalizable. But how 
does one choose the most suitable variables for the case of GE in the UK and China?  
 
Political opportunity theory has been applied to different dependent variables in research, 
such as social protest mobilization and impact on public policy.324 The dependent variable 
of my research is NGOs’ involvement in GE, which can be defined as mobilization of 
NGOs in GE based on social movement theory. Therefore political opportunity theory 
should be employed to generate separate independent variables on social protest 
mobilization rather than dependent variables. I consider one core element of political 
opportunity theory – the degree to which the institutional system is open – as an important 
variable. Openness has been largely discussed concerning whether organisations have 
access to the state’s institutional system to make their voices heard. It relates to the 
question of how organisations can participate in policies, which can be applied to a 
comparable cross-national discussion in the UK and China. In terms of engagement of 
NGOs as more professionalised organisations in the environment movement, scholars have 
argued that relatively open states are likely to have moderate movements while relatively 
closed states tend to exert pressure on movements and thus, produce radical but small 
movements.325 However, in the case of the UK and China, if China is considered as a 
relatively closed state compared to the UK, one would expect to find more radical 																																																								324	 Ibid.	325	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	
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movements than moderate mobilizations. However, according to my awareness, NGOs in 
China normally employ moderate strategies in many environmental areas, as they require 
better collaborations with the state to attain goals rather than remaining hostile. Moderate 
mobilizations in China may be attributed to state repression rather than the openness or 
closure of the polity. Meanwhile in the UK as a relatively open state in terms of political 
opportunity structure, there are radical protests, such as the anti-fracking protest in the UK. 
Therefore, whether the state is open or closed does not necessarily lead to moderate or 
radical action by organisations. It may be the case with regard to GE that political 
opportunity structure, namely whether a polity is open or closed, cannot help to explain the 
nature of mobilizations (radical or moderate). This hypothesis will be discussed more in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
 
In terms of discussing openness, it should be attached to specific cases during a certain 
period of time. This is because ‘a polity that provides openness to one kind of participation 
may be closed to others’.326 It is difficult to say in general that one state is open or closed 
as they may be open in some political area and closed in others, or open to certain 
organisations while closed to others. As Saunders has pointed out, in terms of 
environmental policy area in the UK, political opportunity has been quite open to moderate 
organisations rather than radical ones.327 It raises a problem that organisations, specifically 
NGOs, are difficult to define as moderate or radical, as they may be moderate on some 
issues but become radical on other topics, or they may behave moderately during a certain 
period of time while becoming radical later on. Therefore discussion on openness should 																																																								326	 Meyer	(n	322).	327	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	
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also be based on different NGOs from a dynamic perspective. 
 
In the specific context of GE, a critical element needs to be pointed out before discussing 
the openness of institutional systems – that is to what degree policies have been developed 
by governments. Contrasted with most traditional environmental problems, which are 
already governed by policies, GE is a relatively novel policy issue, meaning that policies 
on GE may not exist at all. NGOs can become involved in environment movements against 
traditional environmental issues by targeting policy reform or change; however, they may 
not be able to participate in GE when there is a deficit in government policy in the first 
place. In terms of this issue, the UK and China are largely likely facing different situations 
of policy development on GE, which requires comparison between them in chapter 8.  
 
In conclusion, openness and the degree of policy development are considered as variables 
based on the political opportunity theory. It brings useful context-dependent insight into 
developing potential variables for discussion, which more or less bridge the gap in 
resource mobilization theory of failing to address exogenous issues. However, political 
opportunity has limitations that have been raised by scholars including its lack of emphasis 
on cultural factors, which will be addressed in the following section on cultural 
perspectives. 
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5.2.3 Cultural perspectives 
In order to address the deficit in resource mobilization theory and political opportunity 
theory, an emphasis on emotions provides a cultural perspective as a supplement to these 
theories. Significant work has been done by Jasper to develop cultural perspective more 
systematically.328 I will employ his cultural approach to generate independent variables for 
discussing the engagement of NGOs in GE. On a general basis, he admits the core 
arguments of resources and opportunities in resource mobilization theory and political 
opportunity theory. For example, according to Jasper, social roles and positions play a 
crucial role in starting strategic actions, which means individuals and organisations have 
their own missions to make strategies.329 This is compatible with the argument in resource 
mobilization that target goals as well as characteristics of organisations link them to 
specific policy areas. In addition, in Jasper’s approach, skills and resources are considered 
essential to both trigger a strategic action as well as continue with the action.330 This 
evidently overlaps with the theory of resource mobilization which, as we have seen, holds 
that resources – both money and labour – are preconditions of social movements. In terms 
of political opportunity theory, the cultural approach has made connections to it by 
demonstrating that goals, which are changing all the time, are crucial for strategies, and the 
dynamic nature of goals results from opportunities. In addition, timing is important for 
making strategic choices.331 This is consistent with the argument in political opportunity 
theory that the context factor of opportunities provides explanations for social movement 																																																								328	 Jasper	(n	52).	329	 Ibid.	330	 Ibid.	331	 James	Jasper,	The	Art	of	Moral	Protest:	Culture,	Biography	and	Creativity	in	Social	Movements	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press	1997).	
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behavior at a given time. However, besides integrating important variables in the two 
theories, Jasper has added a cultural factor to explain the initiation of social movements. 
As he puts it, calculations of costs and benefits, which are suggested by resource 
mobilization theory, are not enough for triggering a social movement; instead, ‘an 
emotional spur’ is required to generate strategic actions.332  
 
Emotions, as pointed out by Jasper, are considered to provide ‘ ideas, ideologies, identities 
and interests to motivate’.333 Emotion is the core element of the cultural approach. In 
general, the cultural approach emphasizes two combining aspects of starting a protest: 
threat and blame.334 I will discuss these two aspects in the following and apply them to 
NGOs’ involvement in GE respectively. Threat is a type of emotion in a negative way that 
entails various aspects. I will use resignation, sense of urgency, and technological fear in 
the theory of threat to discuss the issue of GE.  
 
According to Jasper, resignation contributes much to reluctance in participation.335 It is 
true that people sometimes are pessimistic about the status quo and tend to accept it rather 
than act for changes. With this emotion, when people are dissatisfied with bureaucracies, 
they may simply assume that it makes no difference whether they participate or not as 
outcomes would not change anyway. In this sense, resignation can be illustrated as a lack 
of confidence both in themselves and the relevant authorities. In the context of GE, NGOs 
may have concerns about the uncertainties and risks of GE and propose a ban on GE 																																																								332	 Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World	(n	52).	333	 Jasper,	The	Art	of	Moral	Protest:	Culture,	Biography	and	Creativity	in	Social	Movements	(n	331).	334	 Ibid.	335	 Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World	(n	52).	
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activities – something recommended by several NGOs such as GE Watch in the UK. They 
might be reluctant to continue their participation if there is no response from bureaucracies. 
In terms of a sense of urgency, this suggests that situations may become worse if we do not 
respond or get involved now.336 This can be a potential explanation as to why NGOs are 
not involved in GE which is not considered as an important issue in the near future. Lack 
of urgency means NGOs prefer to focus on more pressing concerns at the moment rather 
than worry about what is yet to come. Technological fear entails that people tend to oppose 
new technologies and generate bias by misusing proper information, which is regarded as 
irrational and a matter of ignorance by risk experts, because people are concerned about 
destroying the status quo even though there is little chance of this happening.337 A 
principal tenet of ENGOs, which is deeply rooted in the culture, is that pollution can only 
be dealt with through reducing emissions; as a result, a technology like GE, which allows 
emissions by neutralizing them, is antipathetic to this idea. In terms of GE, some NGOs in 
the UK oppose risky GE experiments or research due to fear over the uncertainties 
associated with the technology. The concern and fear of damaging the existing 
environment leads them to become engaged and express their opinions negatively on GE. 
In China in contrast, a fear of GE has not formed in NGOs due to an information deficit 
and thus, they are not concerned about the risks of this technology. This may similarly help 
to explain their actions in terms of non-engagement with GE. Apart from existing types of 
threat in the theory, in the case of GE, one might add that there is a threat related to 
strategic choices themselves. This is a fear in terms of a potential dilemma facing NGOs, 
which means that they are likely to be criticized or even risk their brand images when they 																																																								336	 Ibid.	337	 Jasper,	The	Art	of	Moral	Protest:	Culture,	Biography	and	Creativity	in	Social	Movements	(n	331).	
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get involved in such a controversial topic as GE.  
 
If a threat is in place, taking strategic action requires someone to blame.338 Blame can be 
classified into causal blame and remedial blame.339 In the context of GE, side effects may 
possibly be caused by scientists involved in GE activities. Therefore, scientists could be 
the targets of NGOs in the form of causal blame. There is a crucial question arising from 
causal blame that it is also important for NGOs or whoever is taking strategic action to 
know whom to blame. In China, there are scientists involved in GE projects in universities; 
however, NGOs in China are more or less ignorant of the research on it. In terms of the 
remedial form of blame, it is likely that people consider government as responsible. In the 
case of causal blame, actions can only be triggered towards government. This is because 
people always turn to government and regard it as the one who is responsible for 
remedying problems. To conclude, threat built from emotions and people who can be 
blamed are crucial elements of starting social movements according to the cultural 
approach. They are considered here as two variables in discussing NGO participation in 
GE. According to Jasper, there is a gap in understanding what factors contribute to a 
certain choice rather than the other. My research is expected to answer the question in the 
context of GE.  		
	
																																																								338	 Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World	(n	52).	339	 Jasper,	The	Art	of	Moral	Protest:	Culture,	Biography	and	Creativity	in	Social	Movements	(n	331).	
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5.3	Interest	group	literature	
	
Interest groups are groups employing various forms of advocacy to exert influence on 
policy.340 The literature on interest groups is a small field in political science and has been 
accused of being isolated within the broader politics literature.341 In this section, I will aim 
to integrate it with social movement literature. Interest group literature and social 
movement literature are two strands in political science. Some scholars argue that social 
movement theory emphasizes conflicts and non-institutionalized approaches of claim 
making while interest group theory emphasizes semi-institutionalized approaches of 
lobbying.342 It is true that they focus on different perspectives within the political area; 
however, the two strands overlap in various aspects such that they can be considered 
closely related. It is more useful for the purposes of my research to emphasize their 
relationship and overlaps rather than distinctions, so as to form integrated insights for 
discussing NGOs in GE.  
 
The general theory of interest groups is that individuals join them based on various 
benefits which the group will offer them.343 Before continuing the discussion on various 
benefits, it is useful to define ‘joining interest groups’ first in the discussion. According to 
the existing literature regarding membership of interest groups, public interest groups, 
which seek for broader interest with a general benefit rather than benefits for their 
																																																								340	 John	Wright,	Interest	Groups	and	Congress,	Lobbying,	Contribtions,	and	Influence	(1st	edn,	Longman	1995).	341	 Jan	Beyers,	Rainer	Eising	and	William	Maloney,	‘Researching	Interest	Group	Politics	in	Europe	and	Elsewhere:	Much	We	Study,	Little	We	Know?’	(2008)	31	West	European	politics	1103.	342	 Ibid.	343	 Wright	(n	340).	
	 149	
membership, have their own pattern of recruiting members.344 Because of no simple ways 
of targeting potential members, they usually adopt a tactic of direct mail to reach out 
potential members.345 Although with a relatively large membership, few members in 
public interest groups are considered to have actively participated in group decisions.346 
This problem has been proved to exist among environmental groups, such as Friends of the 
Earth, that most members, named as ‘checkbook members’, seldom participate other than 
paying annual fees for subscription.347 A number of ‘checkbook members’ have not even 
recognised their membership or considered themselves as members of groups.348 Therefore, 
I favour the argument by Christopher Bosso that it is necessary to make a distinction 
between members and donors or supporters.349 Checkbook members as defined in the 
literature are supporters or donors as they have little participation in influencing group 
decisions other than paying a low amount of annual fees. Although they are important for 
the survival of groups, they are not real members when discussing the concepts in the 
relevant literature. Therefore, in my discussion, when referring to members, I mean staff 
members specifically. However, although the distinction between supporters and members 
are discussed in the literature, little literature has paid attention to volunteers in groups. I 
argue that this is a gap that requires further research and discussion because volunteers are 
an important component of groups besides staff and supporters. Existing literature has tried 
to distinguish staff members from the rest who only make money contributions while 																																																								344	 Anne	Binderkrantz,	‘Membership	Recruitment	and	Internal	Democracy	in	Interest	Groups:	Do	Group-Membership	Relations	Vary	Between	Group	Types?’	(2009)	32	West	European	politics	657.	345	 Grant	Jordan	and	William	Maloney,	‘Manipulating	Membership:	Supply-Side	Influences	on	Group	Size’	(1998)	28	British	Journal	of	Political	Science	389.	346	 Binderkrantz,	‘Membership	Recruitment	and	Internal	Democracy	in	Interest	Groups:	Do	Group-Membership	Relations	Vary	Between	Group	Types?’	(n	344).	347	 Jordan	and	Maloney	(n	345).	348	 Christopher	Bosso,	‘Rethinking	the	Concept	of	Membership	in	Nature	Advocacy	Organizations’	(2003)	31	The	Policy	Studies	Journal	397.	349	 Ibid.	
	150	
lacking face-to-face contacts with staff members. 350  However, there is a third 
categorization of members in groups – volunteers – that needs to be considered separately 
from staff members and donors. This is because, volunteers are not staff in groups, and 
they cannot simply be defined as donors either, as their contributions is not or not only 
related to money. That is to say, they are included in ‘checkbook members’ who are only 
paying dues to groups; instead, they assist campaigns or become involved in office or 
advertising work, which means they contribute more than just donating. However, 
volunteers are not employed staff in environmental groups, which excludes them in the 
discussion on staff members. Therefore, attention needs to be paid among volunteering 
members in interest groups as a supplement to the existing literature. 
 
Another concern in the literature on membership is the issue surrounding a collective bad 
and a collective good. This is to say, one is more likely to be a member of interest groups 
because of public bads than collective goods.351 People are more motivated to join a group 
to prevent a bad consequence than achieving a good outcome. This is consistent with the 
theory of threat in the social movements literature that the negative emotion of threat is 
more useful in triggering social movements as people care more about what they take for 
granted than what they will acquire in the future.352 This indicates that people are more 
concerned about losing what they already have than receiving the same amount of benefits 
in the future. Therefore, threat is a useful motivation to social movements as it stands for 
loss. Based on this theory, it is more reasonable to understand why a collective bad is more 
																																																								350	 Jordan	and	Maloney	(n	345).	351	 Ibid.	352	 Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World	(n	52).	
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useful in recruiting members than a collective good, as from an emotional perspective, 
preventing a threat from happening matters more than providing benefits. 
 
Within the literature on membership of interest groups, scholars have also focused on the 
instability of large public interest groups concerning membership. As identified in the 
literature, membership turnover rate is high because of large-scale entry and exits.353 That 
is to say, as they have large-scale membership and it is easy to join it as well as exit, public 
interest groups often face a dilemma that a large number of existing members do not renew 
their membership, which means they have to recruit new members instead. Therefore, high 
turnover rate is a common issue among large public interest groups. The existing literature 
has identified this issue and considered it as a negative result of instability. However, in 
my opinion, turnover is not completely bad for interest groups. With a high rate of turnover, 
it is more likely for those groups to have a broader coverage of potential members. That is 
to say, turnover forces groups to target new potential members rather than relying on 
existing members, which has unintentionally expanded the impacts of groups among the 
public. Although they will face a loss in the number of existing members and the total 
number of members will perhaps decrease finally, those previous members who choose to 
exit have already been influenced by those groups. This will benefit groups from the 
advertising perspective in that different people will know about groups and their goals. 
Therefore, high turnover rate is negative when concerning stability of membership, but it 
can also benefit in expanding their influence among potential members. 
 																																																								353	 Jordan	and	Maloney	(n	345).	
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Returning to the question of why people join interest groups, this raises an overlap with the 
free rider dilemma within resource mobilization theory that individuals may not become 
involved as benefits can be obtained without participation. However, in the interest group 
literature, different forms of benefits are defined such as material benefit, solidary benefit 
and expressive benefit. In terms of expressive benefit, as defined by John Wright, this 
entails people joining interest groups to express their moral values or ideologies, which 
indicates that people do not care much about whether goals can be achieved as long as 
their voices are heard during the process.354 Thus, environmental groups and other public 
interest groups are considered to rely on expressive benefit.355 This raises a problem: as 
environmental groups are based on expressive benefits, does the free rider problem still 
apply to them? The free rider problem of interest groups refers to the difficulty of 
attracting members to join the group when the benefits can be obtained without 
membership. Since expressive benefit concentrates on the process of participating and 
expression of their values rather than just obtaining the outcomes, people cannot receive 
expressive benefits if they do not join environmental groups. That is to say, in public 
interest groups such as ENGOs, expressive benefits emphasize participation itself and thus 
it cannot be obtained, or people cannot have a feeling of satisfaction to express moral 
values, without membership. This expressive incentive can be a potential solution to the 
free rider problem proposed by Olson. As mentioned in the earlier paragraphs, Olson has 
raised the issue in group theory that people can free ride when they can still obtain benefits 
without joining in groups. Based on calculation of costs and benefits, Olson has continued 
to argue that this problem only applies to large groups of people. A solution proposed by 																																																								354	 Wright	(n	340).	355	 Ibid.	
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McCarthy and Zald in social movement theory is that it is the elites with conscience who 
are responsible for triggering social movements rather than individuals with self-interests. 
However, as discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the free rider issue applies to both large 
and small NGOs in the context of GE,356 which draws attention back to the problem that 
the solution proposed by McCarthy and Zald fails to provide explanations for those small 
groups which are without elites. Therefore by integrating it with interest group theory, 
expressive benefits can be a potential solution to the free rider issue in both large and small 
environmental groups. This is because, as mentioned earlier in this paragraph, expressive 
incentives in environmental groups emphasize the process of participation itself, which 
gives participation a more legitimate meaning in that people can express their values and 
make their voices heard by joining groups, rather than considering participation as an 
instrument to achieve common benefits only. With this incentive, people will not free ride 
in environmental groups. 
 
The interest group literature comprises various strands of theories which consider different 
questions. These strands or sub-theories investigate questions of, for example, why interest 
groups specialise, the variation in strategic choices, and why interest groups lobby. 
Although emphasizing distinct perspectives, I will discuss them by integrating them with 
social movement theory to generate applicable variables for GE. In terms of the variation 
in strategies, the existing literature has distinguished interest groups by their strategies in 
two ways: distinctions are drawn between insider and outsider strategies; and distinctions 
have also been made between administrative strategy, parliamentary strategy, media 																																																								356	 Large	or	small	NGOs	are	different	from	large	or	small	groups.	The	latter	refers	to	a	large	or	small	group	of	individuals.	
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strategy and mobilization strategy. An insider strategy entails a privileged access to the 
political and administrative process and employs direct actions of close consultation with 
political actors while an outsider strategy involves mobilizations by grassroots networks 
with indirect actions through media and mobilization of citizens.357 However, scholars 
have pointed out that groups often employ a mixture of insider and outsider strategies and, 
as a result, it is difficult to categorize them as wholly insiders or outsiders.358 Therefore, 
scholars have proposed a more suitable categorization of four different types of strategies. 
The four strategies are still based on the basic classification of direct and indirect strategies, 
but with more specific perspectives. This is useful for categorizing groups more precisely. 
In terms of strategy, existing interest group literature focuses on the variations of strategies 
as well as explanations as to why interest groups adopt certain strategies. I propose a 
question combined with the social movement literature which is whether an insider or 
outsider strategy affects choices on whether to become involved in certain policy areas by 
NGOs? In the context of GE, will NGOs employing different strategies – an insider 
strategy or outsider strategy for example – lead to different choices on involvement in 
certain policy areas? If NGOs employ an insider strategy, are they more likely to engage in 
GE? If NGOs adopt an outsider strategy, are they more reluctant or unlikely to engage in 
GE? Although the categorization of insider and outsider strategy to some extent fails to 
define groups properly, it is still useful to draw a basic line between their preferences in 
strategies. Therefore, this question will be examined in chapters 6 and 7 to discuss within 
the cases of China and the UK in detail, based on the categorization of insiders and 																																																								357	 Binderkrantz,	‘Different	Groups,	Different	Strategies:	How	Interest	Groups	Pursue	Their	Political	Ambitions’	(n	52).	358	 Anne	Binderkrantz,	‘Interest	Group	Strategies:	Navigating	Between	Privileged	Access	and	Strategies	of	Pressure’	(2005)	53	Political	studies	694.	
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outsiders. 
 
There are two important questions in discussing insider and outsider strategies: how to 
distinguish between an insider or outsider strategy and insider or outsider status; and 
whether groups have agency to make realistic choices on strategy. In terms of the first 
question, it is important to distinguish strategy from status when discussing the typology of 
groups. Wyn Grant first proposed the typology of insider and outsider groups in 1989 but 
has been criticized for failing to distinguish between strategy and status by scholars such as 
Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin.359 According to Grant’s typology, there are three 
sub-types of groups within each of insider and outsider groups. Insider groups comprise 
prisoner groups, low profile groups, and high profile groups; while outsider groups include 
potential insiders, outsiders by necessity and ideological outsiders.360 He argues that it is 
analytically meaningless to distinguish strategy from status as they are interrelated.361 This 
typology has problems, as pointed out by Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin, because an 
insider strategy adopted by groups cannot guarantee an insider status which is something 
ascribed by government.362 By preferring to separate strategy from status, they have 
proposed a different typology: groups with insider status include core insider groups, 
specialist insider groups and peripheral insider groups; and groups with outsider status 
comprise outsider groups by goal and outsiders by choice.363 From the two typologies we 
can see that there is a difference in categorizing failed insiders which refer to groups 																																																								359	 William	Maloney,	Grant	Jordan	and	Andrew	McLaughlin,	‘Interest	Groups	and	Public	Policy:	The	Insider/	Outsider	Model	Revisited’	(1994)	14	Journal	of	Public	Policy	17.	360	 Wyn	Grant,	Pressure	Groups	Politics	and	Democracy	in	Britain	(Hemel	Hempstead:	Harvester	Wheatsheaf	1995).	361	 Ibid.	362	 Maloney,	Jordan	and	McLaughlin	(n	359).	363	 Ibid.	
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practising insider strategies but with little influence. Grant’s typology defines failed 
insiders as potential insiders, which are classified under outsider groups. In contrast, in the 
typology proposed by Maloney, failed insiders are included in peripheral insider groups. 
There is a problem in defining, as Grant does, failed insiders as potential insiders and 
classifying them as outsiders in that there is no consistency between strategy and status. 
That is to say, according to Grant’s typology, practising insider strategies may lead to an 
outsider status (which is what failed insiders become). It is true that, by separating strategy 
from status, the typology by Maloney maintains a consistency between strategy and status 
when categorizing groups. That is to say, groups practising insider strategies are classified 
as having an insider status while groups with outsider strategies have an outsider status. In 
terms of failed insiders, they can still have the insider status of a peripheral type but not a 
core insider status. In terms of my discussion on GE, by employing Maloney’s typology, 
the question whether and how strategy adopted by NGOs can affect their involvement in 
GE can also be illustrated as how status affects involvement. However, whether it is a core 
insider status or a peripheral insider status still matters when discussing certain NGOs in 
the following sections. 
 
In terms of the second question whether groups have agency to make decisions on their 
strategies, scholars have different views on it. Some, such as Grant, claim that groups have 
choices over strategies;364 some, such as Dunleavy, also suggest that groups have choices 
but with a preference to adopt insider strategies;365 others, such as Maloney, argue that 
																																																								364	 Grant	(n	360).	365	 Patrick	Dunleavy,	Democracy,	Bureaucracy	and	Public	Choice:	Economic	Explanations	in	Political	Science	(London:	Harvester	1991).	
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groups do not have real choices over strategies at all.366 In my opinion, groups still have 
choices on strategies, but not all groups have it. This view is not compatible with 
Maloney’s argument concerning groups’ agency. According to Maloney, strategies are 
mainly determined by the nature of groups’ policy demand and to some extent by the 
history of groups’ formation.367 In terms of outsiders by choice, such as Greenpeace 
pointed out by Maloney, they are forced to adopt an outsider strategy because of 
organisation maintenance, which is also a goal of survival by groups.368 Therefore, it can 
be concluded from Maloney’s view that groups do not have real choices or agency on 
strategies no matter which type of group they belong to. However, with regard to insider 
groups, although as noted by Binderkrantz and Krøyerit is true that their policy demands 
and goals can determine their strategies,369 goals are selected by groups themselves and 
hence considered as a choice in the first place. However, this kind of choice may not be 
defined in the same way as the choice discussed by Maloney, as choices on goals are 
generally made before groups are established while choices on strategy are more likely to 
be made after establishment of groups. 
 
With respect to outsiders by choice, such as Greenpeace, Maloney assumes that 
Greenpeace places more emphasis more on attracting members to ensure organizational 
maintenance than achieving political success, and this forces it to adopt an outsider 
strategy.370 But this could surely be considered to be a choice by Greenpeace to prioritise 
																																																								366	 Maloney,	Jordan	and	McLaughlin	(n	359).	367	 Ibid.	368	 Ibid.	369	 Anne	Binderkrantz	and	Simon	Krøyer,	‘Customizing	Strategy:	Policy	Goals	and	Interest	Group	Strategies’	(2012)	1	Interest	Groups	&	Advocacy	115.	370	 Maloney,	Jordan	and	McLaughlin	(n	359).	
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organizational maintenance? If this is not a free choice, which means Greenpeace has to 
focus on organizational maintenance first to survive, how can it explain that Greenpeace 
has, according to Saunders, shifted its outsider strategy to a mix of both insider and 
outsider strategies?371 Therefore, it is not precise enough to conclude that all groups have 
no real choices on their strategies. Instead, insider groups and outsider groups by goals do 
not have agency on their strategies which are determined by their goals in the first place, 
while outsider groups by choice, which normally adopt thresholders’ strategies,372 have 
agency on their choices. 
 
The insider and outsider strategy specifically overlaps with political opportunity theory in 
addressing the issue of political context. As in political opportunity theory, the openness of 
a polity is a crucial variable. It is closely related to the insider and outsider strategy in that 
a polity will be relatively open to insiders and relatively closed to outsiders in general.373 
However, in terms of outsiders by choice, as discussed above, they have agency on choices 
of strategies and hence, although the polity may be open, they may still practise outsider 
strategies due to organizational maintenance. In terms of environmental NGOs in the EU, 
many of them prefer to practise outsider strategies and thus, are considered as outsiders or 
thresholders.374 Saunders argues that insiders concentrate on issues already on the political 
agenda; thresholders seek to add new, uncontroversial issues onto the agenda; and 
outsiders seek the support of new and controversial issues.375 However, this argument does 
																																																								371	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	372	 A	thresholder	strategy	refers	to	a	mix	of	both	insider	and	outsider	strategies.	373	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	374	 Jan	Beyers,	‘Policy	Issues,	Organisational	Format	and	the	Political	Strategies	of	Interest	Organisations’	(2008)	31	West	European	politics	1188.	375	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	
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not easily apply in the context of GE. For example, thresholders targeting uncontroversial 
issues new to the political agenda, such as Greenpeace and FoE as defined by Saunders, 
have in fact engaged with GE which is considered controversial. Most small NGOs in 
China, which can be classified as outsiders targeting controversial issues according to 
Saunders’s categorization, have not been involved in GE, despite this being perhaps more 
expected of them due to the new, controversial nature of GE and their outsider status.  
 
In answering the question why interest groups lobby, the resource dependence theory has 
been discussed as a potential answer to the question. It indicates that groups controlling 
key external resources have the potential to influence and control other groups.376 It 
overlaps with resource mobilization theory in that they both admit resources as a crucial 
element of mobilization. In the context of GE, it can be applied to explain why small 
NGOs in China make choices over which specific policy areas they are involved 
depending on large NGOs which can provide resources to them. 
 
In conclusion, insider or outsider strategy as a variable can be generated from interest 
group literature. Integrated with social movement theory, the question of whether strategy 
– in terms of insider or outsider strategy – can affect NGOs involvement in GE has been 
discussed under the variable. This is to bridge the gap in answering the question why 
interest groups specialise in certain policy areas rather than others, which is also a deficit 
in social movement literature. 																																																									376	 David	Lowery,	‘Why	Do	Organized	Interests	Lobby?	A	Multi-Goal,	Multi-Context	Theory	of	Lobbying’	(2007)	39	Palgrave	Macmillan	Journals	29.	
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5.4	Legal	literature	
After discussing variables within social movements and interest groups literature, legally 
related literature will be employed and discussed in this section. In addition, integration 
between legal scholarship and the other two strands of literature will be investigated during 
the discussion. Within the broad legal scholarship, governance literature and law and social 
movements literature are employed in this thesis to generate or examine variables 
concerning NGO involvement in GE. 
5.4.1 Governance literature 
Governance literature concerning public participation has talked about a variety of issues 
from different perspectives. There are several main themes receiving much discussion: 
public participation as solutions to improve procedural legitimacy; participation to improve 
results and decisions as a substantive approach; public participation itself as an alternative 
regulatory tool against traditional command-and-control approach; limitations of public 
participation; information disclosure as a precondition of public participation; and loss of 
public trust in government concerning scientific advice. There is a gap in the literature that 
why NGOs choose to participate in some political areas, where my research can to some 
extent fill in it. 
 
In terms of procedural legitimacy, according to Lee and Abbot, public participation is 
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required to improve procedural legitimacy because of the political nature of environmental 
decisions.377 That is to say, environmental decisions normally include very technical 
elements and thus rely on expertise to a large extent. However, decisions on controversial 
topics cannot be made merely by experts; instead, a value judgment from the public can 
bridge gaps in scientific knowledge.378 It is true that involving the public is a way of 
enhancing procedural legitimacy, especially with regard to controversial topics. However, 
in terms of substantially improving results and achieving better decisions, scholars have 
more suspicions of including the ordinary public, which will be discussed later. Another 
important element in procedural legitimacy is related to expression of green values.379 
Although public participation may not necessarily lead to ‘green outcomes’, it is a crucial 
way of ensuring expression of ‘green values’ by the public. 380  Expression of 
environmental values by the public can be incorporated along with expressive benefits in 
the interest group literature. As discussed in the section on interest groups, expressive 
benefits are the main factor in attracting people to join in environmental groups. People 
aiming at expressive benefits care more about their values being expressed and heard, 
which in turn confirms the importance of expressing environmental values as an element of 
procedural legitimacy. 
 
Public participation is also considered by scholars as a way of improving substantive 
results and achieving better decisions. However, it is controversial, as noted in the 
preceding paragraph, concerning the tension between experts and the ordinary public. 																																																								377	 Lee	and	Abbot,	‘The	Usual	Suspects?	Public	Participation	Under	the	Aarhus	Convention’	(n	3).	378	 Ibid.	379	 Abbot	(n	177).	380	 Ibid.	
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According to Lee and Abbot, there is a dilemma between relying on expert judgment 
concerning technical areas and including the public to provide value judgements on 
controversial topics.381 In addition, as they have summarised in their work, opposite views 
are held by other scholars that an emphasis on experts should be placed even at the 
expense of involving the public in terms of technical intensive decisions.382 This is due to 
both the difficulty in including the public and there being no room for including values in a 
technical perspective.383 Opponents have questioned the expertise of the public as well as 
the feasibility of involving them. But a decision on a technical topic cannot solely be 
interpreted as including purely technical issues. Although a topic may include significant 
technical elements, as long as it is related to environmental decisions, political and ethical 
concerns will go hand in hand with technical decisions. Therefore, arguing that an issue is 
too technical to involve the public may not be realistic within environmental decisions. In 
addition, another question arising from the expertise of the public is whether the public 
needs high technical expertise to participate in such debates. It seems that high technical 
expertise does not matter too much as long as the public has common sense. According to 
a report by the House of Lords, common sense is a solid base for participation.384 In 
addition, understanding scientific data is not a requirement for the public as this is the 
responsibility of experts. What the public has to cope with is information provided by 
experts who are interpreting from raw scientific data. This raises an issue between raw data 
and information, which will be discussed later in this section. 
 																																																								381	 Lee	and	Abbot,	‘The	Usual	Suspects?	Public	Participation	Under	the	Aarhus	Convention’	(n	3).	382	 Ibid.	383	 Ibid.	384	 Roger	Brownsword	and	Morag	Goodwin,	Law	and	The	Technologies	of	The	Twenty-First	Century	(William	Twining	ed,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2012).	
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Apart from improving substantive results and procedural legitimacy, public participation 
itself is also considered as an alternative regulatory tool.385 According to Maria Lee, the 
traditional command-and-control approach is not sufficiently able to cope with emerging 
environmental issues including ozone depletion.386 Alternative tools such as economic 
mechanisms have been critically analysed by Lee in terms of their challenges and 
environmental effectiveness. 387  Lee has considered public participation among these 
alternative regulatory mechanisms which can act as a supplement to traditional regulatory 
tools. In terms of the limitations of public participation, scholars have raised a concern that 
NGOs cannot represent the public.388 And because of this, whether to involve the ordinary 
public draws attention. However, involving the ordinary public is considered difficult and 
not cost effective and additionally has a risk that it may not improve outcomes in the 
end.389 This is due to the fact that the public is considered by some as irrational and 
ignorant concerning technical issues. 390  This perspective is closely related to the 
technological fear by the public in the cultural perspective of social movement theories. 
Technological fear in the variable of emotions means people tend to oppose new 
technologies and generate bias by misusing scientific information, which is regarded as 
irrational and a matter of ignorance. Because of this, it has been suggested by some that the 
public should perhaps be excluded from decision-making. While it is normal for the public 
to hold this technological fear, excluding them from decisions is, nevertheless, not a proper 
solution to reduce their fear. Instead, involving them in decisions can make the public 
																																																								385	 Lee	(n	181).	386	 Ibid.	387	 Abbot	(n	177).	388	 Lee	and	Abbot,	‘The	Usual	Suspects?	Public	Participation	Under	the	Aarhus	Convention’	(n	3).	389	 Ibid.	390	 Ibid.	
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more or less well informed of the issues and through this, their fear of technology may be 
reduced. 
 
Access to information is another theme under discussion concerning public participation, 
and is a precondition of public involvement. Access to information requires information 
disclosure by government. There is a concern that raw data can only be understood by 
experts and it is difficult for the ordinary public to identify relevant material from massive 
and overwhelming data. While explaining data is easier to understand, there remains a risk 
of manipulation by authorities such as developers in EIA.391 The issue is related to the 
difference between data and information. Usually data is raw while information is more a 
matter of interpretation of data. Based on this distinction, data is usually provided by 
scientists to decision makers and information is provided by decision makers to the public. 
Therefore, access to information refers to interpreted information by decision makers and 
this is why there is an opportunity for decision makers to manipulate the data. But it seems 
that there is no way out of this dilemma as the interpreted data cannot always be neutral 
and stick to facts; and raw data cannot easily be understood by the public. 
 
The last issue discussed in the literature is the loss of trust in government concerning 
scientific advice. Scholars have proposed a solution by enhancing openness and gaining 
participation.392 However, how effective this solution can be is also related to the public 
themselves. As mentioned above, the public, with technological fear, can be irrational and 
ignorant and hence, generate bias against issues. Merely enhancing openness and 																																																								391	 Ibid.	392	 Ibid.	
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participation may not be enough to increase trust if bias is already in place. Therefore, 
technological fear among the public also needs attention when dealing with the loss of trust 
in government.  
  
Within the governance literature, there are two strands of literature or theory which need to 
be noted concerning NGOs. One important strand of the literature is focused on regulatory 
legitimacy; another looks at effective participation. NGO participation is considered not 
only closely related to governance but is also seen as a form of ‘new governance’.393 This 
governance literature can be seen as an important bridge between the political science 
literature on social movements and interest groups considered above and literature in law, 
which has tended to focus more on governance. 
 
In terms of regulatory legitimacy, public participation including NGOs is an important 
element of procedural legitimacy.394 Some scholars argue that legitimacy consists of the 
act of participation itself; some argue that participation is more an instrumental means; and 
others combine the two arguments to indicate that participation is not only good in itself 
but also instrumental.395 In order to foster openness of participation, it is seen as important 
to let various voices including NGOs be heard at different stages of the decision-making 
process.396 There are two ways of having public voices heard: through individuals directly 
and via representative NGOs indirectly. According to the report released by the UK House 
of Lords Science and Technology Committee, there is a difficulty in engaging the public 																																																								393	 Lee	(n	181);	Gráinne	DE	Búrca	and	Joanne	Scott	(eds),	Law	and	New	Governance	In	The	EU	and	The	US	(Oxford:	Hart	2006).	394	 Brownsword	and	Goodwin	(n	384).	395	 Ibid.	396	 Ibid.	
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with complicated issues which require sufficient information, as the general level of 
scientific education in the general public is low.397 It seems that NGOs can mediate public 
voices effectively. However, this role of NGOs has been criticised by scholars as 
controversial because it is possible for NGOs to stop mediating and to define public 
interests by themselves.398 In the context of GE, the controversy exists and yet is perhaps 
more complicated. NGOs being reluctant to talk about GE is a way of them ceasing to 
mediate by pausing the communication between government and the public. This is 
perhaps because NGOs do not want to draw much attention from the public. Intentionally 
avoiding talking about GE can be regarded as affecting the public interest by stopping their 
mediating role, which is different from the danger defined in the literature that NGOs stop 
mediating and decide terms or evidence to shape public debates. That is to say, 
differentiated from the danger defined in the literature, in the case of GE, NGOs cease to 
mediate by staying clear of it rather than shaping the debates. A question arising from the 
discussion of NGOs’ reluctance to participate in GE is whether there is a conscious, 
strategic decision in not making use of their role of mediating to affect public interests. 
This will be examined in detail in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
In terms of effective participation, this entails freedom of expression which is essential to 
the principle of transparency.399 Freedom of expression requires both the freedom of 
having opinions expressed but also the freedom of receiving information. Therefore an 
information deficit between government and the public challenges the principle of 																																																								397	 Ibi	House	of	Lords	Science	and	Technology	Committee,	Science	and	Society	(2000);	Brownsword	and	Goodwin	(n	384).	398	 Brownsword	and	Goodwin	(n	384).	399	 Ibid.	
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transparency to some extent. NGOs are assumed to play an information-exchange role to 
address a deficit of information.400 In terms of GE, there is a deficit of information among 
the public, but why do some NGOs to some extent fail to exchange information and not get 
involved in GE? It perhaps leads to the answer of the new information deficit model that it 
is the deficit of scientists who need to gain more information.401 This is especially related 
to emerging technologies such as GE (and e.g. nanotechnology). As there are many risks 
and uncertainties in GE, scientists are unable to define all of the uncertain risks and side 
effects that would do harm to the environment and health at the current stage of research. 
This deficit is likely to influence NGOs when they aim to exchange information on GE and, 
as a result, NGOs may not become involved as they lack information from scientists. 
According to the report by the House of Lords, common sense possessed by the public is 
able to provide a solid basis for participation.402 To achieve effective participation, 
education is less a condition than the willingness to gain information.403 In terms of GE, 
this may help to explain why some NGOs in China have not gained any information of GE: 
it may simply be a matter of their unwillingness to do so. However, willingness to gain 
information does not guarantee willingness to participate, as in the UK some NGOs do not 
participate although they have knowledge on GE. Despite this, lack of willingness to gain 
information, which is regarded as a precondition of participation, can be a potential 
explanation for why NGOs have not engaged in GE. 
 
As can be seen from the discussion above, intentionally ceasing to mediate and willingness 																																																								400	 Michael	Mason,	The	New	Accountability:	Environmental	Responsibility	Across	Borders	(London:	Earthscan	2005).	401	 Simon	Brown,	‘The	New	Deficit	Model’	(2009)	4	Nature	nanotechnology	609.	402	 Brownsword	and	Goodwin	(n	384).	403	 Ibid.	
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to access information can be considered as potential variables for examining NGO 
participation in GE. These two variables generated from the governance literature are not 
completely independent from those discussed in social movement and interest group 
literatures. They are integrated to form a synthetic framework for my discussion in the next 
section. 
	
5.4.2 Law and social movements literature 
This part discusses the literature on law and social movements with law and society 
scholarship. By incorporating litigation strategy and social movements theory, it focuses 
on the question of why NGOs choose to adopt litigation as a social movement strategy, 
which has been examined by socio-legal scholars. I will continue discussing this core 
question in law and social movements literature, but with an opposite perspective of why 
NGOs in the UK or China do not choose to employ litigation as a strategy, in the context 
of GE. 
 
The existing literature concerning why social movements adopt litigation as a strategy 
includes several key variables: legal opportunity and political opportunity, resources, rights 
consciousness, and grievances. Political opportunity, resources and rights consciousness 
have been developed under legal mobilization theory by Michael McCann and others.404 
Rights consciousness, as argued by scholars, cannot solely trigger legal mobilization; 
instead, it must be combined with resources as well as political opportunity to feasibly 																																																								404	 Lisa	Vanhala,	‘Legal	Opportunity	Structures	and	the	Paradox	of	Legal	Mobilization	By	the	Environmental	Movement	in	the	UK’	(2012)	46	Law	&	Society	Review	523.	
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mobilize.405 Legal opportunity has been introduced by Chris Hilson into social movements 
theory, as a context variable that should be discussed separately from political 
opportunities, together with differentiated terms – legal opportunity structure and legal 
opportunity.406 He has employed the two terms to describe, respectively, stable and 
contingent factors concerning contextual issues.407 The relevant literature has suggested 
and emphasized variables of legal and political opportunity as well as resources, but with 
an ignorance of grievance.408 According to Hilson, grievance is a necessary and important 
variable in explaining climate change litigation in the UK.409 This has brought grievance 
back in discussion on why NGOs choose litigation as a social movement strategy.  
 
Based on existing literature on law and social movements, I will begin to discuss relevant 
variables proposed in the literature within the context of GE. In terms of litigation strategy, 
in recent years, there are only two lawsuits against GE in the US. Although there is one 
lawsuit against GE in Canada, it was organised by an individual, Daniel Towsey, rather 
than a NGO, which does not fit in the discussion. The two lawsuits in the US are organised 
by Geoengineering Action Network and Geoengineering Watch respectively. Both 
lawsuits are supported by a group of law experts and are targeting chemtrails and GE 
according to their websites and posts.410 However, although there are campaigns and 																																																								405	 Holly	McCammon	and	Alison	McGrath,	‘Litigating	Change?	Social	Movements	and	the	Court	System’	(2015)	9	Sociology	Compass	128.	406	 Hilson	(n	314).	407	 Vanhala	(n	404).	408	 Chris	Hilson,	‘Climate	Change	Litigation	in	the	UK:	An	Explanatory	Approach	(or	Bringing	Grievance	Back	In)’	in	Fabrizio	Fracchia	and	Massimo	Occhiena	(eds),	Climate	Change:	La	Riposta	del	Dirotto	(Napoli:	Editoriale	Scientifica	2010).	409	 Ibid.	410	 Geoengineering	Action	Network,	‘Class	Action	Lawsuit	Against	Geongineering	&	Chemtrails	In	The	Works’	(2015)	 	<http://chemtrailsmuststop.com/2015/07/class-action-lawsuit-against-geoengineering-chemtrail-in-the-works/>	accessed	9	July	2015;	Dane	Wigington,	‘Pushing	Back	Against	Climate	Engineering,	Canadian	Lawsuit	Is	Filed’	(2016)	 	 <http://www.geoengineeringwatch.org/?s=law>	accessed	23	March	2016.	
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lobbying activities in terms of GE in the UK, there is no litigation against it so far by 
NGOs. This raises a question why NGOs in the US have resorted to a litigation strategy 
against GE while NGOs in the UK have not turned to litigation.  
 
In order to explore answers to the question, I will turn to grievance and urgency from the 
variable of emotions, and effectiveness from resource mobilization theory. According to 
Hilson, grievance is a crucial factor in climate change litigation, especially specific 
grievance rather than general grievance.411 That is to say, with enough specific grievance 
against GE, legal mobilizations can be triggered even without a high level of concern over 
climate change. Based on Hilson’s theory of specific grievance, I continue to argue that 
extreme or strong grievance can account for litigation on GE. According to the posts by 
GE Action Network and GE Watch in the US, they strongly oppose any GE activities and 
suggest that GE be terminated immediately. With such an extreme emotion, they assume 
that lawsuits are the quickest way to suggest a ban on GE.412 In the UK, NGOs involved in 
GE generally hold a relatively soft view on GE according to my empirical data, which 
means that they do not strongly oppose all methods of GE research activities. Instead, they 
indicate that ‘I would not say that I oppose to GE research; whether to oppose or support 
GE research depends on a case-by-case basis’. From the facts above, it can be seen that 
litigation as a strategy is used by NGOs in the US with strong and extreme grievance 
against any GE activities, and because of this, NGOs in the UK with a relatively soft 
attitude towards GE do not adopt litigation to pursue an immediate outcome. 
																																																								411	 Hilson,	‘Climate	Change	Litigation	in	the	UK:	An	Explanatory	Approach	(or	Bringing	Grievance	Back	In)’	(n	408).	412	 Network	(n	410).	
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Another factor concerns the idea of emergency in the context of GE. GE Action Network, 
have listed a number of serious harms caused by chemtrails and GE and believe that 
chemtrails sprayed in sky are GE activities. Therefore they propose an immediate 
termination on GE activities. One important issue to note is that whether chemtrails are a 
method of carrying out GE is controversial and is not included further in the discussion. In 
the UK, NGOs involved in GE such as Greenpeace, do not consider chemtrails as urgent 
with solid scientific evidence.413 They regard chemtrails as normal trails sprayed by 
aircrafts without conspiracy although they have received significant amounts of video or 
photo ‘evidence’ from the public requesting a campaign or action. By avoiding a 
discussion on whether chemtrails is a GE method, a critical point can still be identified that 
whether the issue we are facing is seen as urgent and as having caused damage is important 
in explaining litigation strategy. In addition, according to GE Action Network, after many 
strategies adopted to stop GE, litigation is the quickest method to achieve the goal. This 
suggests that litigation is considered after other strategies are exhausted and a quick 
solution to make a change. It raises an issue of whether litigation is more regarded as a last 
resort or an emergency aid in the context of GE, which requires further discussion. 
 
Effectiveness in pursuing a change concerning GE by litigation is frequently mentioned in 
the claims by GE Action Network and GE Watch. As posted on their websites, lawsuits are 
seen as the most effective way of disseminating details of GE and are a cost-effective way 
of halting GE. That is to say, litigation effectively draws attention to the issue of GE no 																																																								413	 For	example,	Graham	Thompson,	‘Greenpeace's	View	On	'Chemtrails'’	(2015)	 	<http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/greenpeaces-view-chem-trails-20150313-0/>	accessed	13	March	2015.	
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matter what the outcome of lawsuit is and is likely to have effective impacts among the 
public. This can also explain why relevant NGOs in the UK do not consider litigation as a 
strategy. According to my empirical data, all of the respondents in the UK have expressed 
their reluctance to draw too much attention on GE, as it may distract the public from 
focusing on mitigation and adaptation. Therefore, litigation, which is able to draw 
significant public attention, is not the preferred strategy for NGOs in the UK.  
 
In addition to discussing variables within the literature on law and social movements, the 
perspective of interest group theory can also be incorporated in it. According to some early 
literature on how law is effective in securing social change, law-based strategies, such as 
litigation, are considered as difficult for ‘outsiders’ to employ successfully.414 It suggests 
that litigation strategy is preferably taken by ‘insiders’. In addition, according to the 
literature, litigation is considered conservative and led by law elites, and hence, something 
that many NGOs cannot pursue.415 However, this seems to fail in explaining the situation 
in the UK. Some NGOs in the UK, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, practise a 
mixture of insider and outsider strategies which is defined as thresholders by Saunders,416 
have a history of employing a bottom-up litigation strategy and are well-resourced both in 
financial and experience.  
 
In conclusion, grievance and urgency which can be included in the variable of emotions in 
social movement theory, as well as effectiveness which is situated in resource mobilization 																																																								414	 Steven	Boutcher,	‘Law	and	Social	Movements:	It's	More	Than	Just	Litigation	and	Courts’	(2013)	 	<https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2013/02/18/law-and-social-movements-its-more-than-just-litigation-and-courts/>	accessed	18	February	2013.	415	 Ibid.	416	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	
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theory have been generated and examined within the law and social movement literature. 
5.5	A	synthetic	analytical	framework	for	understanding	NGOs’	involvement	
in	GE	
This part aims to develop a synthetic analytical framework for combining theories of social 
movements, interest groups and governance in order to explore comprehensive variables 
for understanding NGO involvement in GE. To begin with, I will concentrate on the 
limitations of the various theories in the preceding discussion to provide an initial insight 
that variables generated only from social movement literature are not comprehensive 
enough for my research. Next, I will explain why I integrate theories of social movements, 
interest groups and governance and then illustrate how they can be merged in the context 
of GE. Finally, integrated variables are tied in with the hypotheses proposed in my 
literature review to develop a synthetic framework for discussing data in detail in chapters 
6 and 7. 
 
5.5.1 Limitations of the theories 
The variables identified in different literature are important for understanding NGO 
participation in GE, and each of them can shape the dependent variable – NGOs’ 
involvement in GE – from different perspectives. Therefore every single literature or 
theory cannot provide rounded explanations to discuss the data in the UK and China. This 
is because there are limitations in different theories and literature. 
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In the social movement literature, three stands of literature are criticized as having limited 
scope. Resource mobilization theory emphasises organisations and resources among 
organisations but fails to situate organisations within the broader structural context of a 
polity. Applying merely resource mobilization theory to understand NGO involvement will 
lead to a synchronic answer. Political opportunity theory can be used to address the 
limitation of ignoring the context factor as it concentrates on the political environment 
facing organisations. However, applying this theory alone is unable to address the complex 
issues as it is viewed as overly static and focusing purely on the interactions between 
organisations and the political context.417 Therefore it is proper to integrate the two 
theories in my discussion. An integrated theory of resource mobilization and political 
opportunity does not, however, allow for an emphasis on emotions, which is a crucial 
element triggering social movement participation. I therefore added this by including a 
cultural perspective. Overall, social movement literature concentrates on the conflictual 
nature of movements with non-institutionalized approaches; however, not all of the NGOs 
in GE adopt a conflict form in their participation. 
 
The interest group literature is a small field in political science and to some extent isolated 
within the broader politics literature. The theory of variations in strategy in terms of 
insider/outsider can be applied to understand NGO participation in GE. However, there is a 
gap when it attempts to address the question of whether different strategies will affect 
NGOs’ involvement in GE. Applying the theory of strategy in the interest group literature 
alone will not be able to answer the question. This gap requires combining social 																																																								417	 Ibid.	
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movement literature with the strategy theory. In terms of the governance literature, the 
dependent variable, namely NGO participation, is situated within the public participation 
theory. Governance literature addresses mainly normative issues rather than strategic 
issues however. It has limitations when considering how and why NGOs make strategic 
choices. The socio-legal literature on law and social movements is more useful in dealing 
with strategic issues, when addressing the question why social movement organisations 
practise a litigation strategy. It brings important factor – legal opportunity (structure)– into 
social movement theories. Variables discussed in this literature can be embedded in the 
social movements scholarship and will not be discussed separately in the following section. 
In conclusion, incorporating these literatures may help to shed light on coping with the 
limitations. 		
5.5.2 Integration of theories 
Theories in the literature on social movements, interest groups and governance can be 
integrated to some extent. In a general sense, theories on social movements and interest 
groups provide a political angle for exploring NGO participation, while theories on 
governance offer a more legally focused perspective.  
 
They are interrelated in several ways. First, the variable ‘openness’ generated from 
political opportunity theory can be illustrated with interest group theory and also 
governance theory. The openness of a polity in political opportunity theory can affect the 
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insider or outsider strategy employed by organisations in interest group theory. 
Organisations facing a relatively open political environment are more likely to adopt an 
insider strategy while those facing a closed polity tend to act as outsiders.418 Openness is 
also a normative issue of public participation in governance, with openness addressed as an 
important element of participation in the decision-making process.419 Second, both social 
movement and interest group theories have underlined the free rider dilemma based on 
cost-benefit analysis. The expressive benefit in interest group theory, which suggests 
people join environmental groups according to their willingness to express the 
environmental values and make their voices heard during the process, can be used to 
provide a solution for the free rider dilemma in social movements as well. Expressive 
incentives in environmental groups emphasize the process of participation itself, which 
gives participation a more legitimate meaning rather than considering it as an instrument 
only. Third, the resource dependence theory in the interest group literature shares a similar 
profile with resource mobilization in the social movements literature. They equally 
emphasize resources as an essential part of organisations. Thus, there are some points of 
integration across different theories which provide the feasibility of combining those 
variables. And the most important point to merge those theories is to make a synthetic and 
comprehensive framework of variables for discussion in order to try to address the 
limitations in each literature. 	
																																																								418	 Ibid.	419	 Brownsword	and	Goodwin	(n	384).	
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5.5.3 Developing variables 
As is outlined in the literature review in chapter 2, within the public participation literature 
and the governance scholarship, several hypotheses have been proposed to understand 
NGOs’ involvement in GE. These hypotheses can be merged into variables generated from 
preceding discussions. A hypothesis that NGOs with favoured status might push less 
favoured NGOs out of the arena can be integrated into the competition theme in the 
variable of resources in the social movement literature. The hypotheses of lack of expertise 
and possessing limited financial and labour resources420 are considered as an element of 
the material resources variable generated from resource mobilization theory. The 
hypothesis that NGOs fear distracting society from focusing on mitigation and adaptation 
will be discussed under the theme of ceasing to mediate in the governance literature. The 
hypothesis that NGOs ‘feel the dice are loaded in favour of powerful actors’421 is a 
reflection of resignation in the variable of threat from the cultural approach. However, the 
hypothesis of environmental constraints422 cannot be fully integrated into the variables in 
political opportunity theory and thus requires developing a more comprehensive variable 
of context. This is because political opportunity addresses purely political context issues, 
which can include the hypothesis of legal constraints and political constraints, but means it 
fails to address the issue of public consciousness in society proposed by environmental 
constraints.423 Therefore, it is proper to develop a variable of context that can include both 
political factors and public consciousness factors. 																																																								420	 Text	to	section	2.2.1.	421	 Morrow	and	Cullen	(n	132).	422	 Text	to	section	2.2.2.	Environmental	constraints	refer	to	the	situation	that	GE	has	not	draw	much	public	attention	in	China.	423	 Text	to	section	2.2.2.	
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By merging the hypotheses and the theories in the preceding discussion, a synthetic 
framework of variables can be concluded. First, there is the context variable, which 
includes sub-variables of openness, the degree of policy development, and public 
consciousness. Second, there is the emotion variable including sub-variables of threat, 
blame, and willingness to access information. Third, one has the strategy variable, which 
entails insider or outsider strategies, ceasing to mediate, efficiency and competition. 
Finally, there is the resource variable, which includes material resources and the 
conscience of elites. This framework combines three different strands of literature and 
theories, which is expected to generate a more comprehensive analytic framework for my 
further discussion of data in the UK and China in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
This chapter has employed three literatures of different scope – the social movements 
literature, the interest groups literature and the governance literature – to generate variables 
for examining empirical data. By acknowledging limitations in explaining NGOs’ 
involvement with each single literature, this chapter proposes a synthetic analytic 
framework and comprehensive variables for further discussion of the empirical data. The 
next chapter will discuss these variables in detail with the empirical data in the UK and 
China, aiming to explore a pattern, if there is one, to help understand NGO participation in 
the two countries. 
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Chapter	 6	 Discussion	 on	 the	 results	 in	
China	
This chapter discusses the empirical results in China with a theoretical basis of variables 
identified in chapter 5. It seeks to examine the variables with empirical data in China in 
order to develop a theory on NGOs’ involvement in GE. Therefore, data and results in 
China are analysed and discussed according to the categorization of variables. The 
discussion consists of five sections: sections 6.1 to 6.4 examine the four variables – context, 
emotion, strategy, and resource. The last section draws conclusions regarding the variables 
and develops a theory for NGO involvement in China. 
6.1	Context	 	
The variable of context can be considered as the background for discussing NGO 
participation in GE. According to the discussion in chapter 5, context comprises three 
important factors that contribute to the involvement of NGOs in China – openness, public 
consciousness and the degree of policy development.  
 
The openness of a polity can provide a picture of the general political situation that affects 
NGO participation. Before discussing the empirical data produced by interviews in China, 
an investigation in the general political opportunities that NGOs face will be addressed 
from a dynamic perspective. As mentioned in chapter 5, political opportunities refer not 
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only to structural factors, such as the openness of a polity, but also to contingent and 
dynamic factors. NGOs in China have a relatively short history of development compared 
with those in Western countries, and they did not grow in numbers until the opening up of 
policy in China in 1979.424 The early stage of development of NGOs, inter alia during the 
1980s and 1990s, witnessed a rapid growth in numbers and several political opportunities 
due to the opening of the political process and transition of the authoritarian regime.425 
That is to say, the opening up of the polity and the transition of the regime has provided 
many political opportunities for NGOs to emerge and develop during the two decades 
since 1979. In more recent years, NGOs have played a more active role in public policy 
due to the central policy of ‘harmonious society’ introduced by the Chinese government.426 
This policy, emphasising the stability of society, has enabled authorities at various levels to 
consider NGOs as having an important role to play in terms of reducing conflicts between 
the general public and the government. In addition to the political preferences during 
different time periods, structural conflicts between various levels of government and 
different administrative divisions – stemming from decentralisation of political authority – 
have also provided political opportunities for NGOs in China.427 For example, different 
levels of government differ in policy concerning the priority of environmental protection, 
in that local authorities may consider economic development as a priority while the central 
government emphasises environmental protection.  
 
Apart from the positive political opportunities that NGOs face, there are also dilemmas or 																																																								424	 Xueyong	Zhan	and	Shui-Yan	Tang,	‘Political	Opportunities,	Resources	Constraints	and	Policy	Advocacy	of	Environmental	NGOs	in	China’	(2013)	91	Public	Administration	381.	425	 Ibid.	426	 Ibid.	427	 Ibid.	
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obstacles for them. The fundamental barrier for their development, as identified by some 
scholars, is the government’s attitude towards NGOs in China.428 Government has shown a 
contradictory attitude towards NGOs: on the one hand, NGOs’ role in providing social 
services can be considered as a complement to governmental functions in some areas such 
as caring for the disabled; on the other hand, authorities have fears and suspicions 
regarding some NGOs which they consider may contribute to social instability and hence, 
they exert a strict control over their activities.429 This suspicion can further be illustrated as 
lack of trust in NGOs and results in a constraint on their development. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, political opportunity comprises not only objective factors but also a 
subjective factor concerning how NGOs perceive opportunities. Unfortunately, some 
NGOs, according to the empirical data, do not have much faith in government, stressing 
instead its ineffectiveness and reluctance to cooperate with them. This lack of mutual trust 
between government and NGOs forms a barrier that NGOs are facing in China. 	
6.1.1 Openness 
After drawing a picture of the general political opportunities in China, I now turn to 
discuss the empirical data under the relevant variables. As pointed out in the general 
discussion, it is difficult to identify whether a state is open or closed, as it may be closed to 
some issues of participation while open to others, or closed to some organisations while 
open to others. Therefore, it requires discussion concerning certain issue of GE and 
specific types of NGOs in China. According to the respondents in China, the openness or 																																																								428	 Yuwen	Li,	‘Introduction:	Challenges	and	Opportunities	for	NGOs	in	Different	Parts	of	the	World’	in	Yuwen	Li	(ed),	NGOs	in	China	and	Europe:	Comparisons	and	Contrasts	(Burlington:	Ashgate	Publishing	2011).	429	 Ibid.	
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ways of participation varies among international NGOs, large and government supported 
NGOs, and small NGOs. In terms of international NGOs, the respondent from Greenpeace 
China indicated that they are relatively more independent from government than Chinese 
NGOs; they also tend to criticize government policy and hence face more difficulties in 
influencing government and receive fewer opportunities. In order to understand this further, 
it needs to be illustrated within the current situation to explore why the government holds 
this attitude towards INGOs. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, NGOs in China face 
the problem that the government fears that some NGOs may contribute to social instability. 
This is typical and obvious for INGOs. The Chinese government has concerns about 
INGOs that could ‘broach politically sensitive subjects such as democracy and labour.430 
This results in restrictions on their activities and unclear legal status.431 The most serious 
problem regarding unclear legal status concerns registration. The number of unregistered 
INGOs is much larger than registered organisations.432 Unfortunately, there is no legal 
framework for the registration of INGOs in China and they can merely register as a foreign 
foundation.433 The respondent from HD Institute of Environment Observation (HDIEO) 
has confirmed this idea that the Chinese government does not trust international NGOs as 
‘the government is afraid of publicizing Western values by international NGOs and these 
organisations sometimes adopt radical strategies’. This again emphasises that international 
NGOs have more difficulties in influencing government policy mainly because they adopt 
radical strategies against government. In this regard, the Chinese government is closed to 
																																																								430	 Deyong	Yin,	‘China's	Attitude	Toward	Foreign	NGOs’	(2009)	8	Wash	U	Global	Stud	L	Rev	521.	431	 Junkui	Han,	‘International	NGOs	in	China:	Current	Situation,	Impacts	and	Responses	of	the	Chinese	government’	in	Yuwen	Li	(ed),	NGOs	in	China	and	Europe:	Comparisons	and	Contrasts	(Burlington:	Ashgate	Publishing	2011).	432	 Li	(n	428).	433	 Yin	(n	430).	
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international NGOs to some extent. 
  
In terms of large and government-supported NGOs, the respondents admit that they receive 
more opportunities for participation, as government is relatively open to them. The 
respondent from the government-supported NGO pointed out that, being politically 
supported by government, they obtain more opportunities to participate and have particular 
access to the deputies of the People’s Congress. However, there is also a problem that, as 
pointed out by the respondent, ‘large NGOs draw more attention from government than 
smaller organisations and hence, are likely to face more difficulties in participation as 
government may have concerns with their increasing social impacts’. This point provides 
evidence for the idea that government and NGOs in China lack mutual trust and 
government may fear that organisations with large social impacts could be a threat to 
social stability, or they may be an alternative to the government on a particular policy. In 
addition, according to the respondent from the business NGO – HDIEO, ‘the precondition 
of receiving more opportunities for large NGOs is not making trouble with government’. 
Therefore, it is not reasonable to conclude that the Chinese government is more open to 
large and government supported NGOs as they have difficulties in influencing policy when 
they stand on the opposite side to government. In terms of small NGOs, they have less 
opportunity to influence government policy. However, according to the respondent from 
HDIEO, small NGOs ‘have better communication with government as they help 
government to monitor pollution and damage to the environment by industries or 
individuals’. That is to say, whether the Chinese government is open to small NGOs 
depends to a large extent on their position to help government. 
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When it comes to policy concerning GE in the particular context of China, this entails 
several aspects. The first aspect we need to consider is the development of GE technology 
in China. According to the scientists engaged in the National GE Research Project in China, 
‘China does not have much motivation to conduct GE’. This is first because GE is a public 
good including a free rider dilemma, which has, been discussed in chapter 5.434 However, 
understanding this dilemma is different compared to other public goods. It suggests that 
participants in GE may not be benefited and benefits can go to non-participants; however 
non-participants can be affected not necessarily in a beneficial way but likely in a negative 
way. According to the scientists, due to the uncertainties on whether conducting GE will 
guarantee a beneficial outcome to participants themselves, China does not have much 
willingness to deploy GE projects. However why then does China research on GE at all? 
The scientists admit that it is a technology backup to at least research on it in case of an 
emergency need. In addition, GE research, as an alternative to deployment, is restricted to 
computer modeling and lab-based experiments, and furthermore, funding invested in GE 
by government is only used for modeling research rather than physical engineering 
research. This limitation makes it difficult to move on to the stage of deployment. 
Furthermore, according to the scientists, GE is related to a number of politically sensitive 
issues such as energy and food security, which requires more research into the complicated 
social and economic impacts of GE.  
 
The second aspect of context that requires attention is the developing nature of China. The 																																																								434	 Weismuller	(n	302).	
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developing nature includes an element of a relatively short history of development of 
NGOs in China. As mentioned earlier in this section, NGOs in China started to grow in 
number after the policy of opening up in 1979, which is relatively late compared with 
counterparts in the Western countries. As is pointed out by the respondent from 
Greenpeace China, ‘I don’t think it is a Chinese situation that there is no NGOs involved in 
GE; rather, it is more that the UK is a unique case as a well developed country. Because I 
don’t think you will find NGOs involved in GE in other developing countries’. The 
respondent continued to explain that when NGOs move to work on novel scientific topics, 
they typically require the culture of think tanks working with universities and research 
institutions, which is obviously a sign of well-developed countries such as the UK; while 
in contrast, NGOs in China do not have a culture of think tanks cooperating with research 
bodies. However, in reality in China, there are some think tanks with a small scale. They 
emerged after the opening up policy and have played a role in consultations with ‘the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, government 
departments and the army’.435 Because of the reform and opening up and the development 
of a market economy, think tanks in China have grown in diversity and numbers.436 
However, there are only around 100 think tanks and most of them are not well known.437 
Although government is willing to seek consultations from think tanks, they face many 
restrictions and may not have agency in providing thoughts due to, inter alia, registration 
problems.438 Therefore, although the respondent has not provided a precise picture of think 
tanks in China, he still provides an insight that there is no real culture of think tanks in 																																																								435	 Jia,	‘The	Development	and	Institutional	Environment	of	Non-Governmental	Think	Tanks	in	China’	(n	43).	436	 Ibid.	437	 Ibid.	438	 Ibid.	
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China as they are recently developed and their functions are marginal or limited. 
 
It is interesting that respondents from the international NGO indicated that, in the case of 
GE, it is crucial to understand the overall political environment in China and the big 
themes across the environment generally that the government is trying to focus on when 
they aim to engage in the area. That is to say, it is important for NGOs to follow what the 
political preferences of government are, and to try to operate within the scope of the 
government’s preferences. Although there is a national research project on GE, it is 
currently not a big theme for the Chinese government and is merely at its initial stage of 
research in China. However, climate change, including mitigation and adaptation, has 
already been a big theme for the Chinese government, which may lead to a situation that 
GE, as a topic within the context of climate change, will be given more attention as a 
theme. However, it is not a necessity for GE to become a theme in the political area 
because, as discussed earlier in this section, China does not have much motivation to 
become involved in it according to the scientists in the national GE research project. 
Following the big themes also requires that NGOs pay attention to keep up with the 
political environment and wait for the right time to give information across when the 
Chinese government can actually make use of it and adopt it into policy. This view reflects 
a contingent factor of political opportunities that NGOs encounter. According to the 
discussion in the previous chapter, political opportunity includes not only structural factors, 
such as the openness of a polity, but also the receptivity of a political system that 
comprises contingent and non-structural factors.439 The emphasis on the timing of exerting 																																																								439	 Rootes,	‘Political	Opportunity	Structures,	Promise,	Problems	and	Prospects’	(n	52).	
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influence on government can be considered the contingent factor of receptivity of the 
political system in China. In addition, the big themes of government also reflect a 
contingent factor of the polity that the preferences of government, which can change from 
time to time, matter when mobilizing around GE. It is a strategy of seeking opportunities in 
the dynamic political environment. However, respondents from Chinese NGOs440 have not 
paid much attention to opportunities to influence government policy. 	
6.1.2 Public Consciousness 
In terms of public consciousness, most of the respondents admitted that public 
consciousness of GE is low in China. The respondent from the government-supported 
NGO indicated that although public consciousness varies in difference regions in China 
due to their levels of development, the consciousness concerning GE is generally low 
across the whole of China. In addition, respondents from small NGOs and international 
NGOs agreed that ‘the public does not have knowledge on GE, do not mention that they 
are concerned about it or that they would like to see action on it through NGOs’. Since the 
public consciousness on GE is low in China, NGOs would not receive an active response 
from the public if they act on it and therefore have no interest in doing so.  
 
Public opinion on GE can also be discussed in relation to issue salience. Salience is an 
important concept in much of the existing literature on political science, which originally 
comes from research on voting behaviours aimed at exploring the various levels of 																																																								440	 I	use	the	term	‘Chinese	NGOs’	to	refer	to	NGOs	that	are	originally	established	in	China,	which	excludes	international	NGOs,	in	order	to	make	a	distinction	between	domestic	NGOs	and	international	NGOs.	
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importance attached to issues by voters.441 There are two major strands of literature on 
salience in political science: salience in policy-making442 and salience concerning public 
opinion. In employing this salience variable, literature on the latter strand will be applied 
in my discussion. Within this strand of literature, scholars have discussed two main topics: 
agenda-setting theory and the effects of issue salience on public opinion.443  
 
Agenda setting theory refers to ‘the ability of the news media to influence the salience of 
topics on the public agenda’.444 It focuses on the correlation between the media and the 
salience of issues. A key topic in agenda setting theory relates to measurement of salience. 
Initially scholars have turned to ask survey questions like ‘what are the most important 
problems (MIP) facing the nation?’ and then turn to explore aggregate MIP responses.445 
However, this measurement has been questioned by some scholars. For example, Wlezien 
has proposed that an important problem is a combination of importance and the degree to 
which it is considered as a ‘problem’.446 In terms of GE, the variable of salience cannot be 
applied to discuss Chinese NGOs, as the public in China has not really noticed GE. That is 
to say, GE is not a salient issue in China. INGOs do not become involved in it perhaps due 
to the fact of low public salience on GE. According to one of the respondents in 
Greenpeace China, ‘GE is not a mainstream topic in China and you don’t see GE in daily 
life’. This point suggests that GE is not considered salient by the public in China, and nor 																																																								441	 Christopher	Wlezien,	‘On	the	Salience	of	Political	Issues:	The	Problem	with	'Most	Important	Problem'’	(2005)	24	Electoral	Studies	555.	442	 See	e.g.	Rebecca	Bromley-Trujillo,	Jordan	Leising	and	John	Poe,	‘The	Importance	of	Salience:	Public	Opinion	and	State	Policy	Action	on	Climate	Change’	(Annual	Meeting	of	the	State	Politics	and	Policy	Conference).	443	 See	e.g.	David	Ciuk	and	Berwood	Yost,	‘The	Effects	of	Issue	Salience,	Elite	Influence,	and	Policy	Content	on	Public	Opinion’	(2016)	33	Political	Communication	328.	444	 Maxwell	McCombs	and	Amy	Reynolds,	‘News	Influence	on	Our	Pictures	of	the	World’	in	Jennings	Bryant	and	Zillmann	Dolf	(eds),	Media	Effects:	Advances	in	Theory	and	Research	(New	Jersey:	Lawrence	Erlbaum	Associates	Publishers	2002).	445	 Wlezien	(n	441).	446	 Ibid.	
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is it even considered as a problem in the public’s daily life. 
 
In terms of another topic on determinants of salience, traditional agenda setting theory has 
focused on the media and its impacts on issue salience. Some scholars seek to explore 
complements to the media as a determinant, such as real-world cues,447 as well as 
increased knowledge on the issue and more opportunities to participate in politics via, for 
example, voting and signing petitions.448 Opportunities to participate in politics through 
various methods can be illustrated with the theory on political opportunity, which was 
discussed earlier in this section. Increased knowledge can be employed to discuss the case 
of GE. According to David Weaver, increased salience of an issue is accompanied by 
increased knowledge of its causes and potential solutions.449 This may, in turn, imply that 
low salience of an issue, such as GE, is accompanied by lack of knowledge on it. 
Respondents from Greenpeace China have confirmed this point that GE is a novel topic 
even in the scientific community and therefore, they lack information and knowledge on it, 
which somehow prevents it to become a salient topic. Some scholars, however, have 
argued that information gain does not always lead to a change of attitude on salience.450 
This can be interpreted as that information gain does not necessarily lead to increased 
salience as there is a possibility that the more information the public obtain in terms of an 
issue, the less salient they consider it. In terms of GE, some UK NGOs would like to 
prevent it from becoming a salient issue as they regard it as controversial and would rather 
																																																								447	 Roy	Behr	and	Shanto	Itengar,	‘Television	News,	Real-World	Cues,	and	Changes	in	the	Public	Agenda’	(1985)	49	Public	Opinion	Quarterly	38.	448	 David	Weaver,	‘Issue	Salience	and	Public	Opinion:	Are	There	Consequences	of	Agenda-Setting?’	(1991)	3	International	Journal	of	Public	Opinion	Research	53.	449	 Ibid.	450	 Richard	Carter,	‘Communication	and	Affective	Relations’	(1965)	42	Journal	of	Quarterly	203.	
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not talk about it.  
 
Another factor in determinants relating to salience is whether an issue is obtrusive.451 An 
obtrusive issue can affect nearly everyone that has had direct contact with it.452 This factor 
of obtrusiveness is likely to affect issue salience concerning public opinion. Although GE 
is a global issue with transnational impacts on the environment, which might affect nearly 
everyone if finally deployed, it is still considered as unobtrusive at the moment by INGOs 
in China. According to the respondents from Greenpeace China, GE is not linked to and 
cannot be seen in daily life, which implies that, in their assumption, GE is not embedded in 
people’s lived experience and is, hence, unobtrusive to them. In addition, GE is still at a 
stage of computer modeling research that it is no more than an abstract concept which it is 
not possible for them to have direct contact with. 
 
6.1.3 Development of Policy on GE 
When it comes to another variable under contextual factors, namely the development of 
policy concerning GE, respondents from the China-based international NGO indicated that 
GE is still a topic located predominantly among the scientific community in China and it 
has not really been considered at a political level. The deficit in GE policy is a crucial 
element of political context as it may not be the proper time to engage in GE now for 
international NGOs. In contrast, respondents in other NGOs have not noticed the policy 
																																																								451	 E	Rogers	and	J	Dearing,	‘Agenda-Setting	Research:	Where	Has	It	Been,	Where	Is	It	Going?’	(1988)	11	Communication	Yearbook	555.	452	 Ibid.	
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deficit issue due to their unawareness.  
 
In conclusion, the openness of polity as a general context issue, and the particular context 
concerning GE as a contingent factor including political preference of government, public 
consciousness, salience and the deficit in policy on GE are important factors for 
understanding both international and domestic Chinese NGOs’ involvement in GE in 
China. It is interesting to identify that international NGOs are strategically seeking political 
opportunities in GE at the appropriate time. However, as discussed earlier, GE is not a big 
theme for the Chinese government at the moment and because of this, such NGOs are not 
involved in it at present. Additionally, international NGOs have identified the deficit in 
policy concerning GE when they provide explanations for their non-participation. However, 
these views were not identified by respondents from other NGOs in China. It suggests that 
the non-involvement of international NGO in China can be illustrated as a more strategic 
choice than other NGOs in China, 453 from whom non-involvement merely results from 
unawareness.  
6.2	Emotion	
As defined in the previous chapter on potential variables, the variable of emotion 
comprises threat, blame and willingness to access information. However, there is a division 
between threat and blame, and willingness to access information. Although all of them are 
themes concerning emotional issues, they differ greatly in that threat and blame can be 
illustrated as active responses to strategically deal with negative emotions, while 																																																								453	 A	strategic	choice	is	contrasted	to	an	outcome	of	unawareness,	including	an	idea	of	intentionally	making	decisions	by	considering	different	factors	or	elements	that	may	have	impacts	on	the	choice.	
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unwillingness to access information is a negative and passive response to participation. In 
addition, unwillingness to access information, as identified in the governance literature in 
the previous chapter, refers to the emotion that people can be reluctant to access 
information to participate. It suggests that people could effectively participate with a 
reasonable background of common sense and hence, is able to explain that lack of 
knowledge is attributed to the public’s unwillingness to retrieve information rather than an 
information deficit as such. It is, nevertheless, closely related to the problems of 
information deficit and the limited capability of elites, which is an objective limitation in 
organisations. Therefore, while threat and blame is a crucial element of taking strategic 
action to engage in GE or not, while unwillingness to access information cannot be 
considered as a strategic option. The issues of threat and blame will be explored in more 
depth below. 	
6.2.1 Threat 
Threat is a type of useful negative emotion to trigger social movements. As discussed in 
chapter 5, it comprises a diverse range of negative emotions such as resignation, sense of 
urgency, technological fear and so on. From the empirical results in China, we cannot see 
any responses related to resignation and technological fear. This is reasonable because 
these two types of emotions need to be built on an understandable level of knowledge on 
GE with which people can generate opinions against authorities or scientists. It is also 
because the authorities in China do not have a clear position on GE, which means 
resignation concerning GE cannot really yet exist. Technological fear resulted from 
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misusing scientific information cannot really exist either, as the general public does not 
have a reasonable level of knowledge on it. In terms of a sense of urgency, the respondents 
from Greenpeace China have claimed that, as the impacts of GE are not certain and clear 
as well as the fact that it is not recognized in daily life, it is still early to pay attention to 
GE and there are much more pressing and urgent concerns we need to cope with. This 
suggests that GE is not an urgent issue that requires attention at the moment and reflects a 
lack of urgency. It is apparent that the sense of urgency plays a role in influencing the 
involvement of international NGOs in China. However, in terms of domestic Chinese 
NGOs, they did not mention the element of urgency. However, the respondent from the 
interviewed small grassroots NGO indicated that directors are not willing to engage with 
information on GE, which is consistent with the theme of unwillingness to access 
information. The reason why they did not consider urgency as a factor affecting their 
non-involvement in GE is lack of understandable knowledge on the issue. Without a basic 
or reasonable understanding on GE, they cannot make their own judgement on whether it 
is urgent or not. All the emotion-related reasons they have mentioned concern information 
gain. Their unawareness of GE has excluded them from engaging in it in the first place, as 
one can never form an in-depth thought on an issue when it has not been heard of. This is 
why they all attributed their non-involvement in GE to lack of knowledge on it and 
continued to attribute this knowledge deficit to unwillingness to gain information. 
Furthermore, this unawareness of the issue suggests that they did not intentionally stay 
clear of GE. 	
	194	
6.2.2 Blaming 
According to the responses, it also has been found that the variable of blame is not 
appropriate for understanding NGO participation in GE in China. This is not surprising 
because threat and blame are interrelated and threat is the precondition of blaming. In order 
to understand whether blaming is applicable to explain the non-involvement of NGOs in 
China, I will first discuss it within the literature on naming, blaming and claiming as well 
as framing, and then propose that naming, centrality and experiential commensurability are 
applicable, rather than blaming, to explain the case in China concerning GE. 
 
The literature on naming, blaming and claiming within the sociology of law addresses the 
emergence and transformation of disputes. 454  The three terms stand for stages of 
identifying injurious experience, perceived injurious experience transformed into grievance, 
and grievance voiced to the person responsible and asking for remedy.455 In terms of GE in 
China, difficulties lie in the first stage of transformation – naming – to identify injurious 
experience. That is to say, the public in China is not able to identify specific harms 
resulting from GE. The side effects of GE on the living conditions and the environment 
have not been identified clearly among the scientific community and some harms of GE 
may not be visible or obvious enough for the public to notice.  
 
Framing goes beyond the context of sociology of law, within which naming, blaming and 
claiming are discussed, and add ideological considerations in social movements theory. 																																																								454	 William	Felstiner,	Richard	Abel	and	Austin	Sarat,	‘The	Emergence	and	Transformation	of	Disputes:	Naming,	Blaming,	Claiming’	(1980)	15	Law	&	Society	Review	631.	455	 Ibid.	
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The concepts – naming, blaming and claiming – coincide well with framing and there are 
obvious conceptual links between them.456 It was introduced to social movements theory 
by Benford and Snow to conceptualize the work of movements as politics of 
signification.457 They have established four sets of factors affecting framing efforts: core 
framing tasks, infrastructural constraints, phenomenological constraints and cycles of 
protest.458 Among the core framing tasks of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational 
framing, diagnostic framing, which refers to identification of harms and attribution of 
blame, combines the concepts of naming and blaming. In addition, there is a framing 
dilemma that ‘both diagnosis and prognosis may be framed in such a way that public 
debate is rendered superfluous’, which is evident when a number of technological terms 
are employed.459 This sheds some light on the response from one of the interviewees in 
Greenpeace China. As pointed out by the respondent, ‘for a technical issue such as GE, it 
is still a topic among the scientific community. How to communicate and interpret the 
research findings of GE and terminologies included in the issue to the ordinary public or 
non-experts is important’.  
 
In terms of infrastructural constraints affecting framing efforts, centrality is important in 
understanding the non-involvement of INGOs in China. It means ‘if the values the 
movement seeks to promote are of low hierarchical salience, the mobilizing potential is 
weakened considerably’.460 According to the preceding discussion on salience, GE is 																																																								456	 Austin	Sarat	and	Stuart	Scheingold	(eds),	Cause	Lawyers	and	Social	Movements	(Redwood:	Stanford	University	Press	2006).	457	 David	Snow	and	Robert	Benford,	‘Ideology,	Frame	Resonance,	and	Participant	Mobilization’	(1988)	1	International	Social	Movement	Research	197.	458	 Ibid.	459	 Ibid.	460	 Ibid.	
	196	
considered as a low salient issue by respondents from Greenpeace China. It is perhaps less 
motivational to mobilise around such an issue. Therefore the non-involvement is due in 
part to the low hierarchical salience attached to GE. In terms of phenomenological 
constraints, experiential commensurability is another factor contributing to the 
non-involvement in GE. Framings, which are ‘too abstract and distant from the lives and 
experiences of the targeting people’, are considered less salient and hence, less probable to 
trigger movements.461 According to the respondent from Greenpeace China, GE is not 
closely relevant to the living conditions of the public and ‘you don’t see it in daily life’. 
This suggests that GE is not easily identified by the general public in their daily life and 
less able to have resonance with the public, which results in less motivation to become 
involved. 
 
It can be concluded from this part of discussion that variables of threat, framing including 
naming, centrality, experiential commensurability, and unwillingness to access information 
discussed in the previous paragraph can contribute to the explanation for NGOs’ 
non-involvement. However, it is interesting that threat along with naming, centrality and 
experiential commensurability are only in effect mentioned by the international NGO – 
Greenpeace China and the last element is only effectively pointed out by grassroots NGOs 
in China. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, threat as well as framing is a strategic 
response while unwillingness to access information is not. It indicates that the Greenpeace 
in China, as an INGO, is making a strategic choice not to engage in GE, while the other 
grassroots NGOs are more likely to attribute non-involvement with GE to the limited 																																																								461	 Robert	Benford	and	David	Snow,	‘Framing	Processes	and	Social	Movements:	An	Overview	and	Assessment’	(2000)	26	Annual	review	of	sociology	611.	
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capabilities among their staff members. Therefore, it can be summarised that threat and 
unwillingness to access information contribute to the involvement of international NGO 
and grassroots NGOs respectively, which leads to a conclusion that, under the variable of 
emotion, the international NGO is responding to GE deliberately while grassroots NGOs 
are responding unintentionally or unconsciously. 
6.3	Strategy	 	
Strategy is another variable contributing to the non-involvement of NGOs in China. 
According to the previous chapter on potential variables, strategy includes a group of 
sub-variables – insider and outsider strategies, ceasing to mediate, efficiency and 
competition. This part aims to examine them in the context of China concerning GE. 	
6.3.1 Insider/Outsider Strategy 
NGOs’ employment of insider or outsider strategy is discussed on a general basis to 
provide a background for exploring the question of whether different choices of strategy 
will affect their involvement in GE. Government supported NGOs are defined as insiders 
as they obtain a privileged access to the political process. According to the respondent 
from the government-supported NGO, they receive policy support from government which 
other NGOs cannot acquire and they work closely with government on choosing topics and 
making political recommendations. With their privileged access to the political process, 
government-supported NGOs normally employ direct strategies to influence government 
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policy. The HDIEO462 does not obtain the same level of a privileged access to policy as 
government supported NGOs, but they still enjoy a variety of methods to participate in the 
political process. This is first because, according to the respondent from HDIEO, directors 
in such organisations have extensive private connections with officers in government and 
hence have privileges to participate in the policymaking process or are able to influence 
relevant officers within their own social circle. Second, as there is business power behind 
these organisations, they normally obtain sufficient resources and have a significant impact 
in their working areas with the help of this financial power. This leads to more 
opportunities for business-supported NGOs to apply for government projects on 
environmental issues. In terms of large grassroots NGOs, they tend to employ a mix of 
insider and outsider strategy and act as thresholders between insiders and outsiders. For 
example, according to the respondent from TBEAS, they used to employ radical actions to 
make criticisms against government but now have adjusted and turned to a moderate 
strategy. In terms of small grassroots NGOs, they seldom have the privilege of 
participating in the policymaking process and tend to adopt indirect actions among 
grassroots networks and hence they are considered according to the discussion in the 
																																																								462	 This	business-supported	NGO	is	a	unique	case	with	Chinese	characteristics	as	the	nature	of	this	organisation	is	ambiguous.	 It	 is	 registered	 as	 a	 NGO	 aiming	 to	 research	 on	 regional	 and	 national	 environmental	 problems.	However,	it	is	established	by	directors	from	CSD	Environment	which	is	a	business	company	providing	services	on	‘contract	 operation	 of	 environmental	 infrastructure,	wastewater	 treatment	 and	 reuse,	 organic	waste	 treatment	disposal	 and	 bio-energy	 utilization,	 environmental	 remediation,	 environmental	 consulting,	 etc.’	 (see	http://www.zchb.net/csd)	These	directors	are	also	in	charge	of	the	operation	of	HDIEO.	In	addition,	according	to	the	 respondent,	 the	working	 areas	 of	HDIEO	 are	 dominated	 by	 directors	 from	CSD	Environment,	which	makes	HDIEO	less	 independent	 from	the	business	company	–	CSD	Environment.	Apart	 from	this,	as	pointed	out	by	the	respondent,	 ‘directors	of	HDIEO	are	not	making	clear	of	whether	 this	organisation	 is	a	complete	NGO	 in	nature	although	 it	 is	registered	and	claimed	to	be	so’.	Therefore,	 the	boundary	between	business	and	NGO	is	very	blur	concerning	HDIEO.	And	 it	 is	different	 from	 the	 so-called	 ‘business-friendly	NGO’	 in	Western	 countries,	which	 is	considered	 to	 be	 working	 effectively	 and	 closely	 with	 business.	 Although	 business-friendly	 NGOs	 cooperate	frequently	 with	 business	 companies,	 they	 are	 independent	 from	 business	 power	 and	maintain	 their	 nature	 as	NGOs.	Therefore	 I	prefer	 to	 call	HDIEO	 ‘business-supported	NGO’	 rather	 than	 ‘business-friendly	NGO’.	Although	the	 boundary	 of	 this	 organisation	 is	 difficult	 to	 define,	 even	 for	 the	 directors	 themselves,	 it	 will	 not	 affect	substantially	how	they	answer	the	interviewing	questions	and	hence,	the	response	is	valid	and	applicable	to	my	research.	
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previous chapter, as outsiders. According to the respondent from LvXing TaiHang,463 they 
have more interactions with the public by conducting field investigations into mainly 
environmental pollution problems, but little interaction with government such as making 
recommendations on policy. Therefore, small grassroots NGOs are likely to hold an 
outsider status. As discussed in the previous chapter including the issue on the agency of 
insider/outsider strategy, not all types of groups have agency to decide their strategies. 
According to the previous discussion, outsiders by goals do not have real choices on their 
outsider status because their policy demand and goals determine which strategy they 
employ.464 Small grassroots NGOs are considered as outsiders by goals, which determine 
their outsider status, and, as mentioned above, privileged opportunities to participate in the 
political process are not deemed accessible to them by government. In terms of 
Greenpeace China, as an international NGO, normally adopts a mix of insider and outsider 
strategies, as a thresholder. When they have an outsider status, it is the result of adopting 
an outsider strategy with agency. Greenpeace has been defined as an outsider by choice by 
Maloney465 and considered, as discussed in the previous chapter, as having real choices in 
adopting an outsider strategy. As pointed out by the respondent, they are aiming to 
influence government policy and yet are also relatively independent from government. The 
respondent clarifies that, in general, ‘sometimes we are included as experts to make 
recommendations on policy but we also criticise and influence policy’. 
 
As mentioned in the discussion on the variable of openness as a structural factor, the state 
																																																								463	 Aims	of	this	organisation,	as	well	as	other	interviewed	NGOs,	are	presented	in	Table	3.1.	464	 Binderkrantz	and	Krøyer	(n	369).	465	 Maloney,	Jordan	and	McLaughlin	(n	359).	
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is more open to organisations adopting a moderate strategy while more closed to those 
employing a radical strategy. The theory can be integrated with insider and outsider 
strategy in that the polity is relatively open to insiders and closed to outsiders. Obtaining 
an insider or outsider status does not merely depend on what strategy a group employs, but 
also on their political resources and the power of recognition by the state.466 As discussed 
in chapter 5, the state has discretion on whether to accept NGOs as insiders.467 That is to 
say, adopting an insider strategy cannot guarantee an insider status – a status that is 
ascribed by government. In addition, the polity is open to thresholders which are 
considered as practising a mixture of insider and outsider strategies when they obtain an 
insider status and closed to them when obtaining an outsider status.  
 
Based on this analysis above, a question proposed in the previous chapter on potential 
variables needs to be addressed, which is whether different choices of strategy by NGOs 
will affect their involvement in GE. It comprises two sub-questions: if NGOs employ an 
insider strategy, are they more likely to engage in GE or does it work in the reverse 
direction? If NGOs adopt an outsider or thresholder strategy, are they more reluctant or 
unlikely to engage in GE or actually the reverse? According to Clare Saunders, NGOs with 
an insider status seek small gains on issues already on the policy agenda, while outsiders 
prefer to pursue issues that are novel to the policy agenda, many of which are 
controversial.468 When it comes to GE in China, although it is considered controversial by 
INGOs, it has not yet been placed on the political agenda, nor has it been considered 
																																																								466	 Ibid.	467	 Ibid.	468	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	
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salient as discussed earlier in this section. In addition, however, the fact is that a diverse 
range of NGOs have not engaged in GE regardless of what strategies they employ. The 
government-supported NGO, with the most privileged access to the political process and 
defined as an insider, has not become involved in GE. This is understandable, based on the 
point by Saunders, in that GE is a controversial topic, which is not on the policy agenda in 
China. Therefore, we can in part attribute the non-involvement with GE of the 
government-supported NGO to its insider status. However, as the insider status of the 
government-supported NGO is not a result of agency as discussed in chapter 5, we can not 
conclude that it adopts a strategy with agency to deliberately stay clear of GE. Nor could 
we conclude that NGOs with an insider strategy will decrease the possibility of engaging 
in controversial issues such as GE. However, in terms of NGOs as outsiders or 
thresholders, does strategy affect their choice on whether to engage in it or not? According 
to the theory, a polity is closed to outsiders and thresholders when they practise an outsider 
strategy. This leads to the situation that they prefer to pursue issues that are new to the 
policy agenda, irrespective of whether they are controversial or not.469 When thresholders 
practise an insider strategy, they work on issues already on the agenda.470 However, the 
fact is that Greenpeace China, as a thresholder, has not engaged in the area of GE. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, thresholders, such as Greenpeace, have agency on the 
choice of strategies. In addition, the respondents from Greenpeace China effectively stated 
that GE is not yet a topic in the political area and claimed it to be one of the reasons why 
they have not become involved in GE. This to some extent suggests that Greenpeace 
prefers to adopt an insider strategy with agency and therefore decides not to engage in GE 																																																								469	 Ibid.	470	 Ibid.	
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that is not on the agenda. Furthermore, it suggests that Greenpeace is making a strategic 
choice to stay clear of GE rather than as an outcome of unawareness. In terms of outsiders, 
such as small grassroots NGOs in China, they do not have a privileged access to issues on 
the agenda and are supposed to be in favour of pursuing new issues. However, the fact is 
that, although GE is novel to the policy agenda in China, they are not involved in it. 
Therefore, GE not being on the government policy agenda is not the reason why small 
grassroots NGOs have not become involved. However, the actual reason for their 
non-involvement is related to resources, which will be discussed in the following part. 
Therefore, it can be concluded from the analysis that practicing an insider or outsider 
strategy exerts an influence on the participation of insiders and thresholders rather than 
outsiders in GE within the current context of China. The difference of involvement 
between insiders, such as the government-supported NGO, and thresholders, such as the 
INGO, is that the former does not make a strategic choice on it, as they do not have agency 
in adopting an insider/outsider strategy, while the latter decides on their involvement 
strategically as they have agency to adopt an insider/outsider strategy. 	
	
6.3.2 Ceasing to mediate, Efficiency and Competition 
	
The idea of ceasing to mediate refers to the strategic use of mediating by NGOs to 
influence public debates. In general, this theme cannot be identified from responses 
provided by NGOs in China. However, it will be discussed as an important theme for 
NGOs in the UK in the next section. In terms of sub-variables of efficiency of operation 
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and competition between NGOs, they are interrelated due to finite resources that NGOs 
can acquire. Limited resources of NGOs can lead to divergent decisions: first, with limited 
resources, NGOs are required to allocate resources into areas where they can make 
effective contributions; second, they are also likely to pursue a specialised goal because of 
competition, and the more specialised the goals are, the more obvious their identities are 
within similar areas according to the niche theory.471 The first may encourage NGOs to 
focus on areas such as energy and pollution where they are able to effectively contribute 
rather than GE; the second may lead NGOs to specialise in their identities. In order to be 
efficient and competitive, NGOs are likely to form divergent decisions on whether they 
engage in GE or not. Based on this divergence, the interviewed international NGO 
Greenpeace in China chooses the former way of being efficient and competitive and result 
in not engaging in GE. According to the respondents, their choice of topics depends on 
whether they can effectively make contributions. As GE is not a mainstream topic in China, 
it is not cost-efficient to engage in it. However, respondents in the UK prefer the second 
way of being effective and competitive by pursuing a specialised goal on GE, which will 
be discussed in the next section. Then what contributes to the divergence between NGOs in 
the UK and China in response to efficiency and competition? It can be identified in the 
response provided by Greenpeace China, that the divergence lies mainly in the 
development history of NGOs in two different countries. As clarified by one of the 
respondents from Greenpeace China, the development of NGOs in the UK has a long 
history with high competition so that they need to separate themselves from others by 
focusing on a specialised area; while in China, NGOs have developed with a short history 																																																								471	 McCarthy	and	Zald	(n	52).	
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and hence, with lower competition, which means that they focus mainly on the 
development of their own priorities without having to think about how these differentiate 
them from other organisations. That is to say, lower competition in China drives NGOs to 
focus more on their own development by making efficient contributions while high 
competition in the UK forces NGOs to consider other organisations and to carve out a 
unique identity by specialising their goals.  
 
It is important to point out that only the respondent from Greenpeace China indicated 
efficiency and competition in relation to involvement in GE. Therefore it is proper to 
conclude that the themes of efficiency and competition contribute to understanding why 
Greenpeace China does not engage in GE. However, efficiency and competition do not 
help to explain the involvement of domestic Chinese NGOs. Therefore it can be concluded 
from the analysis above that the interviewed INGO has made a strategic choice on whether 
to engage in GE by taking efficiency and competition into consideration. In contrast, this 
cannot be identified from domestic Chinese NGOs. Combining with the discussion on 
insiders/outsiders above, within the variable of strategy, a conclusion generated from it is 
that the interviewed INGO in China makes a strategic choice of not engaging in GE; while 
in contrast the non-involvement of domestic Chinese NGOs with GE is more an 
unconscious consequence. 	
6.4	Resource	
The variable of resource includes sub-themes on material resources and conscience elites. 
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The idea of material resources can be illustrated as money or funding, time and energy, 
necessary information and knowledge, and organisation itself as a resource. Organisation 
itself as a resource is emphasised in the resource mobilization theory as organisational 
infrastructure consisting of target goals and characteristics of organisations. The idea of 
conscience elites is considered as labour resource responsible for the emergence of social 
movements, which not only refers to whether there is enough labour in NGOs to be 
devoted to social movements, but also the concerns of directors and elites in organisations. 
In general, the variable of resource weighs heavily in understanding NGO participation in 
GE. As can be seen from the results of interview, all the respondents in China have 
mentioned funding, time, information, target goals and labour according to their 
explanations of why they have not been involved in GE. 	
6.4.1 Goals of organisations 
The target goals and characteristics of different types of organisations is one of the first 
themes generated from the empirical data. According to the respondent from the CBCGDF 
organisation,472 ‘topics and focusing areas are closely related to the characteristics of 
organisations’. Although there are a variety of organisations as respondents, all of them 
point out that NGOs have settled target goals in the first instance and based on these goals, 
they decide to focus on specific environmental areas. These goals, according to the 
respondents, range from climate change to pollution, which is an explanation of why some 
NGOs do not get involved in GE in the first place. In addition, as pointed out by 
																																																								472	 Aims	of	CBCGDF	are	presented	in	Table	3.1.	
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respondents from grassroots NGOs, they tend to restrict their goals within local areas 
covering traditional environmental issues. Localization is a characteristic of most 
grassroots NGOs in China as different regions in China have distinctive environmental 
problems. For example, in the north of China, air quality problems draw the most attention 
and, thus, many NGOs seek to act on this and employ it as their target goal. This means 
that grassroots NGOs are not likely to focus on GE, as it is neither a local nor a traditional 
environmental issue. But how do they decide their target goals and why is there a variety 
between all types of NGOs? As can be concluded from the responses, it varies among 
different types of organisations. Grassroots NGOs rely heavily on the directors of 
organisations to decide goals; the goals of the business NGOs depend on the business 
powers behind it; government-supported NGOs set target goals according to government 
policy; the interviewed INGO’s goals are based on their global vision. The variety of 
characteristics concerning different types of organisations is responsible for their 
differentiated target goals and thus, contributes to the explanation of NGO participation in 
GE. 	
6.4.2 Information and Knowledge Deficits 
Information deficit and lack of knowledge can also be identified as issues from the data. 
Among the respondents, only the two respondents from the international NGO Greenpeace 
had knowledge or information on GE, while the other respondents had no idea about it at 
all. According to the academic respondent involved in the National GE Project, the general 
public, including Chinese NGOs, does not have enough information about GE, and 
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because of this, the public are not likely to engage in it. In addition, respondents from 
Chinese NGOs admitted that GE is a rarely mentioned and novel topic in scientific and 
political areas, and the respondents from Greenpeace China indicated that the scientific 
community involved in GE in China has not gained much knowledge. The academic 
respondent from the National GE Project also admitted that ‘we are at the very start of GE 
research and have not made much progress. If scientists have not made it clear, the public 
including NGOs cannot obtain knowledge on it’. This is a new model of information 
deficit – where it is the scientific community who need to gain more knowledge. When 
there is deficit of information among scientists due to the early stage of research on GE, it 
is unlikely that they will publicise information to NGOs. Even if there are research 
findings on GE by scientists, it is still difficult for NGOs to access information from the 
scientific community in China. Respondents from grassroots NGOs state that they have no 
interactions with the scientific community, which gives rise to the classic information 
deficit model that knowledge is not transferred from experts to non-experts. In terms of the 
fact that domestic Chinese NGOs have not engaged in GE, therefore, information deficit 
can contribute in part to the explanation of domestic Chinese NGO non-involvement. In 
terms of Greenpeace China, it has not engaged in GE either. However, the two respondents 
have some, albeit limited, knowledge about GE due to their interactions with the head 
office as well as the scientific community involved in the Chinese National GE project. 
This lies in direct contrasts with domestic Chinese NGOs: Greenpeace China has certain 
information and knowledge as well as interactions with scientists, which means that an 
information deficit or lack of knowledge cannot be responsible for explaining why the 
INGO has not engaged in GE.  
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6.4.3 Money and Time 
Money and time are critical to the survival of all types of organisations. However, they do 
not contribute to the non-involvement in GE of all NGOs in China. In terms of the 
interviewed international NGO Greenpeace, according to the respondents, they have 
relatively adequate funding compared to domestic Chinese NGOs. However, they will 
spend time and money on areas that they can work efficiently on as it is not cost-efficient 
to focus on the specialised area of GE. This suggests that, in terms of Greenpeace China, 
limitations on material resources, such as funding, are not responsible for its 
non-involvement with GE; instead, efficiency in mobilizing these resources, as discussed 
in the previous paragraphs, can contribute in part to explain why it has not engaged in GE. 
Domestic Chinese NGOs – especially for grassroots NGOs according to the responses – 
are more likely to face a problem of lacking funding and time. Because of the difficulty in 
acquiring money, according to the respondents from interviewed domestic NGOs, they 
prefer not to expand their focus across too many areas. Therefore it is unlikely that they 
will add GE as a new working area due to limited resources. In addition, it is interesting to 
find out that small NGOs normally receive funding from large NGOs by applying for 
projects released by large NGOs. This can be illustrated with resource dependence theory, 
in that groups controlling key external resources have the potential to influence and control 
an organisation.473 Small NGOs cannot decide their own working areas as they normally 
make a living on applying for projects from large NGOs and receiving funding from them. 
																																																								473	 Lowery	(n	376).	
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This can also develop an explanation in the case of GE that large NGOs have not engaged 
in GE which then affects the decisions of small NGOs. From this analysis, it can be 
concluded that the non-involvement of domestic grassroots NGOs in China can be 
attributed to lack of money and time; while, in contrast, this attribution to money and time 
does not evidently affect the interviewed INGO.  	
6.4.4 Labour Resource 
Labour resource, especially in the aspect of directors, plays an important role in NGO 
involvement in GE. In terms of directors, this can be illustrated in two ways: it is up to the 
directors in Chinese NGOs to make decisions on goals and topics; and the capability of 
directors themselves can affect the involvement of organisations in particular policy fields. 
All respondents from domestic Chinese NGOs admit that what areas they engage in 
depend mainly on the decisions of directors. Among them, respondents who were directors 
of grassroots NGOs in effect pointed out that as they have limited capability especially on 
novel technological topics, they have not paid attention to GE. This can be illustrated with 
resource mobilization theory suggesting that elites are responsible for social movements.474 
The decisions made by elites can in part contribute to which areas they engage in. Within 
the context of GE, it is more due to the capability of directors in that they have not been 
able to follow the debate on GE. In terms of other staff members in organisations, 
according to their responses, there is a difference between international NGOs and 
domestic Chinese NGOs in that some staff members in the international NGO have 
																																																								474	 McCarthy	and	Zald	(n	52).	
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scientific-related roles or advanced degrees while these are rarely seen in Chinese NGOs. 
This is the factor which explains why they have different knowledge on GE. 
 
In conclusion, the sub-elements within the resource variable have been examined to 
contribute to the analysis of NGO involvement in GE. However, an important point is that 
these elements work differently in the context of the interviewed international NGO and 
domestic Chinese NGOs. The idea of target goal and elites can be used to generate 
explanations for both international and Chinese NGOs. The role of money and time is 
applicable to both but works differently between them, in that Greenpeace uses money and 
time strategically so that they choose to devote themselves to more efficient areas rather 
than GE, while Chinese NGOs lack required money and time to engage. The theme of 
information can only be used to explain why domestic Chinese NGOs do not become 
involved as the international NGO Greenpeace has obtained some information on GE and 
yet has not been engaged in GE. As information, money and time are the basic 
requirements for engagement, it is interesting to see that the involvement of the INGO and 
Chinese NGOs differs in nature. In terms of the international NGO, it is more that they are 
making strategic choices of mobilizing the resources they possess, such as money, time, 
information and elites, to decide on whether to engage or not, rather than that they lack 
those resources so that they are not able to engage in GE. However, in terms of Chinese 
NGOs, they lack basic requirements, such as information and knowledge to engage in GE, 
which is a more unconscious consequence due to their limitations in resources. 	
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6.5	Conclusion	
This chapter has examined four variables with the data on Chinese NGOs to form a finding 
on which variables are important in understanding NGO participation in GE in the context 
of China. In terms of the contextual factors, the variables of openness and public 
consciousness are important in understanding the contextual issues in China when 
discussing NGO participation in GE. The third variable discussed in this chapter, namely 
deficit in policy within political opportunity, means that NGOs cannot participate in GE 
unless there is a dedicated policy on it, and the element of salience, which was discussed 
under the variable of public consciousness, only helps to explain non-involvement of the 
international NGO Greenpeace. In terms of the variable of emotion, consideration on 
whether there is a threat as well as naming is identifiable in the case of the international 
NGO, Greenpeace, while unwillingness to access information is identifiable in grassroots 
Chinese NGOs. In relation to the variables of strategy, efficiency and competition, I 
concluded that these are important in affecting the involvement of the international NGO 
rather than other Chinese NGOs. The ideas of goals, elites, money and time are identified 
as crucial factors in affecting NGO participation but work differently between the 
international NGO and Chinese NGOs. Furthermore, the element of information deficit is 
only identified in relation to domestic Chinese NGOs.  
 
According to the analysis in this chapter, a table including variables and NGOs can be 
drawn to show how attributions of variables vary among different NGOs. Variables 
affecting different NGOs are correspondingly ticked in Table 6.1 as shown below: 
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Table	6.1:	How	attributions	of	variables	vary	among	Chinese	NGOs		 	 		 Context	
Political	
opportunity	
(PO)	
Structure	
	
Perceptions	
of	
contingency	
in	PO	
Public	
consciousness	
Salience	 	 The	
deficit	
in	
policy	
INGO:	Greenpeace	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	
Government-supported	NGO:	CBCGDF	 ✔	 	 ✔	 	 	
Business-supported	
NGO:	HDIEO	
✔	 	 	 	 	
Large	grassroots	NGOs:	
TBEAS	and	IPE	
✔	 	 ✔	 	 	
Small	 grassroots	 NGO:	
Lvxing	Taihang	
✔	 	 ✔	 	 	
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Emotion	
Threat	 Framing	 Unwillingness	to	
access	information	
INGO:	Greenpeace ✔	 ✔	 	Government-supported	NGO:	CBCGDF	 	 	 	Business-supported	NGO:	HDIEO	 	 	 	Large	grassroots	NGOs:	TBEAS	and	IPE	 	 	 	Small	grassroots	NGO:	Lvxing	Taihang	 	 	 ✔		
	
Strategy	
Insiders/outsiders	 Ceasing	to	
mediate	
Efficiency	 	 Competition	
INGO:	Greenpeace ✔ 	 	 ✔	 ✔ 	Government-supported	NGO:	CBCGDF ✔	 	 	 	Business-supported	NGO:	HDIEO	 	 	 	 	Large	grassroots	NGOs:	TBEAS	and	IPE	 	 	 	 	Small	grassroots	NGO:	Lvxing	Taihang	 	 	 	 			
	214	
	
Resource	
Goals	 Money	and	time	 Information	and	
knowledge	
Labour	resource	
(elites)	
INGO:	Greenpeace ✔	 	 	 	Government-supported	NGO:	CBCGDF ✔	 	 ✔	 	Business-supported	NGO:	HDIEO ✔	 	 ✔	 	Large	grassroots	NGOs:	TBEAS	and	IPE ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔	Small	grassroots	NGO:	Lvxing	Taihang ✔	 ✔	 ✔	 ✔		
In this table, there are several interesting findings worth pointing out:  
• First, in terms of the variable of political opportunity, although the structure of the 
polity is objective and is applicable to all types of NGOs in China, Greenpeace China, 
as an INGO, pointed out that it is important to focus on contingent factors as well as 
how to perceive and make use of these factors. This suggests that the INGO 
Greenpeace has made a strategic choice on its involvement in GE by paying attention 
to, for example, the political preference of the government.  
 
• Second, the variables of salience, the deficit in policy, lack of threat, framing, 
efficiency and competition were only identified by the INGO concerning engagement 
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with GE, which again suggests that the interviewed INGO has strategically made a 
decision on whether to engage.  
 
• Third, although the element of insiders/outsiders applies to both the INGO and 
government-supported NGO in China, it is divergent as the INGO adopts an insider 
strategy with agency while the government-supported NGO obtained an insider status 
without agency as its insider strategy is determined by goal in the first place. This 
implies that due to its status without real choices, non-involvement of the 
government-supported NGO is likely to be an unintentional consequence.  
 
• Fourth, the variable of goals is applicable to all the interviewed NGOs in China, 
which implies that goals and remits are important to understand their involvement. 
Furthermore, this variable to some extent contributes to their involvement in the first 
place.  
 
• Fifth, it is not surprising that all of the domestic NGOs mentioned an information 
deficit and lack of knowledge on GE. This is a crucial variable or obstacle that 
prevent them from participating in it, which suggests that the non-involvement of 
domestic NGOs in China is based on unawareness.  
 
• Sixth, lack of material resources, such as money and time, and labour resource, such 
as elites with capability, are responsible merely for the non-involvement of grassroots 
NGOs in China.  
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From all these conclusions above, a finding can be generated that, in the context of China, 
the international NGO makes strategic choices not to engage in GE while the 
non-involvement of Chinese NGOs is more an unintentional consequence rather than a 
strategic one. 		
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Chapter	7	Discussion	on	the	UK	Data	
This chapter aims to analyse the empirical results of the UK interviews and discuss them 
with the potential variables generated in chapter 5, such as political opportunity and 
resource. According to the empirical data from my study, NGOs in the UK can be divided 
into two types – NGOs involved in GE and those not involved, which is different from the 
situation in China where no NGOs have engaged in it. Therefore, the data in this chapter is 
discussed in two categories – involved and non-involved. This chapter addresses the issue 
of the causal relations between various variables and NGO participation in the UK. The 
discussion comprises five sections: the first section deals with the contextual factors that 
affect the involvement or non-involvement of interviewed UK NGOs, which includes an 
analysis of variables such as openness, public consciousness and the government’s deficit 
in policy; section 7.2 addresses the emotions variable including sub-elements of, for 
example, threat and blame; the next section on strategy aims to discuss the variables of 
insider/outsider strategy or status, ceasing to mediate, efficiency and competition; section 
7.4 focuses on discussing the variable of resource including both material and labour 
resources; and the last section draws a conclusion, based on the discussion of the preceding 
variables, and on whether the involvement/non-involvement with GE of NGOs in the UK 
is a strategic or unintentional choice. In addition, some additional interesting findings are 
included based on a table of variables and NGOs in the UK. 
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7.1	Context	 	
The contextual factors affecting the involvement of NGOs, as discussed in chapter 5, 
comprise structural and contingent political opportunities, public consciousness and 
salience, and the government’s deficit in policy. This section addresses the application of 
the three main contextual factors in explaining the involvement or non-involvement of 
NGOs in the UK. However, the deficit in policy is not applicable in the context of UK as 
there is policy on GE released by the government.475 Therefore, this variable will not be 
discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. 	
7.1.1 Openness and contingent factors 
According to the discussion in chapter 5, political opportunity includes both structural 
factors, such as the openness of a polity, and contingent factors, such as how NGOs 
perceive the openness of a polity, whether they can seize opportunities, and the receptivity 
of authorities.476 Although both are useful in exploring the causal factors of why NGOs 
become involved or not, openness does not effectively explain the variety of involvement 
within the same country. The openness of a polity, as defined in the literature, refers to ‘the 
permanent characteristics of political institutional structure, such as the nature of 
governmental institutions – especially the degree of centralization’.477 It is not dynamic 																																																								475	 Existing	policy	on	GE	in	the	UK	will	be	introduced	in	section	7.1.1.	Text	to	n	498.	476	 Rootes,	‘Political	Opportunity	Structures,	Promise,	Problems	and	Prospects’	(n	52).	477	 Saunders,	‘It's	Not	Just	Strcutural:	Social	Movements	Are	Not	Homogenous	Responses	To	Structural	Features,	But	Networks	Shaped	By	Organisational	Strategies	And	Status’	(n	318).	
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and hardly varies over different NGOs. That is to say, the structure of a polity may be more 
useful when comparing NGO participation across different states. In terms of explaining 
the two types of involvement in the UK, the openness of a polity, which is stable and more 
or less the same for all NGOs in the country, does not make an effective contribution. 
Instead, contingent factors, which are dynamic and vary with different NGOs in the UK, 
are more useful in understanding the variety of engagement. Therefore the analysis in this 
section emphasises the non-structural, dynamic and contingent factors in the UK. 
 
Before discussing the empirical data of interviews in the UK, it is useful to draw a dynamic 
picture of the development of UK environmental NGOs as an analytical background. The 
history of ENGOs in the UK can be traced back to the middle of the Nineteenth Century 
within the context of ‘an increasing awareness of the impacts of industrialisation upon the 
natural environment’. 478  After the First and Second World War, specialised nature 
protection associations were established, and later in the 1970s, modern environmentalism 
emerged and promoted a common approach among ENGOs.479 The period of the 1980s 
witnessed a growth and innovation among ENGOs and in the 1990s, and after the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992, collaboration among ENGOs emerged.480 In more recent decades, 
there have been many changes in ENGOs due to their broader agendas, more common 
approaches to achieve aims, and better cooperation.481 In addition, climate change, which 
has been considered as increasingly central to political agendas, ‘has emerged as a unifying 
																																																								478	 Rootes,	NGOs	in	Contemporary	Britain:	Non-state	Actors	in	Society	and	Politics	since	1945	(n	109).	479	 Ibid.	480	 Ibid.	481	 Ibid.	
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frame for the broad range of ENGOs’.482 
 
The non-structural political opportunities, or contingencies, that ENGOs face during a 
certain period of time can contribute to the explanations of why they became involved in 
many environmental social movements. These contingent factors are usually related to 
government policies or certain actions taken by government authorities. Before focusing 
on how contingent factors affect environmental social movements, I will first briefly 
summarise the changing history of environmental law and policy in the UK in order to 
inform the analytical background. UK Environmental Law can be traced back to the 
Mid-Eighteenth Century and the industrial revolution of that time.483 In the post-war years 
of the Second World War, rebuilding was the focus and the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1947 which emphasised the role of the planning systems in rebuilding.484 In the late 
Twentieth Century, modern environmentalism emerged and a number of international 
events triggered changes in the UK, such as the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm 1972 and joining the EU on 1 January 1973.485 During this 
period, the focus was broadly on sustainable development and therefore, laws regarding, 
for example, air pollution and climate change were developed and principles of 
environmental law, such as the ‘polluter pays’ principle, were established.486 Because of 
UK accession to the EU, EU environmental law ‘helped to propel the environment up the 
domestic political agenda from the 1980s onwards’.487 In more recent decades, democracy, 
																																																								482	 Ibid.	483	 Ben	Christman,	‘A	Brief	History	of	Environmental	Law	in	the	UK’	(2013)	22	Environmental	Scientists	4.	484	 Ibid.	485	 Ibid.	486	 Ibid.	487	 Ibid.	
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devolution and decarbonlisation have been the focus of UK environmental law and have 
again been affected by international developments, such as the Aarhus Convention.488 
During this period of time, climate change was highlighted but without any significant 
efforts or actions to deal with it. Because of this, the ‘Big Ask Campaign’ was triggered 
and this resulted in a response by the government with the Climate Change Act 2008.489 
The developmental history of UK environmental law, along with the history of ENGOs in 
the UK, implies that social movements, or social movements organisations, can be 
influenced by policies or certain political events, and vice versa. Certain policies or events 
and social movements are interrelated and the dynamic changes of their relations are, to a 
large extent, due to non-structural or contingent factors. 
 
In addition, contingency can be used to explain the emergence of many social movements 
in the UK. For example, due to the fact that the government started to accept 
environmentalism at the time that the Rio Earth Summit was held in 1992, there was a 
criticism against many British environmental movements actors of ‘sharing the language’ 
with the government. 490  This led to the rise of radical environmentalism among 
environmentalists in the late Twentieth Century.491 In addition, the recession in 1992 
diverted attention away from the environment on the political agenda.492 These events 
disappointed radical environmentalists such that they deemed mainstream environmental 
organisations as impotent.493 There were also other contingent events affecting radical 
																																																								488	 Ibid.	489	 Ibid.	490	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	491	 Ibid.	492	 Ibid.	493	 Ibid.	
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environmentalism, such as the government’s road building, which led to high volumes of 
campaigning and protest in the UK.494 There was a decrease in the late 1990s due to the 
withdrawal of the road expansion programme and the ability of the Labour Party which is 
anticipated more environmentally conscious.495 Another example in point is that there was 
a focus on climate change campaigning after 2007 as the new focus provided activists with 
opportunities to ‘draw on the failure of the anti-capitalist summit-hopping protests’ to help 
to establish enduring social movements.496 From these examples, it can be identified that 
contingent events, rather than structural elements, can help to explain the emergence of 
many social movements. 
 
When it comes to the case of GE, contingent factors are also important in understanding 
the involvement of ENGOs in the UK, which has been effectively highlighted by a number 
of respondents during interviews. Before analysing the data concerning contingent factors, 
it is useful to look at existing UK policy on GE. There was a high volume of debate on GE 
from 2009 due to the Royal Society Report on GE.497 GE drew attention from the Science 
and Technology Committee (Commons) and resulted in it producing its own report 
concerning ‘the regulation of geoengineering’.498 In response to this report, the UK 
government then issued a report concerning the government’s position on GE.499 In the 
policy report, the UK government put forward its position on the approval of both the 
research into the science and technology of GE and the need for regulatory 																																																								494	 Ibid.	495	 Christopher	Rootes,	‘The	Resurgence	of	Protest	and	the	Revitalisation	of	British	Democracy’	in	Social	
Movements	and	Democracy	(New	York:	Palgrave	MacMillan	2003).	496	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	497	 Shepherd	and	others	(n	11).	498	 Science	and	Technology	Committee,	The	Regulation	of	Geoengineering	(Fifth	Report	of	Session	2009-10	2010).	499	 The	UK	Government,	Government	Response	to	the	House	of	Commons	-	Science	and	Technology	Committee	Fifth	
Report	of	Session	2009-10:	The	Regulation	of	Geoengineering	(TSO	(The	Stationery	Office),	2010).	
	 223	
arrangements. 500  The government policy calling for more research and regulatory 
frameworks to some extent contributed to the rise of anti-GE campaigns during that time, 
such as that of Friends of the Earth.501 The wave of campaigns on GE was also facilitated 
by the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative report with regard to the 
governance on SRM technology in 2011.502 The second peak of campaigns on GE was 
around 2013 when the UK government issued another policy report on GE research.503 In 
this report, the government supported the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 
reviewing existing regulatory arrangements on GE and contributed to the work under the 
London Protocol.504 In addition, the government emphasised the importance of research 
and dialogue with the public.505 This position by the UK government led to some large 
campaigns calling for a ban on GE, such as the campaign started by Chemtrails Project UK 
in 2013.506 From these events, two important findings can be identified: first, the UK 
government has claimed its position and issued policy concerning the need for both 
research and regulatory arrangements, which partly contributed to the relevant NGO 
campaigns on GE. This suggests that contingent events can contribute to social movement 
responses on GE. Second, this can help to illustrate that the variable of deficit in policy is 
not applicable to UK as there is at least some policy on GE by the UK government.  
 
However, a turn towards NGO reluctance to become involved in GE can be witnessed 																																																								500	 Ibid.	501	 Randall	Abate	and	others,	Climate	Change	Geoengineering	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2013).	502	 Pyle	and	others	(n	13).	503	 Department	of	Energy	and	Climate	Change,	‘The	Government's	View	on	Geo-engineering	Research’	(2013)	 	<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522010/The_government_position_on_geoengineering_research_Mar16.pdf>	accessed	27	February	2013.	504	 Ibid.	505	 Ibid.	506	 Chemtrails	Project	UK,	‘Directive	to	Ban	Stratospheric	Aerosol	Geoengineering	and	Aerial	Aerosol	Spraying	in	the	United	Kingdom’	(2013)	 	 <https://www.chemtrailsprojectuk.com/take-action/directive/>	accessed	21	December	2013.	
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more recently. According to both the empirical data collected for my research and online 
search results, the majority of NGOs in the UK are reluctant to even talk about GE. I will 
focus on analysing the data to explore the explanations for their involvement or 
non-involvement. The respondents from GE Monitor, Action Group on Erosion, 
Technology and Concentration (ETC Group),507 FoE, and Greenpeace, which are involved 
in GE, have in effect mentioned contingent factors in interview to explain their 
involvement. Among them, the respondent from FoE attributed the engagement in GE to 
the Paris Agreement and indicated that ‘one reason is it is clear to us that our chances of 
meeting 1.5 degrees target of the Paris Agreement are incredibly limited, so we need to be 
looking to see what efforts CDR508 could have’. This is consistent with the opinion by the 
respondent from Greenpeace in that the 1.5 degrees in the Paris Agreement means we still 
have to address emissions efficiently, which may increase the potential and possibility of 
GE methods. It is interesting to identify that the Paris Agreement was mentioned by many 
respondents who have engaged in GE, no matter whether they pointed it out as a direct 
reason for their involvement or not. This implies that the Paris Agreement, as a contingent 
political opportunity event, has contributed to the involvement of NGOs with GE in the 
UK. This is surprising because the aim of the Paris Agreement was to exert more pressure 
on mitigation and engage governments and people with the target of reducing GHGs. 
However, perhaps due to the difficulty of achieving the mitigation target in the agreement, 
it generates more space and opportunity for developing GE. This, therefore, partly explains 
the involvement of FoE and Greenpeace with GE. Another contingent factor identified 
from those involved in the relevant NGOs is the policy preference of the government. The 																																																								507	 A	brief	introduction	of	this	group	as	well	as	other	NGOs	will	be	displayed	in	the	appendix.	508	 Carbon	Dioxide	Removal.	
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respondent from Greenpeace indicated that, in terms of the debate on GE, there was quite 
intense discussion around it from 2009 up to a few years ago, but not much recently. This 
is perhaps because, as he explained, the government is still focusing its climate policy on 
dealing with the issue of fossil fuels where it can have the biggest impact on climate 
change. This point was supported by the respondent from FoE when he explained why 
many NGOs do not become involved in GE, stating that ‘NGOs are still making efforts on 
getting off fossil fuels quickly according to the priority of the government and hence we 
don’t have the resources or even the base to concentrate on the debate on GE’. The 
evidence of the policy priority or preference by the UK government can be found in the 
report that ‘the priority is, and must be, to tackle the root cause by reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases from human activities and adapting to those impacts that are 
unavoidable’.509 
 
In terms of non-involved NGOs, the respondents from TearFund and ClientEarth 
mentioned the contingent factor of policy preference of the government when explaining 
why they are not involved. According to the respondent from TearFund, focusing on GE 
may divert attention away from mitigation that is and should still be the main focus of the 
government. Similarly, the respondent from ClientEarth indicated that we should focus on 
the priority identified by the government, which is mitigation. In addition, the respondent 
added to the explanation that most NGOs are focusing on using available technologies to 
achieve the Paris Agreement target rather than GE. Furthermore, she highlighted that ‘it 
depends on the government whether GE is going to be a solution they want to pursue; if it 																																																								509	 Change	(n	504).	
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is, then it would draw attention from NGOs’. This suggests that the focus of the 
government is an important contingent factor affecting their non-involvement in GE.  
 
From the analysis above, three vital findings can be concluded: first, the Paris Agreement 
is important, as a contingent event, in understanding NGO participation in GE; and it is 
mentioned by respondents from both types of NGOs, which implies that the difference 
concerning participation between the two types of NGOs can be partly attributed to their 
different understandings or illustrations of the target in the Paris Agreement. That is to say, 
NGOs involved in GE consider the target as difficult to achieve and therefore see the 
potential in employing GE technology; while NGOs not involved in it regard the target as 
requiring an exclusive emphasis on mitigation and hence believe that we should keep 
government policy focused on mitigation rather than GE. Second, the contingent factor of 
policy preference was only effectively mentioned by respondents from non-involved 
NGOs, which makes sense because of the fact that mitigation, rather than GE, is the 
priority of the government. Third, it can be effectively concluded that both types of NGOs 
in the UK deliberately or strategically make decisions on whether to become involved in 
GE or not, no matter whether they are concerned about the potential for GE in the Paris 
Agreement or the priority of mitigation.		
7.1.2 Public consciousness  
Public consciousness on GE in the UK was investigated by academics around 2010 and 
2011, when there was the first peak in attention by the government, academics and civil 
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society. The first large scale international survey conducted in the US, Canada and the UK 
between 19 November and 7 December 2010 mapped a picture of public awareness on 
GE.510 The results of their awareness were higher than expected, which is 8% and 45% for 
GE and climate engineering respectively.511 The two terms ‘geoengineering’ and ‘climate 
engineering’ are frequently employed concepts in the relevant literature to describe the 
technology. The survey supports the idea that the term ‘geoengineering’ is less effective 
than ‘climate engineering’ because ‘it is difficult for the public to understand and derive its 
correct meaning.512 In addition, it can be identified from the survey that ‘the increase in 
available media and increase in assessed familiarity from past studies suggests a growing 
public interest in GE’.513 Combining all the results from the survey, one can conclude that 
interest in GE has expanded to the general public rather than being confined to academics 
and political elites.514 Apart from this survey, there was a public dialogue conducted in the 
UK in 2010 by the Natural Environment Research Council on GE in order to understand 
public opinions on GE.515 The key finding was that the awareness of GE had increased 
during the public dialogue and that the public, paying heed to ethical516 and practical 
concerns,517 was in favour of researching GE cautiously.518 However, it also found that 
some members of the general public need to be provided with more information as they 
may have low consciousness of GE.519 In addition to these efforts by academics such as 
																																																								510	 A.	M.	Mercer,	D.	W.	Keith	and	J.	D.	Sharp,	‘Public	Understanding	of	Solar	Radiation	Management’	(2011)	6	Environmental	Research	Letters	1.	511	 Ibid.	512	 Ibid.	513	 Ibid.	514	 Ibid.	515	 NERC,	Experiment	Earth?	Report	on	a	Public	Dialogue	on	Geoengineering	(Ipsos	MORI,	2010).	516	 Clive	Hamilton,	‘The	Ethical	Foundations	of	Climate	Engineering’	in	William	Burns	and	Andrew	Strauss	(eds),	
Climate	Change	Geoengineering	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press	2013).	517	 Rafael	and	Filis-Yelaghotis	(n	63).	518	 NERC	(n	516).	519	 Ibid.	
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NERC, the media – such as BBC News – has disseminated the results of the first 
international survey on GE on 24 October 2011, which to some extent increased the public 
awareness of GE.520 There were also some awareness events aiming at improving the 
public awareness of GE in the UK by environmentalists.521 
 
However, despite a reasonable level of awareness, the respondents in my research 
expressed their concerns about public consciousness on GE. In terms of non-involved 
NGOs, when asked about the reasons behind their non-involvement, the respondent from 
Practical Action explained that he feared that some methods of GE might in theory look 
like a solution to climate change, and because of this, the general public would be less 
worried about climate problems and more inclined to support moving away from 
expensive mitigation. He continued with his explanation that, although the NGO 
community and the scientific community could understand the pressures of focusing on 
mitigation and adaptation, there was a problem with the public due to their capacity to 
misunderstand the issues. That is to say, although they may have reasonable awareness of 
it, the public may yet fail to grasp the complexity of GE and misunderstand what it can 
really deliver and hence, expect it to be the solution. Therefore, the respondent highlighted 
this as an important reason why, as an NGO, they refused to engage in it. In terms of 
NGOs involved in GE in contrast, the relevant respondents did not mention concerns about 
public consciousness and did not consider it as a reason for their involvement. This is 
surprising because one might expect NGOs, especially membership based NGOs, to have 																																																								520	 Mark	Kinver,	‘Public	Supports	Geo-engineering	Ideas,	Study	Suggests’	BBC	News	(London)	<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15399832>	accessed	24	October	2011.	521	 Chemtrails	Project	UK,	‘Geoengineering	and	Chemtrails	Awareness	Day’	(2014)	 	<http://www.uk-skywatch.co.uk/Awareness%20Events.html>	accessed	5	May	2014.	
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some sense of directing their attention where public consciousness lies. However, NGOs 
involved in GE do not seem to take the salience of the issue to the public into 
consideration. 
 
With reasonable awareness of GE among the public, salience concerning public opinion is 
worthy of discussion concerning the involvement of NGOs in the UK. The literature on 
salience was addressed in chapter 6. As mentioned in that chapter, salience is a concept in 
political science referring to various levels of importance attached to issues by voters.522 
The relationship between increased awareness or knowledge and issue salience can be 
illustrated as, according to David Weaver, increased salience of an issue is accompanied by 
increased knowledge of its causes and potential solutions.523 A question arising from this 
is that, can this point be illustrated the other way around, which is the more the public 
know about GE, the more salience they may attach to it? However, some scholars have 
argued that information gain does not always lead to a change of attitude on salience, 
which means it does not necessarily follow that increased knowledge on GE will result in 
increased salience. Therefore, in terms of the salience of GE in China and the UK, more 
public consciousness in the UK than that in China does not necessarily lead to more 
salience in the UK. In addition, scholars on salience also claim that information gain can 
lead to increased salience but not necessarily in a positive way; instead, it can result in 
increased negative public opinion.524 For example, around 2010 and 2013, there was a 
high volume of debate on GE and public awareness increased rapidly during that time. 
																																																								522	 Wlezien	(n	441).	523	 Weaver	(n	448).	524	 Ibid.	
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Many environmentalists and NGOs strongly suggested a ban on GE and started several 
campaigns against it. These strong reactions can be regarded as indicative of negative 
public opinion and much importance has been attached to a non-commencement of GE. 
However, in the UK, some non-involved NGOs want to avoid making it a positively 
salient topic. That is to say, in terms of NGOs, many of them are reluctant to talk about or 
engage in GE. This will be illustrated through analysing the empirical data in the following 
paragraph. 
 
In terms of NGOs which do not engage in GE, the respondent from ClientEarth pointed out 
that the reason why they are not involved is that GE is not high on their agenda. That is to 
say, GE is not considered important to them. She continued explaining that the issues on 
GE are not major ones within climate change that need to be addressed currently, which 
implies that they need to focus on more important issues, such as mitigation and adaptation. 
In terms of NGOs involved in GE, it is surprising that many respondents do not consider 
GE important even though they have focused on it. According to the respondent from 
WWF, ‘it is not something you are doing necessarily as a first choice’, which means it is 
not a significant issue for WWF to consider currently. The respondent from FoE also 
expressed his concern that ‘there is too much talk around GE, and the more we talk about it 
the more we raise the idea that there is a magic solution; and we should therefore not 
consider GE as an important focus’. In addition, the respondent from Greenpeace – a group 
which has been actively involved in many activities concerning GE – also considered it as 
an insurance policy that is less important than mitigation. From the responses, we can 
identify that both types of NGOs attach little importance to GE. Therefore, one can 
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conclude that while importance can help to illustrate why NGOs are not involved, it fails to 
explain why NGOs engage. This is because, as generated in the data, involved NGOs 
nevertheless attach little importance to GE. 
 
In addition, it is interesting to identify a transition from strong reaction around 2010 to 
little importance recently. From 2009 to 2011 when there was the first peak in debate on 
GE, the novel topic first drew attention from the public due to the reports released by 
academics and the government. As a newly proposed method to tackle climate change, it 
was important to address the unknowns and uncertainties of GE at that time. Therefore, it 
is understandable to consider it as a salient issue for the public. In addition, the need for 
more research was supported by the government in a policy report,525 which more or less 
contributed to the high volume of debate. However, in recent years, many NGOs have a 
concern about the potentially overwhelming debate on GE and fear that it may reduce the 
importance which the public attach to mitigation. For example, the respondent from FoE 
indicated that ‘there is too much talk around GE…we need to concentrate on talking about 
mitigation’. The respondent from Greenpeace considered it as a distraction from mitigation 
to focus too much on GE. It can be identified that the transition happened when there was 
more public salience attached to GE than mitigation. In order to ensure the relative salience 
of mitigation compared with GE, which addresses the root cause of climate change, many 
NGOs started to cool down the hot debate on GE and highlighted that it is less important 
than mitigation. Based on the analysis on the transition in importance, we can conclude 
that the proportion of importance attached to GE and mitigation by the public is 																																																								525	 Change	(n	504).	
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responsible for the non-involvement of NGOs. 
 
In conclusion, although public consciousness of GE is higher than expected in the UK, 
non-involved NGOs have concerns that the public cannot address the complexity of GE 
and may misunderstand what it entails, and because of this, fear that the public might 
consider it as a magic solution. This is the reason why those NGOs are reluctant to engage 
with GE. However, public consciousness was not mentioned by NGOs involved in GE, 
which suggests that it does not contribute to explain why they participate. In terms of 
salience, NGOs involved in GE do not take it into consideration to explain their 
involvement. Therefore, we cannot identify a connection between issue salience and 
involvement. However, importance appears to explain the non-involvement of NGOs in 
the UK as discussed above. Furthermore, in understanding the non-involvement of NGOs, 
it is important to emphasise the relative importance placed on GE and mitigation, which 
can explain the transition from strong reaction to little or no focus. 
7.2	Emotion	
The variable of emotion comprises three sub-elements: threat, blame and unwillingness to 
access information. The idea of threat includes urgency, technological fear and resignation, 
with which the data will be analysed respectively in the following parts. In terms of blame, 
it will be discussed within the theory of naming, blaming, and claiming, as well as framing. 
The element of unwillingness to access information is not applicable in analysing the UK 
data and therefore, will not be discussed in this section. This is because, according to the 
data in the UK and China, UK NGOs do not face the problem of deficit in information 
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while Chinese NGOs, especially small grassroots NGOs, have to deal with this issue. 	
7.2.1 Threat  
Emotion, as discussed in chapter 5, is required to generate strategic action,526 and is 
considered by commentators to provide ‘ideas, ideologies, identities and interests to 
motivate people who take actions’.527 Threat, as a negative emotion, comprises various 
aspects, such as the urgency of the threat, technological fear as one typical type of threat, 
and resignation as a reaction to threat. First, the power of negative emotions, along with 
‘collective bads’, will be discussed. Urgency and the emotion of technological fear will 
then be the focus of discussion in this part. In terms of resignation, there is no evidence 
shown in the responses that this is a causal factor in the involvement or non-involvement 
of NGOs with GE in the UK.  
 
The power of negative emotions aims to understand the phenomenon that people are more 
motivated to become involved in movements by ‘searching for the least harmful outcome 
rather than the most beneficial’.528 This is because people place more emphasis on the 
security of the status quo than gaining benefits and hence are more inclined to take action 
to avoid threats.529 This is defined by scholars as ‘risk aversion’ – in other words, that 
people tend to ‘place a higher value on what they already have than on what they might 
acquire’.530 This can also be illustrated with the theory on ‘collective bads’, which was 																																																								526	 Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World	(n	52).	527	 Jasper,	The	Art	of	Moral	Protest:	Culture,	Biography	and	Creativity	in	Social	Movements	(n	331).	528	 Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World	(n	52).	529	 Ibid.	530	 Ibid.	
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discussed in chapter 5. This theory means one is more likely to take action or become 
involved because of public bads than collective goods.531 In other words, people are likely 
to participate to prevent a bad consequence than gaining a good outcome. The power of 
negative emotions can be employed to understand why NGOs engage in GE. In terms of 
those involved NGOs, some of the respondents effectively expressed their concerns about 
preventing a bad consequence. For example, the respondent from FoE stated that the 
reason why they engaged in GE is trying to prevent ‘the political and scientific community 
from giving the message that we don’t need to bother with mitigation and this is a real 
fear’. This implies that the motivation for them to become involved in GE is to avoid a bad 
consequence. Similarly, the respondent from Greenpeace attributed their involvement to 
the potential for GE to have negative impacts on biodiversity, which again proves the 
theory that for a number of groups involvement is motivated by bad consequences.  
 
Technological fear is a typical kind of negative emotion concerning bad consequences. It 
means people tend to oppose new technologies and generate bias against them, as people 
are concerned about destroying the status quo even though there is little chance of this 
happening.532 It is closely related with collective bads discussed above, in motivating 
people to become involved. That is to say, collective bads is the root cause for people to 
have technological fear. People become involved to oppose novel technologies because 
these technologies will have negative consequences and then destroy the status quo. 
Negative consequences are in fact collective bads, which cause technological fear. People 
with technological fear have great concerns about the uncertainties and side effects of a 																																																								531	 Jordan	and	Maloney	(n	345).	532	 Jasper,	The	Art	of	Moral	Protest:	Culture,	Biography	and	Creativity	in	Social	Movements	(n	331).	
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new technology, such as GE, and tend to stay clear of engaging in GE. This can effectively 
help to explain the non-involvement of NGOs in the UK. The respondent from TearFund 
was skeptical about technologies, such as SRM, having unpredictable effects, and because 
of this, they chose not to be involved. The respondent from ClientEarth similarly explained 
why they did not focus on GE, arguing that emphasis should be placed on, for example, 
management of soils to combat climate change that would not necessarily have the 
negative impacts of GE. Therefore, technological fear of negative impacts of GE is an 
important element to understand their non-involvement. 
 
Resignation refers to the situation where people are pessimistic about the status quo and 
prefer to accept it rather than act for change.533 It happens when people are disappointed 
with government authorities and therefore believe that it makes no difference whether to 
participate or not as outcomes would not change anyway. In terms of the data, no 
respondents from either involved or non-involved NGOs show a sign of resignation and 
therefore cannot be considered as a contribution to their non-involvement. 
 
The sense of urgency suggests that situations could become worse if we do not respond or 
take action now.534 That is to say, NGOs may prefer to focus on what they regard as more 
pressing concerns at the moment rather than worry about what is yet to come. In terms of 
NGOs that have not engaged in GE, all interviewed respondents have in effect mentioned 
that GE was currently not an urgent issue. For example, the respondent from Practical 
Action indicated that ‘it is not a pressing concern at the moment’. The respondent from 																																																								533	 Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World	(n	52).	534	 Ibid.	
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ClientEarth also claimed that ‘issues around GE are not something we need to be 
concerned with right now’. The responses imply that lack of urgency can partly help to 
explain the non-involvement of NGOs in the UK. However, it is interesting to find the 
same views on GE in some of the responses from involved NGOs. For example, the 
respondent from WWF indicated that ‘GE is not at a stage where you need to go for 
governance and this is not something that has to happen now’. In addition, the respondent 
from FoE confirmed this opinion that GE was not urgent at the current stage and it was 
more urgent to concentrate on current issues rather than problems in the future such as GE. 
Although both types of NGOs mentioned the variable of urgency, they illustrate it in 
divergent ways: NGOs not involved in GE partly attribute their non-engagement to lack of 
urgency; while involved ones have participated despite admitting that there was a lack of 
urgency concerning GE. Therefore the variable of urgency appears to explain 
non-involvement but it does not contribute to involvement.  
 
In conclusion, the variable of threat is applicable to both types of NGOs and every 
interviewed NGO in each type. The power of negative or collective bads only contributes 
to explain why NGOs engage, while technological fear can only help to understand why 
NGOs do not engage. Although the variable of urgency was mentioned by both types of 
NGOs, it is considered as a reason only by respondents from non-involved NGOs. Finally, 
as the involvement and non-involvement of both types of NGOs in the UK are affected by 
the variable of threat which is related to strategic actions, we can conclude that they are 
making strategic decisions on whether to engage in GE or not. 
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7.2.2 Blame 
As mentioned in the chapter on potential variables, if a threat is in place, strategic action 
requires someone to blame.535 It comprises causal blame and remedial blame, referring to 
who cause problems and who should be responsible for remedying respectively. In terms 
of GE, the potential target of causal blame could be the scientific community or 
government who conduct GE related activities. Remedial blame may also happen when 
there is no readily identifiable causal blame, which means the target is often turned on 
someone who should take remedial actions concerning damage when the causal subject 
cannot be identified. In many cases, the remedial blame goes to government.536 According 
to the empirical data, the respondent from FoE in effect included causal blame as one of 
the reasons why they became involved in GE. He indicated that ‘the second reason why we 
are involved is that we are trying to stop the political and scientific community from giving 
the message that we don’t need to bother with mitigation’. He suggests that the political 
and scientific community is considered as the one who causes the misunderstanding of GE 
among the public, and because of this, FoE has become involved against those who should 
be blamed for this misunderstanding.  
 
Blaming, as a variable, needs to be illustrated with the literature on naming, blaming and 
claiming within a broader context of the sociology of law.537 As discussed in the chapter 
on analysing the data in China, the literature addresses the emergence and transformation 
of disputes and includes stages of identifying an injurious experience, transforming the 																																																								535	 Ibid.	536	 Ibid.	537	 Carolyn	Wiethoff,	‘Naming,	Blaming,	and	Claiming	in	Public	Disputes’	(2003)	44	Journal	of	Homosexuality	61.	
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perceived injurious experience into a grievance, and voicing the grievance to the person 
responsible and asking them for a remedy.538 The last stage of claiming is crucial to a 
litigation strategy but does not affect whether social movements can be triggered into 
action or not in the first place. Therefore, naming and blaming are essential to triggering 
social movement action. In terms of NGOs involved in GE, according to the empirical data, 
they in effect indicate that they are able to identify problems as well as find someone 
responsible for the problems. Therefore, blaming can help to explain their involvement in 
GE. However, in terms of non-involved NGOs, the variable of blaming cannot be 
identified in their responses. This suggests that NGOs do not engage with GE due to their 
failure to blame. Based on this, blaming appears to explain both involvement and 
non-involvement of NGOs in the UK, as it is effectively mentioned by involved NGOs 
while it does not show in the data of non-involved NGOs. Based on the analysis of naming, 
blaming, and claiming, we can conclude that naming and blaming can help to explain the 
engagement of NGOs in the UK. 
7.3	Strategy	 	
Strategy, as a variable of analysis, comprises elements of insider/outsider strategy, ceasing 
to mediate, efficiency and competition. It is an important variable to understand the 
involvement/non-involvement of NGOs with GE in the UK. In this section, the idea of 
insider/outsider strategy will first be examined combined with political opportunity theory. 
Ceasing to mediate, identified as a crucial sub-variable when analysing the data in the UK, 
will then be discussed by employing the literature on governance. Efficiency and 																																																								538	 Felstiner,	Abel	and	Sarat	(n	455).	
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competition, rooted in the resource mobilisation literature, will be analysed as a third 
element of strategy.  	
7.3.1 Insider/outsider strategy 
Distinctions between insider and outsider strategy are identified in the interest group 
literature. As discussed in chapter 5, an insider strategy entails a privileged access to the 
political and administrative process and employs close consultation with political actors 
while an outsider strategy involves mobilization from grassroots networks with indirect 
action through the media or mobilisation of citizens.539 Insiders normally form direct 
contact with advisory bodies, committees and agencies to provide their expertise especially 
on technical issues.540 Outsiders tend to start campaigns and protests and work with the 
media to influence the public interest.541 In practice, it is difficult to define, for example, 
an environmental NGO as wholly an insider or outsider, as they will normally take the 
form of a mixture of both types as a thresholder.542 Therefore, whether a NGO is defined 
as an insider/outsider or thresholder should be examined on a case-by-case basis. The 
adoption of an insider/outsider strategy by NGOs in the UK is first discussed in the 
following paragraphs to provide a background for answering the question of whether 
different strategies will affect their involvement in GE. 
 
																																																								539	 Binderkrantz,	‘Different	Groups,	Different	Strategies:	How	Interest	Groups	Pursue	Their	Political	Ambitions’	(n	52).	540	 Beyers	(n	374).	541	 Katharina	Rietig,	Public	Pressure	Versus	Lobbying	-	How	Do	Environmental	NGOs	Matter	Most	In	Climate	
Negotiations?	(Centre	for	Climate	Change	Economics	and	Policy,	2011).	542	 Binderkrantz,	‘Interest	Group	Strategies:	Navigating	Between	Privileged	Access	and	Strategies	of	Pressure’	(n	358).	
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According to the existing literature on environmental NGOs’ strategies, most scholars have 
admitted that ENGOs in the EU are more likely to practise outsider strategies or a mixture 
of insider and outsider strategies.543 In addition, it is useful to examine the strategies of 
NGOs on a case-by-case basis in order to define them respectively. The interviewed NGOs, 
which are involved in GE, are Greenpeace, FoE, WWF, Blue & Green Tomorrow, ETC 
Group and Biofuel Watch. Greenpeace and FoE, which are often considered as 
thresholders in the literature,544 practise both insider and outsider strategies in a general 
sense. For example, the respondent from Greenpeace indicated that he was involved as an 
expert on GE, concerning both technical and governance issues, in producing the 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) report and the London Convention and Protocol 
(LC-LP) report. This is a typical form of inside arena. The respondent from FoE also 
indicated that their organisation was involved in some discussions on governance issues 
concerning GE organised by authorities. In addition to insider strategies, they also act as 
environmental campaign groups and are involved in campaigns on GE in that capacity. For 
example, Greenpeace joined the campaign against the Indo-German research project 
LOHAFEX dumping six tonnes of iron into the Southern Ocean.545 FoE also campaigns on 
climate change including GE and has published a policy position on it.546 In terms of 
WWF, ETC Group, and Biofuel Watch, they similarly practise both insider and outsider 
strategies as thresholders because they participated in producing reports on GE, such as the 
2009 Royal Society Report while they also joined campaigns against GE, such as the 																																																								543	 Beyers	(n	374).	544	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	545	 Geoengineering	Monitor,	‘Resistance	to	Geoengineering:	A	Timeline’	(2015)	 	<http://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/resistance/>	.	546	 Friends	of	the	Earth,	‘Geoengineering:	Friends	of	the	Earth	Position	Paper	On	Managing	Carbon	Sinks	And	Solar	Radiation’	(2009)	 	 <https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/geoengineering.pdf>	accessed	November	2009.	
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‘Hands Off Mother Earth’ campaign.547 In terms of Blue & Green Tomorrow, the 
respondent indicated that they worked mainly as a publisher with interests in disseminating 
issues around sustainability including GE, which suggests that they practise an outsider 
strategy by working as a form of media to influence the public. 
 
The strategies of the other NGOs – Practical Action, ClientEarth and TearFund – will be 
examined in a general sense, as they have not engaged in GE. In terms of Practical Action, 
it adopts a combination of insider and outsider strategies in non-GE policy areas and acts 
as a thresholder. According to its approach stated on its website, it includes publishing 
services, which can be considered as working through the media to influence the public, 
sharing ideas with governments which can be considered as a form of lobbying, and 
working directly with poor people.548 These approaches are predominantly forms of an 
outsider strategy. Apart from these, it is on the government’s consultation list on technical 
issues, which suggests an insider strategy.549 In terms of TearFund, as a Christian charity 
group, it mainly aims to reduce poverty caused by climate change, through starting 
campaigns and working directly with the public. From this perspective, it employs an 
outsider strategy. ClientEarth seeks to protect the environment through advocacy, litigation 
and science and acts on legal opportunities. 550  Litigation, as a tactic, is typically 
considered as a form of an outsider strategy.551 It can be identified from this that 
ClientEarth mainly employs an outsider strategy.  																																																								547	 Monitor	(n	546).	548	 Practical	Action,	‘Practical	Action	Publishing’	 	 	 <https://practicalactionpublishing.org/>	.	549	 Practical	Action,	‘Our	Distinctive	Practical	Approach:	Tranforming	Lives,	Inspiring	Change’	 	 	<https://practicalaction.org/our-approach>	.	550	 ClientEarth,	‘What	We	Do’	 	 	 <https://www.clientearth.org/what-we-do/>	.	551	 Marie	Weil,	Michael	Reisch	and	Mary	Ohmer	(eds),	The	Handbook	of	Commuity	Practice	(2nd	edn,	London:	Sage	Publications	2012).	
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After exploring what strategies these groups employ, it is also important to investigate 
whether they have agency on their choices. As discussed in chapter 5, practising an insider 
strategy does not guarantee an insider status, as it needs to be ascribed by government.552 
This suggests that insider/outsider strategy needs to be separated from insider/outsider 
status, which leads to a typology: groups with insider status include core insider groups, 
specialist insider groups and peripheral insider groups; and groups with outsider status 
comprise outsiders by goal and outsiders by choice.553 The three types of insider groups 
differ in insider status ranging from ‘regularised participation on a wide variety of issues 
cognate to a policy area (core) to participation in particular areas (specialist) to 
participation that has the insider form but little influence (peripheral)’.554  The difference 
between ‘outsider by goal’ and ‘outsider by choice’ is that an outsider by goal is ‘usually 
self-selected by the group through adopting goals that cannot be accommodated in the 
consultative process (e.g. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)’, while an outsider by 
choice may ‘make an explicit policy decision not to become an insider’.555 The main 
difference between the two is that the former does not have agency on its outsider strategy 
which is decided by the goal, while the latter chooses to adopt an outsider strategy with 
agency. Based on this typology, the discussion in chapter 5 has drawn a conclusion that 
insiders and outsider groups by goal do not have agency on their strategies that are 
determined by their goals in the first place, while outsiders by choice, which normally 
adopt thresholder strategies, have agency on their choices. That is to say, thresholders 																																																								552	 Maloney,	Jordan	and	McLaughlin	(n	359).	553	 Ibid.	554	 Ibid.	555	 Ibid.	
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practising a mixture of insider and outsider strategies, such as Greenpeace and WWF, are 
defined as outsiders by choice that have agency on their choices. In terms of ClientEarth, 
TearFund and Blue & Green Tomorrow that practise only outsider strategies, they can be 
defined as outsiders by goals without agency within the path they have taken. For example, 
the goal of ClientEarth is to achieve environmental justice through litigation and legal 
opportunities. Litigation, as its predominant way of taking action, is an outsider strategy by 
goal, which implies that the aim of ClientEarth has forced it to adopt an outsider strategy in 
the first place. Therefore, it is defined as an outsider by goal with no agency on strategies 
once its goal is chosen. 
 
In terms of the openness of a polity to insiders/outsiders, a conclusion has been drawn in 
the previous chapter that the state is more open to insiders and thresholders when they 
practise insider strategies, and closed to outsiders and thresholders employing outsider 
strategies. In addition, adopting an insider strategy does not guarantee an insider status, as 
the status also depends on the discretion by government on whether to accept a group as an 
insider. The analysis leads to a question, raised in the preceding chapter, of whether 
different strategies of NGOs will affect their involvement in GE. This can be illustrated in 
a two-fold manner: if NGOs employ insider strategies in general, are they more likely or 
less likely to be involved in GE? And if NGOs generally adopt outsider or thresholder 
strategies, is it more possible for them to engage in GE or the reverse? In the following 
paragraphs, I will seek answers to these questions. 
 
According to Saunders, insiders seek small gains on issues already on the policy agenda; 
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thresholders not only focus on issues already on the policy agenda, but also add new but 
uncontroversial issues; outsiders emphasise novel issues for the policy agenda and many of 
the issues, if not all, are controversial.556 From the literature, we can identify two elements 
that affect the relations between strategies and involvement: whether an issue is already on 
the agenda or is a novelty, and controversy. This idea can be concluded in a table 
according to her book Environmental Networks and Social Movement Theory:557 	
Table	 7.1:	 The	 relationships	 between	 insider/outsider/thresholder	 and	
focused	issues	Insider	 	 Seeks	 ‘small	 incremental	 gains	 on	issues	already	on	the	policy	agenda’.558	Thresholder	 	 Focuses	on	issues	already	on	the	policy	agenda;	 and	 adds	 novel	uncontroversial	issues.	Outsider	 	 Works	 on	 issues	 novel	 to	 the	 policy	agenda;	 ‘many	 of	 them	 would	 be	controversial’.559		
In the context of the UK, GE, as analysed in the first section, has already been taken into 
consideration by the authorities and resulted in several policy reports, which means the 
topic is already on the policy agenda. Although it is on the agenda, it is a controversial 
topic to some extent. This suggests that, concerning the two elements identified above, GE 
is not novel to the policy agenda, but has attracted a degree of controversy. In addition, in 
terms of the facts regarding their involvement and strategies, the interviewed NGOs can be 
divided into four types: NGOs which are involved in GE and practise thresholder strategies 																																																								556	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	557	 Ibid	(Pp	99).	558	 Ibid.	559	 Ibid.	
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with agency, such as Greenpeace, FoE, WWF, ETC Group, and Biofuel Watch; NGOs 
which are involved in GE and adopt an outsider strategy with no agency, such as Blue & 
Green Tomorrow; NGOs which have not engaged in GE and employ a thresholder strategy 
with agency, such as Practical Action; and NGOs which have not engaged in GE and 
practise an outsider strategy with no agency, such as ClientEarth and TearFund. This 
categorization is presented in Table 7.2 below to provide a clear picture for analysis: 	
Table	7.2:	The	relationships	between	UK	NGOs’	involvement/non-involvement,	
what	 strategies	 they	 adopt,	 and	 whether	 they	 have	 agency	 on	 choices	 of	
strategies		 GE	Involvement	 	 Strategies	 	 Agency	 	Greenpeace,	 FoE,	WWF,	 ETC	 Group,	Biofuel	Watch	
Involved	 	 Thresholder	 	 Agency	 	
Blue	 &	 Green	Tomorrow	 Involved	 	 Outsider	 	 No	agency	Practical	Action	 Non-involved	 	 Thresholder	 	 Agency	 	ClientEarth,	TearFund	 Non-involved	 	 Outsider	 	 No	agency		
The first type of group in Table 7.2 are thresholders, which focus on issues that are usually 
already on the agenda according to Table 7.1. GE, as identified above, has already been put 
on the policy agenda in the UK and therefore, appears to explain why those thresholders 
engage in GE. The second type of NGO in Table 7.2 – Blue & Green Tomorrow – 
practises an outsider strategy, which, according to Table 7.1, seeks to bring novel issues or 
controversial issues on to the policy agenda. Although GE is not that novel to the political 
domain, it is generally considered as controversial to a large extent, which seems to follow 
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the pattern in Table 7.1 that outsiders pursue support on controversial issues. The third 
type of NGO in Table 7.2 – Practical Action – adopts a thresholder strategy generally that 
is considered to emphasise issues already on the agenda according to Table 7.1. However, 
the non-involvement of Practical Action cannot be regarded as contradictory to what 
Saunders says (i.e. Table 7.1). This is because thresholders focusing on issues in the 
political domain do not necessarily become involved in GE. Therefore, a thresholder 
strategy cannot guarantee the involvement in GE and cannot help to explain the 
non-involvement of Practical Action. In terms of the last type of NGO in Table 7.2 – 
ClientEarth and TearFund, outsiders, according to Table 7.1, focus on new and mostly 
controversial issues to the policy agenda. GE is not completely new to the policy agenda, 
therefore it seems to explain why ClientEarth and TearFund do not engage with it. 
However, comparing Table 7.1, which is a theory developed by Saunders in the literature, 
and Table 7.2, which summarises the situation in the context of GE, it seems that, although 
the pattern displayed in Table 7.1 may work for most cases, it cannot be simply applied to 
the case of GE. That is to say, the same pattern in the literature cannot be identified 
concerning GE. 
 
Therefore, from the analysis of Table 7.1 above, we can only cautiously draw a conclusion 
that the general insider/outsider strategy partly influences the involvement of groups in GE. 
But we cannot identify a uniform pattern on how strategy affects the involvement in GE, as 
the relations between strategy and involvement are not sufficiently obvious and 
straightforward. This suggests that although insider/outsider strategy may have some role 
in affecting involvement, the involvement of NGOs in GE is not only determined by 
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strategy. We can also conclude that the pattern of the relations is more complex, in the case 
of GE within the context of the UK. 	
7.3.2 Ceasing to mediate  
According to the governance literature, NGOs can mediate between public voices and 
government, which has been criticized by scholars as controversial because it is possible 
for them to stop mediating and to define public interests by themselves.560 In the context of 
GE, NGOs being reluctant to talk about GE is a form of ceasing to mediate between the 
government and the public and avoiding placing attention on GE. They stop mediating by 
staying clear of GE rather than shaping the debates. This suggests that NGOs strategically 
stop using their mediating role in order to avoid a distraction of attention. The idea of 
ceasing to mediate is an important element to understand the involvement or 
non-involvement of NGOs with GE in the UK. 
 
In terms of non-involved NGOs, all the interviewed respondents in effect included ceasing 
to mediate as one of the reasons why they did not engage. The respondent from Practical 
Action indicated that ‘there would be lots of NGOs opposed to engaging in GE because it 
will divert the public’s attention away from more pressing concerns’. He placed 
considerable emphasis on the idea of diverting the general public away from critical issues, 
which suggests that they have a role in mediating the public interests and may strategically 
stop using it. The respondents from TearFund and ClientEarth held the same concerns on 
																																																								560	 Brownsword	and	Goodwin	(n	384).	
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diverting the public interests and described it as a distraction. Therefore, ceasing to 
mediate can be considered as a critical element of the explanations to their 
non-involvement in GE. 
 
However, in terms of NGOs involved in GE, they generated the same views that GE might 
distract attention from preventing the root causes of global warming, such as mitigation. 
For example, the respondent from Blue & Green Tomorrow indicated that they had a 
concern about GE in that it might divert attention away from mitigation. In addition, the 
respondents from ETC Group and Biofuel Watch supported this idea that GE might draw 
attention away from other approaches. An interesting point identified from the data is that 
both types of NGOs have concerns about the distraction of GE. However, why do some 
NGOs choose to engage in it although it is a distraction, or why does the concern of 
distraction result in two divergent ways of involvement? The explanation to this question 
lies in the mediating role of NGOs. The mediation between government and the public can 
be illustrated in two directions: the connection with government, and the connection with 
the general public. Ceasing to mediate, therefore, can also be illustrated in two directions: 
stop government from disseminating information on GE, and stop the public from 
receiving information on GE. The former leads to a situation that NGOs become involved 
in order to stop government from giving potentially misleading messages on GE; while the 
latter forces NGOs to stop talking about or engaging in GE. The two ways of ceasing to 
mediate help to explain why NGOs with the same concerns on distraction resulted in 
different choices of involvement. For example, the respondent from FoE indicated that the 
reason why they became involved in GE was ‘trying to stop the political community from 
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giving the message that we don’t need mitigation’. This suggests that NGOs becoming 
involved in GE is also a way of ceasing to mediate, but in a way that emphasises trying 
still to steer the direction of government.  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded from the discussion that ceasing to mediate contributes to 
explain both the involvement and non-involvement of NGOs in the UK. The involvement 
can be illustrated as stopping the government from disseminating messages and the 
non-involvement can be explained as stopping the public from receiving information. As 
this variable suggests a strategic use of their mediating role by NGOs, it can also be 
identified that they are making strategic decisions on whether to engage with GE. 
7.3.3 Efficiency and Competition 
According to the discussion in chapter 6, the variables of efficiency of operation and 
competition between NGOs are interrelated due to finite resources that NGOs can acquire. 
Although they both rely on limited resources, efficiency and competition lead to divergent 
outcomes: in terms of efficiency, due to the uncertainties of GE technology, it is not clear 
enough for NGOs to have an impact on it and therefore they prefer to allocate limited 
resources to areas where they can efficiently make contributions and tend to focus on 
approaches that already exist, such as mitigation, rather than GE; with regard to 
competition, NGOs can pursue a specialised goal, such as GE, to claim their identities 
when in competition with other NGOs, as the more specialised the goals are, the more 
obvious their identities are, according to niche theory. 561  Therefore, efficiency and 																																																								561	 McCarthy	and	Zald	(n	52).	
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competition can result in opposite outcomes on involvement.  
 
However, in the case of GE, we cannot simply conclude that efficiency leads to 
non-involvement while competition leads to involvement. In the empirical data, both 
efficiency and competition are effectively mentioned by each type of NGO in the UK. In 
terms of involved NGOs, for example, the respondent from WWF in effect indicated that 
WWF, as an environmental NGO, was in competition with other NGOs, which has made 
them keep on top of GE as it developed. This confirms the variable of competition in 
affecting involvement with GE. However, other respondents from involved NGOs 
mentioned efficiency as well when explaining why they did not become particularly 
involved. For example, the respondent from FoE stated that they had to use limited 
resources to focus more on areas where they could have the greatest impact. In addition, 
the respondent from Greenpeace also claimed that ‘NGOs inevitably have limited 
resources. We don’t want it to take up all of our time and energy when we know that we 
can put that more productively elsewhere. That is why we are not deeply involved in it’. 
That is to say, although they are involved in GE, they do not want to engage too much as 
more efficient efforts can be achieved elsewhere. This raises an important point concerning 
the perceptions of GE by involved NGOs: the proportion of resources matters in that not 
too much resource should be allocated to GE. This is because a large proportion of 
resource on GE will be a distraction from mitigation and adaptation which also require 
more resource. Therefore, they decided to engage but not to a large extent. The proportion 
of resource is a critical element when understanding the involvement of NGOs and was 
mentioned by all the respondents from involved NGOs. It is important to notice that, 
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despite their engagement in GE, they do not consider GE as a main focus of their work. 
Instead, they would like to be involved as long as there is not a large proportion of 
resource placed on it. Furthermore, efficiency can be considered as useful to explain the 
limited involvement of some NGOs in GE. 
 
When it comes to non-involved NGOs, the respondent from ClientEarth effectively 
included efficiency as one of the reasons why they did not engage. She indicated that, to 
have effective impacts, ClientEarth should focus on using technologies that we already 
have. This suggests that efficiency contributes to the explanation of the non-involvement 
of NGOs in the UK. However, some respondents also in effect mentioned competition 
when explaining why they noticed GE in the first place. The respondent from Practical 
Action, for example, explained that ‘it is important to stay up to speed with negotiations 
and discussions around GE; otherwise we might fall behind others’. It is interesting to 
identify the competition variable in those non-involved NGOs. However, it is reasonable 
as competition helps to explain why they came to notice or know about GE even though 
they did not then become involved.  
 
Therefore, from the discussion above, we can effectively conclude that efficiency 
contributes to non-involvement as well as limited involvement of NGOs in the UK; and 
competition contributes to the explanations of both involvement and why, even if not 
involved, groups noticed and followed the topic in the first place. In addition, as the 
variables of efficiency and competition are related to strategic actions, we can also 
conclude that both types of NGOs make strategic choices concerning their involvement 
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and non-involvement. 	
7.4	Resource	 	
The resource variable comprises material resources, such as money, time and information, 
and labour resource, such as elites or experts. These sub-elements will be discussed 
respectively to explore whether they affect the involvement or non-involvement of NGOs 
with GE in the UK. It is important to point out that the element of labour resource was not 
identified in the responses from either type of NGO, which differs from that in China, and 
therefore, will not be discussed in further detail in this section. 
7.4.1 Goals 
According to resource mobilization theory, target goals link groups to specific social 
movements.562 The idea of goals contributes to explaining why NGOs do not engage in the 
first place. According to the empirical data, this element plays an important role in 
understanding the involvement and non-involvement of NGOs in GE. In terms of 
respondents from involved NGOs, most of them attribute their engagement to pursuing a 
goal relevant to GE. For example, the respondent from WWF explained why they became 
involved in GE in that WWF was an ENGO with a goal in climate change. The respondent 
from Blue & Green Tomorrow also attributed their involvement to their goal in climate 
change and sustainability. Similarly, the respondent from Greenpeace indicated that ‘one 
of reasons is that we are committed to dealing with the problem of climate change’. In 
																																																								562	 Ibid.	
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addition, the respondent working for both ETC Group and Biofuel Watch included the 
element of goals as the main reason to explain their involvement: ‘in terms of Biofuel 
Watch, the main area of concern is biology, and the two leading GE techniques are biology 
with CCS,563 which include our main area of work; in terms of ETC Group, it always 
focuses on the emerging and new technologies; therefore it is within our remit’. From these 
responses, we can identify that the idea of goals is crucial when understanding the 
involvement of NGOs in GE. 
 
When it comes to non-involved NGOs, the respondent from TearFund also made reference 
to the element of goals. As he pointed out, ‘we did not get involved in GE because it is 
outside out remit. The NGO has its own specific mandate and focus. Our mission is 
poverty; therefore we focus on climate change which causes poverty. But we do not 
research much on the causes of climate change.’ From the responses from both types of 
NGOs, it can be concluded that the element of goals effectively affects their involvement 
and non-involvement in GE. 
 
7.4.2 Funding and time 
Money and time are crucial to the survival and maintenance of organisations, and are 
considered as a typical type of material resources. All the respondents from non-involved 
NGOs mentioned the element of funding and time, which implies that this element 
effectively influences non-involvement. The respondent from Practical Action was 																																																								563	 CCS	stands	for	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage.	
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concerned about becoming involved in GE in that ‘it might look like a good idea that we 
should invest our time and energy in it’. Likewise, the respondent from TearFund stated 
that NGOs had to focus on their remit due to limited resources and time. In addition, the 
respondent from ClientEarth indicated that ‘it is a question of priority of resources; if you 
have to choose between research on different subjects, then it depends on the possible costs 
of solutions, risks and disadvantages of solutions’. This response raises an important point 
with regard to the proportion of resources discussed above. It suggests that money and time 
allocated to GE should not be considered as a priority when distributing resources; and if 
some resources are allocated to it, it should not be a large proportion.  
 
The proportion or priority of resources can also explain the responses from involved NGOs. 
The respondent from FoE, for example, effectively indicated that as many NGOs still 
considered fossil fuels as the main focus, it did not have too much resource to concentrate 
on GE. The respondent from Greenpeace confirmed this point by stating that ‘NGOs 
inevitably have limited resources. We don’t want it to take up all of our time and energy 
when we know that we can put that to use more productively elsewhere’. In addition, the 
interviewee from ETC Group and Biofuel Watch claimed that they should not be too 
involved with GE as it took away resources from other approaches. Therefore, from the 
discussion, we can identify that the proportion or priority of resources is important when 
understanding the non-involvement and limited involvement of NGOs in the UK. 	
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7.4.3 Information and knowledge 
The deficit in information and knowledge on GE is a critical element contributing to the 
non-involvement of NGOs in China. However, the same situation cannot be identified in 
the UK, as both types of NGOs have good or reasonable knowledge on GE. In terms of the 
involved NGOs, all of them have knowledge and information on GE. The respondent from 
ETC Group and Biofuel Watch, for example, indicated that ‘enough information is out 
there for people who are new to the issues to be able to campaign on it’. In terms of 
non-involved NGOs, all of the respondents claimed that they had obtained reasonable 
knowledge on GE. For example, the interviewee from TearFund admitted that he was 
familiar with some aspects of GE and had reasonable knowledge on it. 
 
From the empirical results, it is appropriate to conclude that the element of deficit in 
information and knowledge does not contribute to the non-involvement of NGOs in the 
UK. When it comes to explain involvement, it does not help either, as the interviewees 
from involved NGOs did not include it as an attribution. Therefore, the idea of knowledge 
and information does not appear to explain the situation in the UK. 
 
Based on the discussion in this section, several conclusions can be drawn: the element of 
goals is an important factor affecting both types of NGOs in the UK; the idea of funding 
and time can explain both the non-involvement and limited involvement of NGOs with GE; 
information and knowledge cannot be identified as a factor influencing NGOs in the UK, 
as both types of groups have acquired reasonable knowledge; and labour resource cannot 
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be identified as influencing NGOs in the UK either.  
7.5	Conclusion	
According to the analysis in this chapter, a table can be drawn in order to provide a clear 
picture on how variables vary between two types of NGOs in the UK. Applicable variables 
or sub-elements are ticked in Table 7.3 below: 	
Table	7.3:	How	variables	vary	between	two	types	of	NGO	in	the	UK	
	
Context	
Political	opportunity	 Public	consciousness	 Importance	 	 	Deficit	in	policy	Involved	 FoE	 ✔	 	 	 	WWF	 	 	 	 	Greenpeace	 ✔ 	 	 	 	Blue	 &	Green	Tomorrow	
	 	 	 	
ETC	 Group	and	 Biofuel	Watch	
✔ 	 	 	 	
Non-involved	 Practical	Action	 	 ✔ 	 	 	TearFund	 ✔ 	 	 	 	ClientEarth	 ✔ 	 	 ✔ 	 	
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Emotion	
Threat	 	 Blaming	 	 Unwillingness	 to	 access	information	Involved	 FoE	 ✔	 ✔ 	 	WWF	 ✔	 	 	Greenpeace	 ✔	 	 	Blue	 &	Green	Tomorrow	
✔	 	 	
ETC	 Group	and	 Biofuel	Watch	
	 	 	
Non-involved	 Practical	Action	 ✔	 	 	TearFund	 ✔	 	 	ClientEarth	 ✔	 	 				
Strategy	
Insider/outsider	 Mediating	 	 Efficiency	 and	competition	Involved	 FoE	 	 ✔	 ✔	WWF	 	 	 ✔	Greenpeace	 	 ✔	 ✔	Blue	 &	Green	Tomorrow	
	 ✔	 	
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ETC	 Group	and	 Biofuel	Watch	
	 ✔	 	
Non-involved	 Practical	Action	 	 ✔	 ✔	TearFund	 	 ✔	 	ClientEarth	 	 ✔	 ✔			 Resource	Goal	 Funding	and	time	 Information	and	knowledge	
Labour	resource	
Involved	 FoE	 	 	 ✔	 	 	WWF	 ✔	 ✔	 	 	Greenpeace	 ✔	 ✔	 	 	Blue	 &	Green	Tomorrow	
✔	 	 	 	
ETC	 Group	and	 Biofuel	Watch	
✔	 ✔	 	 	
Non-involved	 Practical	Action	 ✔	 ✔	 	 	TearFund	 ✔	 ✔	 	 	ClientEarth	 	 ✔	 	 			
As can be concluded from the table above, these variables and elements can be classified 
in three types: variables affecting both types of NGOs, variables influencing only one type 
of NGO, and variables not applicable in the context of the UK.  
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Variables or elements of political opportunity, threat and blaming, mediating, efficiency 
and competition, funding and time, and goal appear to explain both types of NGOs. 
However, some of the variables need clarification when understanding both types of NGO. 
Political opportunity, especially contingent or non-structural factors, contributes to 
explaining both types of NGOs. The Paris Agreement, as an important contingent event, 
influences both involvement and non-involvement of NGOs due to their different 
understandings of the 1.5-degree target in the agreement. The idea of policy preference, 
also as a contingent factor, only explains non-involvement. In terms of threat, this was 
mentioned by almost all the respondents. However, the power of the negative or collective 
bads only contributes to explaining why NGOs engage, while technological fear can only 
help to understand why NGOs do not engage. In addition, sense of urgency contributes 
merely to non-involvement. In terms of efficiency and competition, efficiency contributes 
to non-involvement as well as limited involvement of NGOs in the UK; and competition 
contributes to the explanations of both involvement and, for non-involvement, why they 
noticed and followed the topic in the first place. In addition, funding, time and goals are 
the most frequently mentioned elements applying to both types of NGOs. 
 
There are variables contributing to only one type of NGO: public consciousness and 
importance are merely effective in explaining the non-involvement of NGOs in the UK. In 
addition, there are variables not evidently influencing the involvement or non-involvement 
of NGOs in the UK: the deficit in policy, unwillingness to access information, 
insider/outsider strategy, information and knowledge on GE, and labour resource.  
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Therefore, we can identify an interesting finding that, as the element of deficit in 
knowledge and information is not applicable in the context of the UK, both types of NGOs 
are making strategic decisions on involvement or non-involvement, rather than acting 
unintentionally, with these decisions based on concerns about strategic related factors, such 
as efficiency, threat and mediating. Apart from this main finding in this chapter, there are 
some interesting sub-findings: first, the proportion of resource and goals are the most 
frequently mentioned variables, which implies that they can be considered as the main 
factors affecting NGOs in the UK. Second, although some NGOs are involved in GE, they 
prefer to have limited engagement due to the distraction from mitigation and adaptation. 
Third, although some variables affect both types of NGO, the reasons for their involvement 
and non-involvement are slightly different within the variables. For example, the element 
of mediating is identified in both types of NGOs. However, according to the discussion in 
previous paragraphs, the two directions of mediating – stopping the government from 
disseminating information and preventing the public from accepting information – lead to 
different decisions on whether to engage or not. Therefore, in terms of this kind of variable, 
we cannot simply conclude that they work identically in both types of NGOs. 
 
In this chapter, empirical results in the UK have been examined with variables to form a 
conclusion that involvement and non-involvement of NGOs in the UK can be considered 
as intentional and deliberate outcomes. This is different compared to the conclusion on 
Chinese NGOs in chapter 6 in that only INGOs in China made strategic decisions on 
non-involvement and domestic Chinese NGOs did not engage unintentionally. In addition, 
due to differences between the context of China and the UK, the effects of variables on 
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NGOs concerning GE vary significantly in the two countries. The comparison and 
contrasts of variables in the UK and China will be analysed further in chapter 8. 	
Table	7.4:	Aims	of	interviewed	NGOs	NGO	 Aims	and	scope	FoE	 Campaign	 group	 on	 various	 topics	 in	environment	 area,	 such	 as	 climate	change,	environmental	justice.	WWF	 Aiming	 at	 ensuring	 the	 harmony	between	human	beings	and	nature.	Greenpeace	 Campaign	 group	with	 various	 focuses,	such	 as	 climate	 change,	 oceans	 and	peace.	Blue	&	Green	Tomorrow	 Focusing	on	sustainable	living.	ETC	Group	 Aiming	 at	 monitoring	 power,	 tracking	technology,	 and	 strengthening	diversity.	Biofuel	Watch	 Providing	 information,	 advocacy	 and	campaigning	 with	 regard	 to	 the	climate,	 environment,	 human	 rights,	and	public	health.	 	Practical	Action	 Aiming	at	using	sustainable	technology	to	challenge	poverty.	TearFund	 A	 Christian	 charity	 dealing	 with	reducing	poverty.	ClientEarth	 Lawyers	 using	 environmental	 law	 to	protect	 oceans,	 forests,	 other	 habitats	and	people.	
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Chapter	8	Comparison	between	the	UK	and	
China	
	
This chapter addresses a comparative analysis of the empirical data in the UK and China. It 
aims to explore and identify more findings contributing to the existing literature on social 
movements and public participation through comparison. To be more precise, this chapter 
focuses on several questions: which variable or variables are the most relevant to NGO 
participation in each country and why? Which variable or variables are responsible for 
NGO participation in both capitalist (UK) and post-socialist (China) countries? In terms of 
similarities and differences of variables in each country, is there a pattern? From these 
questions, it can be identified that transnational comparison can contribute to social 
movement theory by generalizing theories to other societies. Social movement theory was 
established in the US and then spread to Europe and the main body of studies in this area 
have been limited to Western or developed countries. Transnational comparison including 
a developing country like China will help to develop the theory in terms of its application 
in state socialist countries. 
 
Before comparing variables and empirical data, it is necessary to justify the comparison 
between the UK and China. This is because these two countries are very different in 
various aspects: not only in their social ideology in that China is a socialist and developing 
country while the UK is a capitalist and developed country, but also in areas such as social 
	 263	
movements context and development of civil society. That is to say, it seems that China 
and the UK are different to a large extent and thus, incomparable. However, I argue that it 
is possible and meaningful to compare these two countries under the scope of social 
movement theory. I will make justifications on comparison on two levels: in a broad sense, 
thanks to contentious politics theory, it is feasible to analyse social movements in capitalist 
and socialist countries in the same frame;564 in a narrow sense, political opportunity theory 
in the social movements literature can and has been applied to both capitalist and socialist 
countries, and has been proved to share the same set of core variables, notably 
sub-variables of political opportunity, between them.565 Based on the core argument that 
‘it is political opportunity structure which is responsible for the emergence and effects of 
social movements in different societies’,566 my research aims to examine this and then add 
to it that not only political opportunity structure, but also other variables can help to 
explain the emergence of social movements in different societies, which will be analysed 
in detail later in this chapter. Before continuing to discuss this, a significant link needs to 
be made between emergence of social movements on GE and engagement of NGOs in GE. 
In terms of research on ‘movements’, a question that draws attention is that ‘what exactly 
are social movements’, namely are they ‘a kind of public opinion in favour of change? Or 
networks of individuals and organisations? A collective identity? A series of public events 
and statements?’567 According to Jasper, in a social movement, there are a range of players 
including formal organisations, informal groups, networks of individuals and organisations, 
																																																								564	 See	the	previous	studies,	for	example,	Xie	(n	48).	565	 Xie	and	Van	Der	Heijden	(n	49).	566	 Ibid.	567	 James	Jasper,	‘Players	and	Arenas	Formerly	Known	as	the	State’	in	James	Jasper	and	Jan	Duyvendak	(eds),	
Breaking	Down	the	State:	Protesters	Engaged	(Amsterdam:	Amsterdam	University	Press	2015).	
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campaigns bringing informal and formal players together.568 Engagement of NGOs, as 
formal organisations with resource and internal rules, is an essential component of social 
movements. Efforts by NGOs to oppose GE can be considered as triggering social 
movements on it.569 Therefore, in this research, ‘emergence of social movements on GE’ is 
treated identical to involvement of NGOs/SMOs in GE. 
 
Contentious politics is considered as a broad concept including elements such as social 
movements and civil wars.570 It is defined in the literature as ‘consisting of public, 
collective making of consequential claims by connected clusters of persons on other 
clusters of persons or on major political actors, when as least one government is a claimant, 
an object of claims, or a third party to the claims’.571 Therefore, social movement theory is 
only one part of contentious politics, but has attracted the most study in the area. Among 
studies in contentious politics, scholars have explored an integrated approach to break up 
all the boundaries of contention – disciplinary, historical, geographic, and different forms 
of contention – and ‘try to use the same concept and method to analyse the inner logic of 
these collective actions’.572 One attempt at an integrated approach is to examine whether 
concepts developed in ‘one part of the world – generally in advanced industrial 
democracies – apply under other scope conditions’.573 Another attempt is to break up the 
boundaries of geographic areas of contentious politics study and extend them into 
																																																								568	 Ibid.	569	 Halpin	(n	50).	570	 Doug	McAdam,	Sidney	Tarrow	and	Charles	Tilly,	‘Comparative	Perspectives	on	Contentious	Politics’	in	Mark	Lichbach	and	Alan	Zuckerman	(eds),	Comparative	Politics:	Rationality,	Culture,	and	Structure:	Advancing	Theory	in	
Comparative	Politics	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2007).	571	 Ibid.	572	 Xie	(n	48).	573	 McAdam,	Tarrow	and	Tilly	(n	571).	
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transnational scope.574 Therefore, with regard to the social movements theory developed in 
the Western countries,575 it is meaningful to conduct research across the UK and China to 
shed light on the application of social movement theory in different societies. It adds to the 
efforts to break up the boundaries of the study of contentious politics that are generally 
limited to Western countries. 
 
In a narrow sense, political opportunity structure, as defined in the literature as one of the 
factors giving rise to contentious politics, is responsible for the emergence of social 
movements in both capitalist and socialist countries.576 As different political conditions in 
different countries are considered as decisive variables in explaining social movements, 
political opportunity structure ‘has developed into a powerful analytical tool in 
transnational comparative political science’. 577  One question arising from political 
opportunity structure research is whether it is a ‘universal concept, applicable to both 
capitalist and socialist countries’.578 The main body of research in this area has been 
conducted merely among Western countries.579 Recently, however, there have been studies 
addressing the issue across capitalist nations (e.g. US) and socialist countries (e.g. 
China). 580  However, comparison between the UK and China concerning political 
opportunity structure theory is still a gap in research. In addition, research conducted by 
Pickvance proves that political opportunity theory is universal and applicable to socialist 
																																																								574	 Ibid.	575	 Ibid.	576	 Xie	and	Van	Der	Heijden	(n	49).	577	 Ibid.	578	 Ibid.	579	 Ibid.	580	 See	for	example,	Kevin	O'Brien	and	Lianjiang	Li,	Rightful	Resistance	in	Rural	China	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press	2006);	Xie	(n	48).	
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countries as well.581 My comparative analysis, therefore, not only seeks to bridge the gap 
by comparing the UK and China – a comparison which has attracted little attention in 
political opportunity theory, but also expects to identify other variables, other than political 
opportunity structure, affecting social movements in both capitalist and socialist countries 
under the scope of contentious politics. 
 
However, it is necessary to acknowledge that the comparative method on the UK and 
China has limitations. As defined in the relevant literature, a fundamental problem of 
comparative method ‘concerns the choice of the units being compared’.582 In terms of my 
comparative analysis, only two countries – the UK and China – have been chosen as 
objects. Although the two countries are typical examples of capitalist and socialist 
countries, the findings cannot be generalised to all the other nations as each case may have 
different situations. Another problem facing the comparative method concerns 
overwhelming variables.583 This research has established four sets of variables including 
many sub-elements and therefore may render the problem of handling all the variables 
more difficult to solve. However, a solution to this problem is focusing on the key 
variables.584 In terms of my study, I will concentrate on those more predominant variables 
in each country in order to minimize the limitation. The comparative analysis will be 
classified into four parts as in the following sections: context, emotion, strategy, and 
resource. According to the Tables 6.1 and 7.3 summarizing discussion on China and the 
																																																								581	 Pickvance	Chris,	Local	Environmental	Regulation	in	Post-Socialism:	A	Hungrarian	Case	Study	(Aldershot:	Ashgate	Publishing	Limited	2003).	582	 Reza	Azarian,	‘Potentials	and	Limitations	of	Comparative	Method	in	Social	Science’	(2011)	1	International	Journal	of	Humanities	and	Social	Science	113.	583	 Lijphart	(n	274).	584	 Ibid.	
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UK results respectively, the focus in each part of analysis will be on key variables 
identified in the tables. 	
8.1	Context	
Contextual factors, as identified in chapter 5, comprise sub-elements of political 
opportunity, public consciousness, salience, and deficit in policy. Comparing the two 
Tables 6.1 and 7.3, political opportunity is the only variable that plays an important role in 
involvement of social movement organisations with GE policy in both countries, which 
will be the main focus of analysis in this section. As political opportunity structure has 
been identified in the literature as responsible for social movements in both capitalist and 
socialist countries, the comparative analysis in this section also aims to test whether this 
conclusion holds true for the UK and China in the context of GE. The other variables are 
responsible for the involvement of social movement organisations merely in the UK or in 
China, and will also be analysed to explore the differences between the two countries. 	
8.1.1 Political opportunity 
In the existing literature on contentious politics, scholars often employ the concept of 
‘political opportunity structure’ when conducting transnational comparative studies. This is 
because different political conditions in different countries are considered as decisive 
variables in explaining social movements in transnational comparative studies.585 Two key 
contributions to the theory have been defined as a ‘strong approach’ by Saunders: one 																																																								585	 Xie	and	Van	Der	Heijden	(n	49).	
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approach, proposed by Kitschelt, includes ‘input structures and output structures’ as 
measurements of the openness of a polity; the other approach, proposed by Kriesi, 
comprises formal institutional structure and informal elite strategies. 586  The two 
approaches overlap to some extent and both are labeled as ‘structural’.587 However, few of 
these variables are truly structural in nature as defined by Rootes.588 The two approaches 
are also criticised by Saunders to ‘have cherry-picked variables that suited what they 
wanted to say and finally reach different conclusions about which states are open or 
closed’.589 Therefore, as discussed in chapter 5, the terminology of ‘political opportunity’, 
rather than ‘political opportunity structure’, is more precise to include not only structural 
factors of a polity but also contingent and non-structural factors. Additionally, in order to 
propose a synthesized approach, Saunders has made efforts to establish a set of indicators 
of openness with a classification of structure and contingency: structural factors include 
the degree of centralisation and configuration of power;590 contingent indicators comprise 
political culture, policymaking capacity, elite divisions, electoral stability, tolerance of 
protest, and alliances.591 However, the two strong approaches are only developed in 
Western countries; and the synthesized approach has not been tested in developing or 
socialist countries in the literature, although it is claimed to be applicable broadly across 
countries. Therefore, my comparative study can help to examine the approach in a socialist 
and developing country like China. 
 																																																								586	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(295).	587	 Ibid.	588	 Rootes,	‘Political	Opportunity	Structures,	Promise,	Problems	and	Prospects’	(n	52).	589	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	590	 The	two	extremes	of	configuration	of	power	refer	to	proportional	representation	in	an	idealized	open	polity	and	totalitarian	in	an	idealized	closed	polity.	See	ibid.	591	 Ibid.	
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Thus, as we have seen, in the existing transnational comparative studies, political 
opportunity structure is concluded to be applicable in capitalist and socialist countries. 
However, structural factors alone have been criticised by scholars, such as Saunders and 
Rootes, as discussed above. I will first examine whether structural factors alone – the 
degree of centralisation and configuration of power – can help to explain the involvement 
of NGOs in GE in the UK and China. In terms of degree of centralisation, an idealized 
open polity is decentralized and has a proportional representation while an idealized closed 
state is centralised with totalitarian rule.592 The term ‘idealized’ adopted by Saunders can 
be illustrated as an open or closed state at the extreme. In terms of China, it used to be a 
highly centralised state.593 In the transition time period from ‘a planned to a market 
economy’, highly centralised power has weakened as local governments have their own tax 
revenues and many state-controlled public goods have been devolved to them.594 The UK 
has historically been generally considered as one of the most centralised countries in the 
Western world.595 The devolution drive in recent years has changed this so that power is 
now much more decentralized than in the past.596 However, the UK is still regarded as a 
highly centralised developed country.597 It seems that both the UK and China are deemed 
to be centralised although they differ in many fundamental aspects, such as capitalism or 
socialism, and developed or developing. From this perspective, China and the UK can be 
considered as centralised and thus closed to some extent. In terms of the policy area of GE 
and the involvements of NGOs in them, they differ significantly between the two countries. 																																																								592	 Ibid.	593	 Xie	and	Van	Der	Heijden	(n	49).	594	 Ibid.	595	 Department	for	Communities	and	Local	Government,	Decentralisation	-	An	Assessment	of	Progress	(ISBN	9781409834687,	2012).	596	 Ibid.	597	 See	for	example,	Winnie	Agbonlahor,	‘UK	'Almost	Most	Centralised	Developed	Country',	Says	Treasury	Chief’	
Global	Government	Forum	(London).	
	270	
The situation in the UK can be described as some NGOs having engaged while some have 
not; in China no NGOs are involved. It can be seen that the degree of centralisation cannot 
help to explain the difference between the involvement or non-involvement of NGOs in the 
UK and China, as both of them are highly centralised countries and yet involvement in GE 
differs.  
 
Regarding configuration of power, Saunders has described an idealized open polity as 
‘proportional representation’ and an idealized closed polity as ‘totalitarian’.598 This is 
related to the electoral systems. The electoral system in the UK is, predominantly, a 
first-past-the-post system.599 This is considered as relatively closed.600 In China, elections 
are not based on popular vote; rather they take place within the framework of single-party 
rule.601 The system is considered as centralised and thus closed by scholars and citizens 
cannot ‘access the local People’s Congress or higher level legislative bodies’.602 This is 
because although citizens are ‘entitled to express opinions through the legislative bodies of 
the People’s Congress system and elect members to the Congress, the ruling Communist 
Party committee plays a decisive role in the selection of candidates’.603 In addition, 
deputies of the national and local Congress are selected by the authorities.604 As discussed 
above, the electoral systems in the UK and China can both be categorized as closed. Given 
the fact that the involvement of NGOs in GE in these two countries differ greatly, 
																																																								598	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	599	 First-past-the-post	is	employed	to	‘elect	MPs	to	the	House	of	Commons	and	for	local	elections	in	England	and	Wales’.	See	The	UK	Parliament,	‘Voting	Systems	In	The	UK’	 	 	<http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/voting-systems/>	.	600	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	601	 Xie	and	Van	Der	Heijden	(n	49).	602	 Ibid.	603	 Ibid.	604	 Ibid.	
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differences of structural factors alone – both degree of centralisation and configuration of 
power – in political opportunity cannot help much to understand the different situations. 
Therefore, the traditional strong approach of employing political opportunity structure to 
understand social movements in both capitalist and socialist countries, as the main body of 
the existing literature does, cannot contribute to the comparison between the cases of the 
UK and China, at least in the context of GE. 
 
After identifying the failure of structural factors to explain the cases of GE in the UK and 
China, I will now turn to examine contingent and non-structural factors. As discussed in 
chapters 6 and 7, contingent factors are important in understanding the involvement of 
NGOs with GE in the UK and China respectively. In the UK, as analysed in chapter 6, 
government policy in calling for more research and regulatory frameworks on GE led to a 
rise in anti-GE campaigns in 2009.605 The second peak of campaigns on GE was around 
2013 when the government issued another policy report concerning GE research.606 The 
active time of movements on GE in the UK are, it seems, triggered by government policy 
and reports on it, which implies that policymaking is an important factor in understanding 
the involvement of social movements organisations with GE. This raises an issue 
concerning the contingent factors identified by Saunders – policymaking capacity. In her 
framework of measuring the openness of a polity, an idealized open polity has strong 
policymaking capacity while an idealized closed polity enjoys weak policymaking 
capacity.607 However, this contingent factor – policymaking capacity – does not accurately 
																																																								605	 Abate	and	others	(n	502).	606	 Change	(n	504).	607	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	
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explain the situation concerning GE. This is because, the UK may be identified as having a 
strong policymaking capacity, given the government’s active reactions to a policy area; 
however, it does not necessarily mean policymaking capacity is weak if there are no 
reactions to the area. Therefore, it is the existence of policy or policymaking, rather than 
policymaking capacity, which contributes to the explanations for the involvement of social 
movement organisations. In the UK, the government has reacted actively to GE research 
and this resulted in several policies and reports on it. In comparison, the policymaking on 
GE in China is relatively weak because, as pointed out by the respondent from Greenpeace 
China, GE is still a topic located predominantly among the scientific community and it has 
not really been considered at a political level. In addition, the respondent effectively 
claimed that as there was no policy on GE in place, it was not the proper time to engage in 
it. It suggests that policymaking contributes to understanding the non-involvement of 
NGOs in China. Therefore, in a comparative perspective, relatively strong policymaking in 
the UK and relatively weak policymaking in China can help to explain the difference in the 
emergence of movements on GE. 
 
Another important contingent factor to explain the difference between the UK and China 
concerns the political preference of government. In the UK, as discussed in chapter 6, there 
was quite intense discussion on GE from 2009 up to a few years ago, but not as much 
recently. This is because, as explained by the respondent from Greenpeace UK, the 
government is still focusing on dealing with the issue of fossil fuels, where they can have 
biggest impacts on the environment. The evidence of political preference by the UK 
government can be found in the report that ‘the priority is, and must be, to tackle the root 
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cause by reducing emissions of greenhouse gases from human activities and adapting to 
those impacts that are unavoidable’.608 This implies that their focus or preference is 
mitigation. In addition, the non-involved NGOs in the UK include political preference of 
government as one of the reasons why they do not engage. For example, the respondent 
from ClientEarth highlighted that ‘it depends on the government whether GE is going to be 
a solution they want to pursue, then it would draw attention from NGOs’. From the 
responses, it can be concluded that tolerance of protests, especially political preference, is 
an important indicator when understanding the non-involved NGOs in the UK. In China, 
the idea of political preference of government also helps to explain the non-involvement of 
the interviewed INGO. As mentioned in chapter 7, the respondent indicated that it was 
crucial to understand the overall political environment in China and what are the big 
themes across the environment generally on which the government is trying to focus. This 
suggests the importance of understanding the government’s political preference when 
becoming involved. Looking in comparative terms, this indicator can be applied to both 
non-involved NGOs in the UK and INGOs in China. 
 
In conclusion, structural factors cannot be applied in comparative study between the UK 
and China in the context of GE. This is not consistent with the majority of conclusions in 
the existing literature on comparative studies of political opportunity structure that political 
opportunity structure can be applied to explain the emergence of social movements in 
capitalist and socialist countries. Instead, in accordance with the theory of Saunders and 
Rootes, contingent factors appear to play a predominant role in transnational comparative 																																																								608	 Change	(n	504).	
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studies between the UK and China on social movements. To be more precise, 
policymaking and the political preference of governments are the two main contingent 
indicators that are responsible for the emergence of movements concerning GE in the UK 
and China. Policymaking and political preference may lead to different directions 
concerning involvement or non-involvement with GE, as policymaking may result in 
triggering or facilitating involvement of social movement organisations while preference 
of government elsewhere may lead to non-involvement with GE. In the UK, there is policy 
on GE, which seems to trigger involvement of NGOs with GE, while in the long term the 
political focus of government lies elsewhere (i.e. mitigation) and NGOs agree that it should 
be like this, which leads to non-involvement in that NGOs do not want to divert the public 
attention away from mitigation. In China, both lack of policy outputs and preference of 
government elsewhere lead to non-involvement of NGOs with GE, which helps to explain 
the situation that no NGOs become involved in it. In this respect, this section has examined 
a synthesized approach combining structural and non-structural elements, which can be 
applied in a socialist and developing country like China. 	
8.1.2 Other Variables 
The other three variables concerning contextual factors are public consciousness, salience, 
and deficit in policy. They have different levels of impacts in the two countries. Public 
consciousness is an important element affecting the non-involvement of NGOs in China 
while it is not considered as important concerning the situation in the UK. In China, public 
consciousness on GE is generally low across the whole country, as the public does not 
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have knowledge on it, and nor are they apparently concerned about it. NGOs would not 
receive a positive response from the public if they were to act on it and therefore they have 
no interest in doing so. In contrast, public consciousness on GE in the UK has been 
investigated and proved to be higher than expected.609 In addition, it can be identified from 
relevant surveys that ‘the increase in available media and increase in assessed familiarity 
from past studies suggest a growing public interest in GE’.610 However, a high level of 
public consciousness is not considered as the reason why NGOs engage with GE in the UK 
according to the interview data. Nevertheless, a concern about public consciousness in the 
UK was mentioned by one of the respondents from non-involved NGOs as the reason to 
explain their non-engagement. They worry that some methods of GE might in theory look 
like a solution to climate change, and because of this, the public would be less worried 
about climate problems. This suggests a concern about the public’s misunderstanding of 
GE in terms of what it can really deliver. This is slightly different from public 
consciousness used elsewhere in the thesis in that it emphasises possible negative effects of 
public consciousness here. Apparently, although only one NGO considered the element of 
public consciousness, it contributes to the non-involvement of NGOs in the UK to a lesser 
extent compared with China. However, the idea of public consciousness in the two 
countries differs greatly in that the public in the UK might have the possibility of 
misunderstanding GE while the public in China does not know about it at all. It is also 
important to mention that, as groups within one country face the same level of public 
consciousness, this cannot explain both involvement and non-involvement in that country; 
rather, it works when comparing groups across different countries, such as the UK and 																																																								609	 Mercer,	Keith	and	Sharp	(n	511).	610	 Ibid.	
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China. 
 
The variable of salience concerning public opinions, according to Tables 6.1 and 7.3, is not 
identified as a key element affecting the situations in both countries.611 The idea of deficit 
in policy does not affect the involvement or non-involvement in the UK while it affects the 
non-involvement of the interviewed INGO in China.612 This is reasonable and can be 
understood along with policymaking capacity in political opportunity in that the UK 
government has engaged in relatively strong policymaking on GE while the Chinese 
government is considered to be weak on it.  
 
In conclusion, among those contextual factors, political opportunity, especially contingent 
factors, can be applied to understand the movements both in the UK and China in the 
context of GE. The same cannot be said of other variables, such as deficit in policy. 
Therefore, in this section, the comparative analysis helps to prove that structural factors 
alone cannot be applied in transnational comparative studies and contingent factors play a 
predominant role. Furthermore, it adds to the literature, from an empirical perspective, in 
finding that policymaking and political preference of government are the main elements 
when comparing GE-related movements in the UK and China. In addition, it is important 
to specify that contingent factors only work in relation to the INGO in China and all UK 
NGOs. According to the conclusions in chapters 6 and 7 on whether NGOs make strategic 
choices on GE or it is an unintentional outcome, a further conclusion can be drawn that, 																																																								611	 As	mentioned	in	Chapter	6,	salience	is	an	important	concept	in	much	of	the	existing	literature	on	political	science,	which	originally	comes	from	research	on	voting	behaviors	aiming	at	exploring	the	various	levels	of	importance	of	issues	attached	by	voters.	 	612	 The	deficit	in	policy	on	GE	means,	as	mentioned	in	Chapter	6,	there	is	no	dedicated	policy	on	GE	activities	or	the	topic	of	GE	has	not	been	considered	at	a	policymaking	level.	
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although contingent factors can be applied to both countries, they are only responsible for 
the intentional involvement and non-involvement of NGOs with GE. 	
8.2	Emotion	 	
Emotion-related factors, as defined in chapter 5, comprise the variables of threat, blaming, 
and unwillingness to access information. By comparing Tables 6.1 and 7.3, it is reasonable 
to identify that the variable of threat is a key emotion-related variable for the intentional 
involvement and non-involvement in both countries.613 This will be illustrated in further 
detail in section 8.2.1. Other variables, including blaming, and unwillingness to access 
information, will also be analysed briefly concerning the differences between the UK and 
China. 	
8.2.1 Threat 
As discussed in chapter 6, threat is necessary for generating strategic actions and is 
considered to provide ‘ideas, ideologies, identities and interests to motive’.614 It is a type 
of negative emotion to trigger social movements including a diverse range of elements, 
including resignation as a reaction to threat, sense of urgency as the reason for threat, and 
technological fear as one particular type of threat. In this section, each of the three 
elements will be analysed from a comparative perspective between the UK and China. 
Conclusions on differences between the two countries will then be drawn in Table 8.1 at 																																																								613	 Intentional	involvement	and	non-involvement	refer	to	NGOs	that	make	strategic	choices	on	their	engagement	or	non-engagement.	614	 Jasper,	The	Art	of	Moral	Protest:	Culture,	Biography	and	Creativity	in	Social	Movements	(n	331).	
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the end of this section. 
 
The sense of urgency is the key element identified as responsible for the involvement or 
non-involvement of NGOs both in the UK and China. As mentioned in chapter 7, urgency 
suggests that situations could become worse if we do not respond or take action now.615 In 
the UK, the idea of lack of urgency was mentioned by all interviewed NGOs concerning 
GE. The concept of ‘urgency’ needs to be defined as it can be illustrated as two-fold: some 
may consider GE not urgent because it is not a tipping point for us to carry out GE, which 
means there are still other options such as mitigation; others could argue that GE, as a 
policy area, requires a governance framework. The term ‘urgency’ identified in the 
interview responses refers to the former. However, it is important to point out that, as 
discussed in chapter 7, the variable of urgency only helps to explain non-involvement of 
NGOs in the UK.616 In China, lack of urgency has also been employed as one of the 
reasons for non-involvement with GE. However, this element is applicable solely to the 
interviewed INGO in China as only the respondents from Greenpeace China claimed that 
‘as the impacts of GE are not certain and clear as well as the fact that it is not recognized in 
daily life, it is still early to pay attention to GE and there are much more pressing and 
urgent concerns we need to cope with’. From a comparative perspective, one could argue 
that the sense of urgency is applicable for explaining the non-involvement of NGOs in the 
UK and the non-involvement of INGOs in China. According to the conclusions drawn in 
chapters 6 and 7, INGOs in China deliberately do not engage in GE while domestic 																																																								615	 Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World	(n	52).	616	 As	mentioned	in	chapter	7,	although	both	types	of	NGOs	have	mentioned	the	variable	of	urgency,	they	illustrate	it	in	divergent	ways:	NGOs	not	involved	in	GE	partly	attribute	their	non-engagement	to	lack	of	urgency;	while	involved	ones	have	participated	despite	admitting	that	there	was	a	lack	of	urgency	concerning	GE.	Therefore	the	variable	of	urgency	appears	to	explain	the	non-involvement	but	it	does	not	explain	involvement.	
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Chinese NGOs unconsciously stay clear of it, and all the UK NGOs make strategic choices 
on their involvement or non-involvement with it. Therefore, a further conclusion across the 
boundaries of the UK and China can be identified in that the element of urgency 
contributes only to the intentional non-involvement of NGOs in the context of GE. 
 
Technological fear means people tend to oppose new technologies and generate bias 
against them as people are concerned about destroying the status quo even though there 
may be little chance of this happening.617 In the UK, the idea of technological fear is 
applicable to the non-involvement of NGOs, as the respondents effectively include this to 
express their concerns about the uncertainties and side effects of GE. In relation to the 
empirical results in China, technological fear related responses couldn’t be identified. This 
is understandable because the general public does not have a reasonable level of 
knowledge on GE, which suggests technological fear resulted from misusing scientific 
information cannot really exist. Due to different levels of understandings on GE in the UK 
and China, the element of technological fear only helps to explain the non-involvement of 
NGOs in the context of the UK. Resignation, as discussed in chapter 7, this refers to the 
situation where people are pessimistic about the status quo and prefer to accept it rather 
than act for change.618 It happens when people are disappointed with bureaucracies and 
therefore believe that it makes no difference whether they participate or not as outcomes 
would not change anyway. This provides a consideration that NGOs may be disappointed 
with bureaucracies and thus reluctant to become involved in GE. However, the idea of 
resignation has not been identified as a reason for the involvement or non-involvement by 																																																								617	 Jasper,	The	Art	of	Moral	Protest:	Culture,	Biography	and	Creativity	in	Social	Movements	(n	331).	618	 Jasper,	Getting	Your	Way:	Strategic	Dilemmas	in	the	Real	World	(n	52).	
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NGOs in both countries. Therefore, it is not applicable to the emergence of movements on 
GE in either country. According to the discussion in chapter 7, it is applicable when 
explaining the non-involvement and limited involvement of NGOs in the UK. However, 
this element does not help to explain involvement or non-involvement of NGOs in China.  
 
Therefore, from the comparison above, it can be identified that the sense of urgency is the 
only key variable responsible for involvement or non-involvement with GE in both 
countries. More precisely, it is applicable to the intentional non-involvement of NGOs in 
the two countries. Other elements of the threat variable are only valid in either China or the 
UK and therefore, cannot be treated as effective for comparison. This conclusion can be 
shown as Table 8.1 below: 	
Table	8.1:	How	elements	of	threat	vary	between	UK	and	Chinese	NGOs		 UK	 China	Urgency	 	 Applicable	 for	 the	non-involved	NGOs	 Applicable	 for	 the	non-involvement	of	INGO	Technological	fear	 Applicable	 for	 the	non-involved	NGOs	 Not	applicable	Resignation	 	 Not	applicable	 	 Not	applicable	 			
8.2.2 Other Variables 
In this section, the variables of blaming and unwillingness to access information will be 
analysed in a comparative way between the UK and China. The variable of blaming can be 
illustrated with the literature on naming, blaming, and claiming. As discussed in chapter 6, 
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naming, blaming, and claiming stand for the stages of identifying an injurious experience, 
the perceived injurious experience being transformed into grievance, and grievance being 
voiced to the person responsible and asking for a remedy.619 Naming, the first stage of 
identifying an injurious experience, may be regarded as providing an explanation for the 
non-involvement of the interviewed INGO in China due to lack of ability to identify harms, 
which has been discussed in chapter 6. In terms of blaming, it is only applicable in 
explaining the involvement of NGOs in the UK and is not considered as a main variable by 
the respondents. According to the empirical data, the respondent from FoE indicated that 
‘the second reason why we engage in GE is we are trying to stop the political and scientific 
community from giving the message that we don’t need to bother with mitigation’. This 
implies that the respondent blamed the political and scientific community for 
disseminating the wrong message, which leads FoE to become involved in GE. Similarly, 
according to the analysis in chapter 7, centrality620 can also be used to explain the 
non-involvement of NGOs in the UK. Integrated with the conclusion that INGOs in China 
and all the UK NGOs make strategic decisions on their involvement or non-involvement, it 
thus can be identified that centrality, although it is not a key element identified in the 
empirical data, is partly responsible for the intentional non-involvement of NGOs both in 
the UK and China. 
 
With regard to the variable of unwillingness to access information, this is only identified in 
relation to Chinese NGOs, which results in their lack of knowledge on GE. Furthermore, it 
																																																								619	 Felstiner,	Abel	and	Sarat	(n	455).	620	 As	mentioned	in	section	6.2.2,	it	refers	to	‘if the values the movement seeks to promote are of low hierarchical 
salience, the mobilizing potential is weakened considerably’; see Snow and Benford (n 458).	
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is merely applicable to small grassroots NGOs in China to understand their 
non-engagement with GE. It is closely related to the problems of information deficit and 
limited capability of elites, which is an objective limitation in Chinese NGOs, and is thus 
considered as an unconscious option.  
 
In conclusion, among the emotion-related factors, threat is identified as a key variable 
applicable to both countries. Within the variable, the sense of urgency is responsible for 
the intentional non-involvement of NGOs with GE in the UK and China. This adds to the 
existing literature on transnational comparative studies on contentious politics in that not 
only political opportunity but also threat, at least in the context of GE, can be useful in 
understanding social movements in both capitalist and socialist countries such as the UK 
and China. 
 	
8.3	Strategy	
As is defined in chapter 5, strategic factors include variables of insider/outsider strategies, 
mediating, efficiency and competition. In the literature on interest groups, strategy includes 
insider/outsider strategies that groups employ. ‘Strategy’ mentioned in this section refers to 
broad strategic factors including not only insider/outsider strategies, but also other 
variables, such as mediating, efficiency and competition. This is because the variables of 
efficiency and competition affecting involvement or non-involvement suggest strategic 
choices or decisions rather than unintentional outcomes. Among the variables, efficiency 
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and competition are identified as key variables responsible for the movements on GE in 
both countries, which will be discussed in detail in the following sections. In terms of 
insider/outsider strategies and mediating, although these two variables are identified as 
important in one country, namely insider/outsider strategies in China and mediating in the 
UK, they are found to play a predominant role respectively in determining the involvement 
or non-involvement of NGOs in that country. Therefore, these two variables will also be 
the focus of my discussion in this section. 
 
8.3.1 Insider/outsider strategy 
In the existing literature on social movements and contentious politics, the approaches of 
using political opportunity structure and that including contingent factors have been 
examined in transnational comparative studies. Some scholars researching in Western 
Europe, following criticism of these approaches, argue that ‘local level factors based on 
ideologies and strategies are more influential in determining movements within countries 
than macro-political opportunity factors are at explaining variation between countries’.621 
Furthermore, more recently, scholars, such as Saunders and Rootes have proposed that 
‘when comparing environmental organisations within as well as across countries, it seems 
to make more sense to consider political opportunities based on strategies and status rather 
than on structures or other properties of a polity’.622 My comparative analysis in this 
section aims to examine this theory or approach in two ways: first, to see whether the 
approach of focusing on organisational strategy and status is applicable in the context of 																																																								621	 Saunders,	Environmental	Networks	and	Social	Movement	Theory	(n	295).	622	 Ibid.	
	284	
GE; second, as the theory was originally developed in organisations in Western Europe or 
industrialised countries, it is useful to investigate whether it is applicable for organisations 
in a socialist and developing country like China and therefore, to examine whether it holds 
true for comparative studies between capitalist and socialist countries. 
 
As discussed in chapter 5, an insider status entails a privileged access to the political and 
administrative process and employs direct actions of close consultation with political 
actors while an outsider strategy involves mobilisation from grassroots networks with 
indirect actions through media or mobilisation of citizens. 623 A distinction between 
strategy and status has been identified in that practising an insider strategy does not 
guarantee an insider status – something that needs to be ascribed by government.624 
Therefore, based on the distinction, a conclusion has been drawn, in chapter 5, that not all 
types of groups have agency on their choice of strategies. To be more precise, outsiders by 
goals do not have real choices on their outsider status because their policy demand and 
goals determine which strategy they employ, while outsiders by choice have real agency in 
adopting an outsider strategy.625 In chapters 6 and 7, a question has been answered in the 
context of the UK and China of ‘whether different choices of strategy adopted by NGOs 
would affect their involvement in GE’. That is to say, if NGOs practise an insider strategy, 
are they more likely to engage in GE or the reverse direction? Or, if NGOs adopt an 
outsider strategy or thresholder strategy, are they more reluctant or unlikely to engage in 
																																																								623	 Binderkrantz,	‘Different	Groups,	Different	Strategies:	How	Interest	Groups	Pursue	Their	Political	Ambitions’	(n	52).	624	 Maloney,	Jordan	and	McLaughlin	(n	359).	625	 Outsider	by	goal	refers	to	a	group	attaining	an	outsider	status	through	its	adoption	of	goals,	which	is	a	‘self-selected’	process.	Outsider	by	choice	have	agency	in	making	decisions	on	its	outsider	status.	
	 285	
GE or actually the reverse?626 In terms of involvement with GE in China, the conclusion 
drawn in chapter 6 is that the adoption of strategy does exert influence on the participation 
of insiders and thresholders rather than outsiders. In addition, the difference of 
involvement between insiders, such as the government-supported NGOs in China, and 
thresholders, such as the INGO, is that the former do not make a strategic choice on it, as 
they do not have agency in adopting an insider strategy, while the latter decide their 
involvement strategically as they have agency to practise an insider/outsider strategy. 
However, surprisingly, according to the analysis in chapter 7, it can only be cautiously 
concluded that insider/outsider strategies partly influence the involvement of NGOs in the 
UK, as there is no uniform pattern on how insider/outsider strategy affects NGOs’ 
involvement with GE that can be identified. This is because the relations between strategy 
and involvement shown in Table 7.1 are not obvious or straightforward enough. This 
further suggests that how insider/outsider strategies influence the involvement of NGOs is 
more complex in the context of GE in the UK.  
 
From the review of discussions in chapters 6 and 7, it can be identified that organisational 
insider/outsider strategy does not exert direct or straightforward influence on the 
involvement or non-involvement of NGOs in the UK, which implies that the approach of 
focusing on strategies and status cannot be simply applied in the case of GE in the UK. In 
contrast in China, organisational strategy and status does influence the non-involvement of 
NGOs with GE, which suggests that this approach, identified in the literature, is applicable 
in a socialist and developing country like China in the context of GE. Therefore, at least in 																																																								626	 Thresholder	strategy	refers	to	an	integrated	strategy	of	outsider	and	insider	strategies.	
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the case of GE, this approach cannot help to explain the transnational comparative study 
between the UK and China, which to some extent challenges what has been identified – the 
approach focusing on strategy and status for transnational comparison– in the existing 
literature and indicates that GE is a more complex case. In conclusion, the variable of 
insider/outsider strategy is merely applicable in China in the context of GE. Integrated with 
the conclusion that the interviewed INGO strategically stays clear of GE (which suggests 
an intentional non-involvement) while domestic Chinese NGOs do not become involved 
unconsciously (which suggests unintentional non-involvement), it can be further concluded 
that this variable is considered responsible for both intentional and unintentional 
non-involvement of NGOs in China. 
8.3.2 Mediating  
The variable of mediating in this section refers to NGOs strategically employing their 
mediating role between government and the public or intentionally ceasing mediating in 
terms of involvement or non-involvement with GE.627 The governance literature suggests 
that it is possible for NGOs to stop mediating and to define public interests themselves.628 
In the context of GE, they stop mediating by staying clear of it rather than shaping the 
debates in order to avoid a distraction of attention on the part of the public. This is a key 
variable for understanding the situation in the UK, as all of the respondents considered it 
responsible for the involvement and non-involvement of NGOs with GE. As discussed in 
chapter 7, both types of NGOs in the UK – involved and non-involved – included 																																																								627	 The	role	of	mediating	has	been	discussed	in	chapter	5.	In	terms	of	fostering	openness	of	participation,	there	are	two	ways	of	having	public	voices	heard:	though	individuals	directly	and	via	representative	NGOs	indirectly.	The	latter	way	of	having	public	voices	heard	suggests	the	role	of	mediating.	628	 Brownsword	and	Goodwin	(n	384).	
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mediating as one of the reasons why they did not engage. This is because, as mentioned in 
chapter 7, stopping mediating can be illustrated as a two-fold process: stopping 
government from disseminating information on GE; and stopping the public from 
receiving information on GE. Some NGOs engage in order to stop government from giving 
messages concerning GE while other NGOs stay clear of it in order to prevent the public 
from accessing information on it. Therefore, mediating is an important and main variable 
in terms of the UK. However, in China, the idea of ceasing mediating cannot be identified 
from the data and therefore, it is not applicable in understanding the non-involvement of 
NGOs with GE. Furthermore, it is not responsible for the involvement and 
non-involvement in both countries and does not work in the transnational comparative 
study at least in the context of GE. This makes sense because, as concluded in chapter 7, 
unlike Chinese NGOs, all of the UK NGOs strategically make decisions on their 
involvement or non-involvement and stopping mediating entails a strategic element. Based 
on this, one could further conclude that the variable of mediating is responsible for 
intentional involvement and non-involvement in the context of UK. 
8.3.3 Efficiency and competition 
The variables of efficiency and competition are identified as key variables that work in 
both countries. As discussed in chapters 6 and 7, they are interrelated due to finite 
resources that NGOs are able to acquire which can lead to divergent outcomes between 
different NGOs concerning involvement and non-involvement: NGOs prefer to allocate 
limited resources to areas where they can effectively make contributions, and thus tend to 
focus on approaches to climate change that already exist, such as mitigation, rather than 
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GE; NGOs can pursue a specialised goal, such as focusing on GE, to claim a particular 
identity when in competition with other NGOs. 
 
In the UK, as discussed in chapter 7, it cannot simply be concluded that efficiency leads to 
non-involvement while competition leads to involvement. This is because the proportion of 
resource is a critical element when understanding the involvement of NGOs and was 
mentioned by all the respondents from involved NGOs. It is important to notice that, 
despite their engagement in GE, they do not consider GE as a main focus of their work. 
Instead, they would like to be involved as long as a large proportion of their resources are 
not placed on it. In terms of competition, although it is included as the reason why NGOs 
engage, it was also mentioned by respondents when they explained why they noticed GE in 
the first place. 
 
In China, the variable of efficiency is important in understanding the non-involvement of 
INGOs. The respondent effectively indicated that ‘their choice of topics depends on 
whether they can have effective impacts and contributions’. The difference between the 
UK and China is that competition is more influential in determining involvement in the 
UK while it cannot be identified that much in China. That is to say, due to a short 
development history of NGOs in China, lower competition drives NGOs to focus on their 
organizational maintenance, such as acquiring enough funding or attracting members, 
rather than getting involved in novel environmental areas to become more competitive than 
their peers. In addition, lower competition means NGOs in China do not have to specialise 
their goals in GE as they would under high competition. This suggests that low levels of 
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competition can be considered as responsible for the non-involvement of INGOs in China. 
It is also important to point out that only the interviewed INGO in China included 
efficiency and the low level of competition as factors influencing non-engagement with 
GE. However, they do not work in relation to domestic Chinese NGOs.  
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the variables of efficiency and competition 
work in both countries in the context of GE (although they only works in relation to 
INGOs in China). In addition, they are responsible for the intentional involvement and 
non-involvement with GE in the UK and China. In conclusion, in this section, the variables 
of efficiency and competition are identified as key variables that work in both countries, 
which adds to the existing literature that efficiency and competition can be applied in 
transnational comparative studies in capitalist and socialist countries, at least in the case of 
GE. The variable of insider/outsider strategy is surprisingly identified to be less influential 
in determining the involvement or non-involvement of NGOs in the UK, which challenges 
the conclusion in the literature that we should conduct transnational comparative studies 
based on organisational strategy and status. However, it is considered as an important 
element in China. In terms of the variable of mediating, it has been found to play a 
predominant role in determining the engagement and non-engagement in GE in the UK. 	
8.4	Resource	 	
This section will discuss elements of resource: goal, funding and time, information and 
knowledge, and elites as labour resource. From Tables 6.1 and 7.3, the variable of goals is 
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found to be a key factor in both countries as nearly all the respondents from the UK and 
China regarded it as responsible for the involvement and non-involvement of NGOs with 
GE.629 The idea of funding and time was identified as influential in determining the 
situation in the UK;630 in China, it also works but merely for Chinese grassroots NGOs. 
These two variables – goals, funding and time – will be the main focus of discussion in this 
section. In terms of information and knowledge, as well as elites, they are only responsible 
for the non-involvement of Chinese NGOs and cannot be identified in the context of the 
UK. However, the variable of information and knowledge is important in understanding 
the difference between intentional and unconscious choices in the UK and China, and will 
also be discussed in detail in this section. 	
8.4.1 Goals 
As can be apparently discovered from Tables 6.1 and 7.3, the variable of goals plays the 
most important role in both countries. It helps to explain why NGOs engage or do not 
engage in the first place. In the UK, both involved and non-involved NGOs have 
effectively included it as partly responsible for their involvement with GE. As mentioned 
in chapter 7, for example, the respondent from Greenpeace indicated that ‘one of the 
reasons for our involvement is that we are committed to dealing with the problem of 
climate change, and GE is within the remit’. The respondent from TearFund also attributes 
their non-involvement to it, stating that ‘the reason why we did not get involved is because 
GE is outside our remit’. In terms of Chinese NGOs, as analysed in chapter 6, all of the 																																																								629	 As	discussed	in	chapter	5,	according	to	resource	mobilization	theory,	target	goals	of	organisations	link	them	to	specific	social	movements.	630	 Money	and	time	refers	to	material	resource	that	organisations	require	for	their	survival.	
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respondents pointed out that ‘NGOs have settled goals and tend to focus on specific areas 
within their goals’. In addition, they decide target goals in different ways. For example, 
grassroots NGOs rely heavily on the directors of organisations; government-supported 
NGOs depend on government policy. From a comparative perspective, the idea of goals 
can be generally applied to understand different types of NGOs in different countries. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that this variable is in part responsible for the 
involvement and non-involvement of NGOs in both capitalist – the UK – and socialist – 
China – countries in the context of GE. In addition, as the UK NGOs are making strategic 
choices and those of domestic Chinese NGOs are a result of unconsciousness, one could 
further conclude that the variable of goals helps to explain both intentional and 
unconscious involvement and non-involvement with GE. 
8.4.2 Funding and time 
As mentioned in the previous two chapters, funding and time are important to the survival 
and maintenance of organisations. They are key variables in understanding the movements 
concerning GE in both countries. In the UK, funding and time are important elements 
influencing the non-involvement of NGOs. From the empirical data, it can be identified 
that the proportion of distribution of money and time resources is the crucial point in that 
money and time allocated to GE should not be considered as a priority or should not be a 
large proportion. This critical idea can explain the limited engagement of involved NGOs 
in the UK as well. However, in China, it is not applicable for all types of NGOs in that 
only grassroots NGOs included lack of money and time as the explanation for their 
non-involvement. That is to say, due to the difficulty in acquiring money, they prefer not to 
	292	
expand their focus across many areas, such as GE. However, in terms of other types of 
NGOs in China, such as INGOs and government-supported NGOs, funding and time do 
not help to explain their non-involvement as they obtain more sufficient funding support 
than grassroots NGOs. According to the country comparison, the variables of funding and 
time can be applied to both countries, but it is important to point out that while the 
elements can effectively help to explain both involvement and non-involvement in the UK, 
in China they merely help to explain the non-involvement in China. Integrated with the 
conclusion concerning whether it is a strategic choice or unconscious one, one could argue 
that the variables of funding and time are useful in understanding the intentional 
involvement and non-involvement in the UK and the unconscious non-involvement of 
NGOs in China. 
8.4.3 Other variables: information and knowledge, and elites 
The deficit in information and knowledge on GE cannot be identified in terms of UK 
NGOs, as both involved and non-involved NGOs have satisfactory or reasonable 
knowledge. Therefore, it is not applicable in understanding the situation in the UK. 
However, it is an important element to explain the non-involvement of Chinese NGOs. 
According to the empirical data in China, only the interviewed INGO Greenpeace had 
some knowledge and information on GE, while the other respondents knew nothing about 
it at all. All the respondents from domestic Chinese NGOs included the deficit in 
knowledge as the predominant reason why they have not participated, which makes sense 
in that they cannot participate in an area unknown to them like GE. In addition, the deficit 
in knowledge and information is the decisive variable in determining whether their 
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non-involvement is an unconscious result. That is to say, it is the key variable in 
understanding the difference between intentional and unintentional behaviour in the UK 
and China. Therefore, with regard to all UK NGOs and INGOs in China, which make 
strategic choices, the deficit in knowledge is not applicable to them; while in terms of 
domestic Chinese NGOs with a lack of consciousness of GE, this variable is effective in 
understanding their non-involvement. The element of deficit in information and knowledge 
plays a decisive role in affecting the unintentional non-involvement with GE. When it 
comes to the labour resource – elites, it is only identified in grassroots Chinese NGOs in 
that the major disadvantage of this type of NGO is lack of professionalism. It thus does not 
work in relation to the UK NGOs and other types of Chinese NGOs. 
 
In conclusion, from the comparative analysis in this section, the variable of goals has been 
examined as the most important factor responsible for the intentional and unconscious 
involvement and non-involvement in both countries. It adds to the literature that this 
variable can be applied in transnational comparative studies between both capitalist and 
socialist countries. The variable of funding and time has been examined as a key factor in 
influencing the intentional involvement and non-involvement in the UK, but it only works 
for understanding the unconscious non-involvement of grassroots NGOs in China. When it 
comes to the variable of information and knowledge, this has been identified as the key 
factor for Chinese domestic NGOs in explaining the difference between unconscious 
action and a deliberate choice. 
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8.5	Conclusion	
In this part, conclusions will be drawn according to the comparative analysis above. The 
findings will be concluded from two perspectives: first, in terms of the UK and China 
respectively, I will examine which variables play the predominant role in influencing the 
involvement or non-involvement in each country; second, and more importantly, I will 
consider what can be added to the existing literature on transnational comparative studies 
on social movements, especially between capitalist and socialist countries. That is to say, 
what variables can be applied to transnational comparative studies between capitalist and 
socialist countries? In addition, the comparative analysis in this chapter will also add to the 
literature in a way of integrating with the theory on strategic choices in order to develop 
comparative social movements theory. 
 
The first perspective focuses on the UK and China respectively in order to investigate 
which variable or variables play a predominant role in determining the situation in each 
country in the context of GE. In the UK, it can be concluded that contingent factors in 
political opportunity, threat in emotion, mediating, efficiency and competition in strategy, 
goals, funding and time in resource play the main roles in influencing the movements on 
GE. All of these variables can be illustrated as intentional or strategic choices. In China, 
political opportunity structure, public consciousness, goals, information and knowledge are 
identified as the most influential variables concerning non-involvement with GE. The 
variable of goals is responsible for both intentional and unintentional non-involvement in 
China, and is considered as a key factor in determining the non-involvement in the first 
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place. The variable of information and knowledge is partly responsible for unconscious 
non-involvement in China, and is regarded as the main factor in explaining the difference 
between intentional and unconscious involvement. 
 
With regard to transnational comparative studies on social movements, the analysis in this 
chapter helps to add to the existing literature in two ways: first in analysing what variables 
are applicable in the situations in both countries; and second in determining which of these 
are responsible for intentional and unconscious involvement or non-involvement. The 
existing literature proposes three approaches in transnational comparative research: the 
approach of employing the variable of political opportunity structure, the approach of 
focusing on contingent factors of political opportunity, and the third approach based on 
organisational strategy and status. The analysis in this chapter has examined the three 
approaches and found that structural factors cannot be applied to understand the case of 
GE while contingent factors play a predominant role in both capitalist and socialist 
countries like the UK and China. In detail, policymaking and political preference of 
government are the two main contingent factors that are responsible for involvement of 
social movement organisations with GE in both countries. In addition, contingent factors 
are only responsible for the intentional involvement and non-involvement with GE (not 
unconscious actions). In terms of the third approach based on organisational strategy and 
status, it was surprisingly found that this approach cannot help to explain involvement or 
non-involvement in the transnational comparative study between the UK and China, which 
to some extent challenges what has been identified in the literature and implies that GE is a 
more complex case. 
	296	
 
The variables of efficiency and competition under organisational strategy and status work 
in the transnational comparative study between the UK and China in the context of GE. 
They are partly responsible for the intentional involvement and non-involvement with GE. 
The variable of threat, especially the sense of urgency as a reason for threat, is partly 
responsible for the movements on GE in both countries. Furthermore, it helps to explain 
intentional non-involvement of NGOs in the UK and China. In terms of the variable of 
goals, it works in understanding different types of NGOs in both countries. It helps to 
explain both intentional and unconscious involvement and non-involvement with GE. The 
elements of funding and time helps to explain involvement or non-involvement in both 
countries, but it is important to point out that they are useful in illustrating intentional 
involvement and non-involvement in the UK and unconscious non-involvement in China. 
 
The conclusions above contribute to the existing literature on transnational comparative 
studies on contentious politics. In detail, in the context of GE, not only political 
opportunity, but also threat from cultural perspectives, efficiency and competition under 
organisational strategy, goals, funding and time identified from resource mobilisation 
theory, can be useful in understanding social movements in both capitalist (i.e. the UK) 
and socialist (i.e. China) countries. In addition, these variables work differently in affecting 
intentional or unconscious involvement/non-involvement. This can be seen in Table 8.2 
below: 	
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Table	8.2:	Variables	that	work	in	both	countries		 Involvement	or	Non-involvement	 Intentional	or	Unconscious	Contingent	 factors	 in	political	opportunity	 Both	 Intentional	Efficiency	 and	competition	 Both	 Intentional	Threat	 Non-involvement	 Intentional	 	Goals	 Both	 Both	Funding	and	Time	 Both	 Both	
	298	
Chapter	9	Conclusion	
This chapter draws an overall conclusion of the thesis. The first section addresses the 
background within which my research has been carried out, including a discussion on the 
governance system of GE as well as the role of NGOs. Section 9.2 provides a summary of 
the thesis, including issues that have been discussed, how the research questions have been 
answered, and what the findings are. Based on this summary, I go on to expand the issue 
concerning the role of NGOs further to briefly discuss the question of whether they are 
ready to take a role in the governance on GE. The last section focuses on potential for 
future work, namely remaining issues to be solved and what further research might be 
done. 
 
9.1	Background	 	
The thesis concentrates on the issue of GE and discusses NGO participation within a 
broader scope of public participation in governance of GE more generally. Therefore, the 
background of this research concerns potential governance systems for GE. As discussed 
in chapter 2, the issue of governance has been addressed in the literature on GE. Some 
work has focused on the international framework for governing GE technology;631 another 
group of scholars has investigated governance under a national legal framework;632 some 
																																																								631	 For	example,	Redgwell	(n	20);Long	(n	84);	Hansson,	Rayner	and	Wibeck	(n	86).	632	 For	example,	Neil	Craik,	Jason	Blackstock	and	Anna-Maria	Hubert,	‘Regulating	Geoengineering	Research	through	Domestic	Environmental	Protection	Frame-works:	Reflections	on	the	Recent	Canadian	Ocean	Fertilization	Case’	[2013]	CCLR	117;	Armeni	and	Redgwell,	‘Geoengineering	Under	National	Law:	A	Case	Study	of	the	United	Kingdom’	(n	27);	Redgwell	and	Armeni	(n	28).	
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have addressed the research governance of GE research and development;633 others have 
dealt with issues regarding public participation including civil society engagement.634 In 
fact, a governance system for GE is likely to need all these elements – an international 
framework, national legal regimes, research governance and public engagement – to 
provide oversight on the development of GE technology. The 2009 Royal Society report, 
in its section on governance sets out considerations of ethics, international frameworks, 
governance of GE research and development, public engagement as well as economic 
factors.635 A synthetic system integrating all of these elements is likely to be required for 
GE governance. 
 
In terms of the international framework, although a new and dedicated agreement is not 
considered necessary among scholars,636 applying existing treaties and regimes, such as 
UNFCCC, CBD, and LC/LP, in an integrated way seems important. That is to say, 
although some articles in each potential treaty may contribute to regulating GE, how to 
integrate and coordinate them in practice matters. Some GE related activities which cannot 
be covered by these treaties may be subject to principles in international law. Governing 
GE at national level is also important, either by incorporating international law directly or 
by adjusting it according to domestic circumstances. As this national level of governance 
concerns state sovereignty, it could be complicated to put it into practice, which may 
require cooperation among states. With regard to research governance, which may be 																																																								633	 For	example,	Pyle	and	others	(n	13);	Erin	Tanimura,	‘Geoengineering	Research	Governance:	Foundation,	Form,	and	Forum’	(2013-2014)	37	Environs	Envtl	L	&	Pol'y	J	167.	634	 For	example,	J.	Stilgoe,	Matthew	Waston	and	Kristy	Kuo,	‘Public	Engagement	with	Biotechnologies	Offers	Lessons	for	the	Governance	of	Geoengineering	Research	and	Beyond’	(2013)	11	PLOS	Biology	1;	D.	Scheer	and	O.	Renn,	‘Public	Perception	Of	Geoengineering	And	Its	Consequences	For	Public	Debate’	(2014)	125	Climatic	Change	305.	635	 Shepherd	and	others	(n	11).	636	 Kuokkanen	and	Yanmineva	(n	20);	Parker	(n	90).	
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required much sooner, it depends on the nature and scale of the relevant experiments. 
Indoor experiments and research, such as computer modeling that have been considered 
non-hazardous in the literature,637 could be left to self-regulation by scientists. Field trials, 
which could pose a potential risk to the environment, may be permitted in certain 
circumstance or given a ban.638 Public and civil society involvement is important in the 
decision-making process concerning GE. As stated in the 2009 Royal Society report, any 
GE related activities should not proceed unless a dialogue between scientists, policymakers 
and the public including civil society organisations is included. 639 Therefore, NGO 
engagement is a critical part of ensuring public participation in GE governance. However, 
we have seen that NGOs, as a significant element of GE governance, were not actively 
involved in GE as a policy area in the UK and China. This thesis therefore focuses on the 
role of NGOs to explore why they did not engage with it. After briefly discussing, in this 
section, what the governance system on GE is like and how this research is situated in it, 
the following section then moves on to provide an overall summary of the thesis. 		
9.2	Summary	of	the	thesis	 	
This thesis addresses the issue of why NGOs do or do not become involved in GE as a 
policy area in the UK and China. As discussed above, governance is a key issue in the 
academic literature and public policy concerning GE. Among the elements included in a 
governance system regarding GE technology, according to the 2009 Royal Society report, 																																																								637	 Pyle	and	others	(n	13).	638	 Shepherd	and	others	(n	11).	639	 Ibid.	
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public and civil society organisation participation is important and should be included in 
the decision-making process.640 Scholars have paid attention to this issue concerning the 
public and civil society in GE and discussed it in the existing literature within 
environmental law and related fields. However, the issue of NGOs’ participation stands out 
due to their limited involvement. It is thus meaningful to investigate the reasons for 
engagement or non-engagement of NGOs with GE as a policy area. Although public 
participation has long been an interest of study, the literature has paid little attention to the 
causes of participation. The thesis contributes to the existing literature by way of adding a 
consideration of why certain groups participate or not in particular areas of environmental 
law and policy.  
 
The thesis is generally based on the literature on public participation in environmental law. 
The main research question of the thesis is ‘why do NGOs participate in GE or not in the 
UK and China?’ In order to explore the causes of participation, qualitative interviews were 
employed as the research method of the thesis: notably in-depth interviews were conducted 
among environmental NGOs in the UK and China. Through in-depth qualitative interviews, 
empirical data concerning respondents’ opinions of GE, whether their organisations have 
engaged with GE, and why they participate or not in GE as a policy area were collected. In 
relation to the research design, it is a comparative design aiming to compare the two 
contrasting cases to explore explanations for differences and identify similarities 
applicable in both countries. Based on the empirical data, the thesis employs the literature 
on social movements, interest groups and governance in public policy to generate variables 																																																								640	 Ibid.	
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for analysing the relevant data, which were set out in chapter 5. Variables of context, 
emotion, strategy, and resource are identified in these strands of literature and each of them 
consists of sub-elements. The context variable includes elements of openness,641 the 
degree of policy development,642 and public consciousness; the variable of emotion 
consists of threat, blame and willingness to access information; the strategy variable entails 
an insider/outsider strategy, ceasing to mediate,643 efficiency and competition;644 finally 
the variable of resource includes money, time, information and knowledge, and elites. 
 
Through analysing the data with the variables mentioned above, findings concerning which 
variables help to explain non-involvement or involvement of NGOs in China and the UK 
were identified. Chapter 6 examined four variables with the data on Chinese NGOs to form 
a finding on which variables are important in understanding NGO participation in GE in 
the context of China. In terms of the contextual factors, the variables of openness and 
public consciousness are important in understanding the contextual issues in China when 
discussing NGO participation in GE. The deficit in policy within political opportunity, 
which means that NGOs cannot participate in GE unless there is a dedicated policy on it, 
and the element of salience is only identified and applied in the international NGO 
Greenpeace in China. In terms of the variable of emotion, consideration on whether there 
																																																								641	 Text	to	section	5.2.1.	Openness	refers	to	the	question	whether	a	polity	is	open	or	closed.	642	 Degree	of	policy	development	means	whether	there	is	deficit	in	GE	policy	in	the	UK	and	China.	643	 Text	to	section	5.4.1.	NGOs	can	mediate	public	voices.	However,	However,	this	role	of	NGOs	has	been	criticized	by	scholars	as	controversial	because	it	is	possible	for	NGOs	to	stop	mediating	and	to	define	public	interests	by	themselves.	NGOs	being	reluctant	to	talk	about	GE	is	a	way	of	them	ceasing	to	mediate	by	pausing	the	communication	between	government	and	the	public.	644	 Text	to	section	5.2.1.	Based	on	costs	and	benefits	analysis,	NGOs	not	involved	in	GE	are	potentially	attributed	to	the	free	rider	dilemma	that	they	will	be	benefiting	even	if	they	do	not	participate.	Furthermore,	as	GE	is	a	novel	and	specialised	area,	NGOs	can	devote	resources	into	areas	where	they	can	make	contributions	more	efficiently	than	GE.	The	element	of	competition	refers	to	competition	for	finite	resources.	The	more	competitive	the	area	is,	the	more	specialised	and	narrow	the	goals	pursued	by	NGOs,	such	as	GE,	to	make	their	specialised	identities.	
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is a threat as well as framing645 is identified in the international NGO Greenpeace while 
unwillingness to access information on GE is identified in grassroots Chinese NGOs. In 
relation to the variables of strategy, efficiency and competition, I concluded that these are 
important in affecting the involvement of the international NGO rather than other Chinese 
NGOs. The ideas of goals, elites, money and time are identified as crucial factors in 
affecting NGO participation but work differently between the international NGO and 
Chinese NGOs. Furthermore, the element of information deficit was only identified in 
domestic Chinese NGOs. Furthermore, it was found that the international NGO makes 
strategic choices to not engage in GE while the non-involvement of Chinese NGOs is more 
an unintentional consequence without even noticing the area of GE rather than a strategic 
one.  
 
In chapter 7, findings were stated in relation to the UK. Variables or elements of political 
opportunity, threat and blaming, mediating, efficiency and competition, funding and time, 
and goals appear to explain both involved and non-involved of NGOs. However, some of 
the variables need clarification when understanding both types. Political opportunity, 
especially contingent or non-structural factors, contributes to explaining both types of 
NGOs. The Paris Agreement, as an important contingent event, influences both 
involvement and non-involvement of NGOs due to their different understandings of the 
1.5-degree target in the agreement. The idea of general political preference of the 
government, also as a contingent factor, only explains non-involvement. In terms of threat, 
it was mentioned by almost all the respondents. However, the power of the negative or 																																																								645	 Text	to	section	6.2.2.	Framing	including	sub-elements	of	naming,	centrality,	and	experiential	commensurability	can	help	to	explain	NGOs’	non-involvement	in	China.	
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collective bads646 only contributes to explaining why NGOs engage; while technological 
fear can only help to understand why NGOs do not engage.647 In addition, the sense of 
urgency contributes merely to non-involvement. In terms of efficiency and competition, 
efficiency contributes to non-involvement as well as limited involvement of NGOs in the 
UK; and competition contributes to the explanations of both involvement and why they 
noticed and followed the topic in the first place. In addition, funding, time and goals are 
the most frequently mentioned elements applying to both types of NGOs. There are 
variables contributing to only one type of NGO (either involved or non-involved NGOs): 
public consciousness and importance can only help to explain non-involvement of NGOs 
in the UK. Furthermore, both involvement and non-involvement of NGOs in the UK can 
be considered as intentional and the deliberate outcome of strategic choices.  
 
After exploring the reasons in each country, the thesis then focused on a comparative study 
between the UK and China as well as across different NGOs, which was covered in 
chapter 8. In detail, policymaking and political preference of government are the two main 
contingent factors that are responsible for involvement of social movement organisations 
with GE in both countries. The variables of efficiency and competition under 
organisational strategy and status work in a transnational comparative study between the 
UK and China in the context of GE. They are partly responsible for the intentional 
involvement and non-involvement with GE. The variable of threat, especially the sense of 
urgency as a reason for threat, is partly responsible for the involvement of movements on 																																																								646	 Text	to	section	5.3.	Collective	bads	means	people	are	more	motivated	to	join	a	group	to	prevent	a	bad	consequence	than	achieving	a	good	outcome.	647	 Text	to	section	7.2.1.	People	with	technological	fear	have	great	concerns	about	the	uncertainties	and	side	effects	of	a	new	technology,	such	as	GE,	and	tend	to	stay	clear	of	it.	This	can	effectively	help	to	explain	the	non-involvement	of	NGOs	in	the	UK.	
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GE in both countries. Furthermore, it helps to explain intentional non-involvement of 
NGOs in the UK and China. In terms of the variable of goals, it works in understanding 
different types of NGOs in both countries. It helps to explain both intentional and 
unconscious involvement and non-involvement with GE. The elements of funding and 
time helps to explain involvement or non-involvement in both countries, but it is important 
to point out that they are useful in illustrating intentional involvement and 
non-involvement in the UK and unconscious non-involvement in China. These conclusions 
regarding comparison contribute to the existing literature on transnational comparative 
studies in that, at least in the context of GE, not only political opportunity but also other 
variables can be useful in understanding social movements in both capitalist and socialist 
countries such as the UK and China.648  
 
In summary, the overall contribution of the thesis is three-fold. It adds to the literature on 
social movements, interest groups and public policy by concentrating on whether NGOs 
make strategic choices on becoming involved in GE or not and why. It also contributes to 
the future governance framework of GE by understanding what may lead NGOs, as a 
potentially critical part of this framework, to become involved. Aside from this, the thesis 
makes a contribution in an empirical way by mapping the picture of NGO involvement 
with GE in the UK and China.  	
																																																								648	 Other	variables	include	threat from cultural perspectives, efficiency and competition under organisational strategy, 
goals, funding and time identified from resource mobilisation theory.	
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9.3	Are	NGOs	ready	to	take	a	role	in	governing	GE?	 	
The thesis addresses the issue regarding the causes of NGO participation in the UK and 
China in order to understand why NGOs have not taken a role in GE. In this regard, one 
could move forward a little to consider the question of whether NGOs are ready to take a 
role in governing GE. This needs to be discussed in terms of the two countries respectively. 
In order to answer this question, what kind of role is referred to needs to be addressed first. 
As the basis of discussion in this thesis is in relation to public participation, the role of 
NGOs will also be considered in this field. That is to say, this section will address the 
question whether NGOs in the UK and China are ready to take a role in public 
participation.  
 
Section 2.2.1 focused on a review of the general role of UK NGOs in political and legal 
processes, and public participation. In terms of improving public participation, NGOs have 
been a critical facilitator in the UK. In order to foster openness of participation, it is seen as 
important to let various voices including NGOs be heard at different stages of the 
decision-making process.649 There are two ways of having public voices heard: through 
individuals directly and via representative NGOs indirectly. According to the report 
released by the UK House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, there is a 
difficulty in engaging the public with complicated issues which require sufficient 
information, as the general level of scientific education in the general public is low.650 As 
the ordinary public often trusts NGOs more than the government, they have been 																																																								649	 Brownsword	and	Goodwin	(n	384).	650	 Ibi	Committee;	Brownsword	and	Goodwin	(n	384).	
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successful in shaping public opinion and mobilizing members.651 They also contribute to 
public debates and generate publicity for issues and coordinate or undertake research.652 It 
seems that NGOs not only represent the ordinary public, but also shape and mediate public 
voices, and can be described as a bridge between the government and the ordinary public. 
This general mediating role of NGOs in the UK raises a question: are they ready for this 
role in GE specifically? I will go on to address this question below. 
 
The inspiration for doing this research is identifying a lack of NGO engagement with GE 
as a policy area in the UK. Therefore the initial hypothesis regarding the role of NGOs is 
that they did not take a mediating role in governing GE. However, after analysis of the 
empirical data, it is surprisingly to find out that NGOs in the UK turn out to have played 
this role, and their non-involvement is actually the result of it. That is to say, NGOs in the 
UK were strategically using this mediating role by not engaging with GE to prevent the 
general public from focusing on it. As discussed in section 7.3.2, NGOs being reluctant to 
talk about GE is a form of ceasing to mediate between the government and the public and 
avoiding placing attention on GE. They stop mediating by staying clear of GE rather than 
shaping the debates. Therefore, one could argue that NGOs in the UK were ready, or more 
precisely, have in fact taken a mediating role in governing GE. 
 
Section 2.2.2 reviewed the role of NGOs in China discussed in the existing literature. With 
regard to public participation, NGOs have in recent years contributed to making China’s 
																																																								651	 Hilton	and	others	(n	109).	652	 Nurse	(n	115).	
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environmental governance a more open process.653 They are increasingly contributing to 
the emergence of a pluralistic civil society and no longer restrict their role to 
uncontroversial service provision. They thus tend to act as an arena for pluralistic debate. 
Despite this, NGOs in China are considered, in the existing literature, as lacking both 
strength and independence to pressure the state to move in a more democratic direction. 
The overall context for NGOs in China has been discussed in section 6.1: civil society, 
which has a relatively short history of development, is not mature enough in China 
compared with that in the UK. Government has shown a contradictory attitude towards 
NGOs: on the one hand, NGOs’ role in providing social services can be considered as a 
complement to governmental functions in some areas such as caring for the disabled; on 
the other hand, authorities have fears and suspicions regarding some NGOs which they 
consider may contribute to social instability and hence, exert a strict control over their 
activities.654 This suspicion can also be illustrated as lack of trust in NGOs and result in a 
constraint on their development. Different types of NGOs have received different 
restrictions from the government. INGOs may be afraid to exert pressure on the 
government for fear of the fact that they could get ‘kicked out’. Illustrative of this is that, 
in early 2017, the Chinese government tightened control over INGOS, which was 
described as a crackdown against foreign forces.655 Domestic Chinese NGOs rely on the 
government in terms of funding and operations to some extent so that they too may be 
afraid to exert pressure.  
 																																																								653	 Tang	and	Zhan	(n	140).	654	 Li	(n	428).	655	 Rob	McBride,	‘New	Chinese	Law	Tightens	Control	Over	NGOs’	(2017)	 	<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/china-ngo-law-170101083414954.html>	accessed	1	January	2017.	
	 309	
In this regard, I would argue that NGOs in China are still far away from achieving a 
mediating role in general as well as in GE specifically. As mediating concerns interactions 
with the government and the general public, this can be explained in a two-fold way. As 
discussed above, NGOs in China may not be effective in influencing the government, as 
they are restricted or need to rely on it. In terms of representing the general public, 
government-supported NGOs seem to speak for the government and mainly work in areas 
where the government wants them to; although grassroots NGOs may have more 
interactions with the general public, they hardly seek to shape the public voices and instead 
let the voices be heard or taken in by the government unmediated. Therefore, it is 
challenging for NGOs to play a mediating role in China in general. With regard to GE 
specifically, according to the analysis of empirical data in Chapter 6, they did not have a 
role in it. For example, grassroots NGOs did not have any knowledge or information on 
GE and lack expertise in dealing with scientific issues; government-supported NGOs did 
not step into the area of GE due to the deficit in GE policy from the government. It may be 
more challenging for NGOs to take a role in a novel area like GE. However, they now need 
to start to consider how they can be involved in GE. This is because the on-going National 
Research Project on GE funded by the Chinese government implies that China has entered 
into this area. It may require public participation in the decision-making process which 
NGOs need to be ready for. 
9.4	Potential	for	future	work	 	
This research has its originality in exploring the causes of NGO participation regarding GE 
in the UK and China. It involves empirical elements, namely qualitative interviews, to 
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provide data for analysis. However, there were some difficulties in conducting in-depth 
interviews in practice. As mentioned in section 3.3.6, the first aspect of difficulty lay in 
accessing participants. As the respondents needed to speak for the organisations they 
represent, it was better to invite directors or staff members with high positions in these 
groups. Although most of the interviewed respondents were directors in their organisations, 
there was a difficulty in accessing chief directors in some large NGOs, such as Greenpeace. 
Another obstacle in approaching potential participants is that, especially in China, people 
turned down my request for an interview in the first place when they heard about the topic 
of GE, as they were reluctant to make comments if they had little knowledge on it. It takes 
time to persuade people to participate to talk about why they do not engage with GE and 
some still refused to be interviewed in the end. The second aspect of difficulty was 
conducting interviews in different national contexts as well as a time issue. As mentioned 
earlier, this research involves a comparison between the UK and China. Due to the 
different situation concerning GE in the two countries, as well as the different languages 
required, it was difficult to arrange all the interviews in both countries in a relative short 
period of time to situate responses in different social contexts. In addition, translating the 
transcripts of interviews in China required considerable time, and also the accuracy of 
translation matters when understanding their responses.  
 
Due to the difficulties mentioned above, there is still a remaining issue concerning this 
research. The access issue and limited time led to a situation that this research was not able 
to include a large number of respondents. Instead, although I tried to interview as many 
eligible respondents as I could, it was still relatively a small number of them. However, as 
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discussed in section 3.3.2, a small-N approach is not a substantial problem concerning 
interpretivist qualitative studies. An advantage of small number approaches is that they 
have better internal validity and measurement validity,656 which means the approaches 
allow more in-depth study into what we want to explore.657 However, it has problems with 
generalising, which means the findings cannot be over generalised among all groups in the 
UK and China. Therefore, the remaining issue is that more NGOs can be included in this 
research to make a more generalised conclusion, which is likely to be one of my 
post-doctoral research focuses. 
 
There are also related research areas which can be explored for future studies. My research 
addresses the role of NGOs regarding GE in the UK and China with a specific focus on the 
causes of their engagement. In this regard, future research could focus on how they should 
engage and contribute to GE governance, namely what role they should play in it. This 
potential research angle will add a normative element to the thesis. Another potential focus 
might be studies on NGOs in different countries. As mentioned in section 3.3.6, the thesis 
employs a ‘most-different design’ including the UK and China, which refers to a method 
examining cases as different as possible to identify similar factors influencing these 
different cases. Future research could be done within, for example, the US and the UK 
which are the two leading countries in GE research and public policy, to achieve a 
‘most-similar design’ aiming to identify differences between them. There is also a potential 
																																																								656	 Internal	validity,	as	opposed	to	external	validity	was	introduced	by	Campbell	in	1957.	Internal	validity	aims	to	deal	with	the	question	of	whether	‘a	treatment	had	an	effect	in	a	given	study’	while	external	validity	addresses	the	issue	of	whether	this	effect	could	be	generalised.	See	Campbell	(n	272);	Reichardt	(n	272).	Measurement	validity	relates	to	the	concern	whether	operationalization	‘adequately	reflect	the	concept	the	research	seeks	to	measure’.	See	Adcock	and	Collier	(n	272).	657	 Baker	and	Edwards	(n	241).	
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research angle concerning the role of the ordinary public in GE governance. The thesis 
explored the reasons why NGOs became involved or not in GE as a policy area to 
contribute to the literature on public participation. Within the area of public participation, 
previous research has been carried out in terms of exploring public perceptions of GE.658 
Future research may concentrate on the ordinary public to investigate the causes of their 
engagement or non-engagement. However, this kind of research typically involves a 
quantitative element to include a large number of participants, which may require a long 
period of time.
																																																								658	 Scheer	and	Renn	(n	635).	
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